423 U.S. 96 (1975)
On April 8, 1971, Richard Bert Mosley was arrested in Detroit, Michigan, in connection with robberies at the Blue Goose Bar and the White Tower Restaurant.1 Detective James Cowie of the Armed Robbery Section advised Mosley of his Miranda rights, and Mosley read and signed a notification form.2 Cowie questioned Mosley about the White Tower Restaurant robbery for approximately twenty minutes, during which Mosley stated he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies.3 Cowie immediately ceased the interrogation, and Mosley was taken to a ninth-floor cell block.4
Shortly after 6 p.m. the same day, Detective Hill of the Homicide Bureau brought Mosley to the fifth-floor Homicide Bureau office to question him about the January 9, 1971, fatal shooting of Leroy Williams outside the 101 Ranch Bar.5 Hill advised Mosley of his Miranda rights, which Mosley read silently and aloud before signing the form.6 Mosley initially denied involvement, but after Hill told him that Anthony Smith had confessed and named Mosley as the shooter, Mosley made an incriminating statement implicating himself in the homicide.7 The second interrogation lasted approximately fifteen minutes.8
Mosley was charged with first-degree murder.9 Before trial he moved to suppress the incriminating statement on the ground that it had been obtained in violation of his Miranda rights because questioning had resumed after he declined to answer questions about the robberies.10 The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, the statement was introduced at trial, and the jury convicted Mosley of first-degree murder, imposing a mandatory life sentence.11
On appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the second interrogation constituted a per se violation of Miranda.12 The Michigan Supreme Court denied further appeal.13 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper interpretation of Miranda with respect to the resumption of questioning after a person in custody has exercised the right to remain silent.14
Whether the Miranda principle that interrogation must cease once a person in custody indicates a desire to remain silent creates a per se proscription of any further interrogation?15
The Miranda opinion does not impose a per se proscription of any further interrogation once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent.16 The Court recognized that the accused may validly waive his rights even after asserting them and did not impose an absolute ban on further police-initiated questioning after the accused has asserted his Miranda rights.17
No. The Miranda opinion itself indicates that the Court did not intend to create a per se rule, as it stated that the defendant may waive effectuation of these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.18 Applying the rule to the established facts shows that Mosley was arrested on April 8, 1971, advised of his Miranda rights by Detective Cowie, and questioned about the White Tower Restaurant robbery for approximately twenty minutes before stating he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies.19
Cowie immediately ceased the interrogation, and Mosley was taken to a ninth-floor cell block with no claim that the initial procedures failed to comply with Miranda.20 Shortly after 6 p.m. the same day, Detective Hill brought Mosley to the fifth-floor Homicide Bureau office and advised him of his Miranda rights again, which Mosley read silently and aloud before signing the form.21
Mosley initially denied involvement in the Leroy Williams homicide but made an incriminating statement after Hill mentioned Anthony Smith's confession naming Mosley as the shooter.22 The second interrogation lasted approximately fifteen minutes, during which Mosley did not ask for a lawyer or indicate unwillingness to discuss the homicide.23
Mosley was charged with first-degree murder, moved to suppress the statement on Miranda grounds, and the trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing.24 The statement was introduced at trial, resulting in a first-degree murder conviction and life sentence.25 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding the second interrogation a per se violation of Miranda, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper interpretation.26
The facts demonstrate that the police respected Mosley's initial assertion by immediate cessation without persuasion or badgering, satisfying the recognition in Miranda that waivers remain possible after assertion.27
The Miranda principle does not create a per se proscription of any further interrogation.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurred in the result and agreed that the police scrupulously honored Mosley's assertion of his right to remain silent.29 He noted that the police ceased questioning immediately after Mosley indicated he did not want to answer questions about the robbery and did not badger him or engage in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance.30 The second interrogation occurred after a significant lapse of time, was conducted by a different officer about an unrelated crime, and did not violate the Miranda rule.31
White emphasized that Miranda places a heavy burden on the government to show a knowing and intelligent waiver but does not require a per se prohibition on resumption after a proper initial assertion.32
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, arguing that the Court's decision undermines the Miranda rule by allowing police to resume interrogation after a brief pause so long as they give the Miranda warnings again.33 He contended that Miranda requires all interrogation to cease once a person indicates a desire to remain silent and permits resumption only if the person in custody initiates further communication.34
Brennan warned that the ruling would allow repeated rounds of interrogation that undermine the protections Miranda sought to provide against the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation, and he would affirm the Michigan Court of Appeals judgment.
Justice Marshall joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. He would also point out that the second interrogation in this case was not truly about a "different" crime.35 The murder and the robbery both occurred at the same bar and grill.36
The police had reason to believe that the respondent was involved in both crimes.37 The police should not be allowed to circumvent the Miranda rule by dividing one investigation into multiple parts.38
Whether the admissibility of a statement obtained after a person in custody has decided to remain silent depends on whether the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored?39
The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends upon whether his right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously honored.40 This requires that the police immediately cease interrogation upon assertion, resume only after a significant period of time has elapsed, provide fresh warnings, and limit the second interrogation to a different crime without badgering.
Yes. The critical safeguard identified in Miranda is a person's right to cut off questioning, which counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting by allowing the individual to control the time, subjects, and duration of interrogation.41 Applying the rule to the established facts, Detective Cowie immediately ceased questioning when Mosley declined to answer about the robberies and made no effort to resume or persuade him to reconsider.42
After an interval of more than two hours, a different officer, Detective Hill, questioned Mosley at a different location about an unrelated homicide.43 Hill gave full and complete Miranda warnings at the outset, Mosley read and signed the form, and the questioning focused exclusively on the Leroy Williams homicide rather than the robberies.44
These steps ensured that the subsequent questioning did not undercut Mosley's previous decision and that his right to cut off questioning was fully respected without any repeated efforts to wear down his resistance.45 The contrast with Westover v. United States, where warnings came only at the end of prolonged interrogation, further confirms that the procedures here complied with the scrupulous-honoring standard.46
Because the right was scrupulously honored, the incriminating statement was admissible under Miranda principles.47
The admissibility of the statement depends on whether the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored, and here it was.48
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurred that the police scrupulously honored the respondent's assertion of his right to remain silent.49 He stressed that they ceased questioning immediately after Mosley indicated he did not want to answer any questions about the robbery and did not engage in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance.50 The second interrogation after a significant lapse of time by a different officer about an unrelated crime satisfied the Miranda rule without implying that all post-assertion statements must be suppressed absent some magical time period.51
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented that the procedures approved by the Court fail to provide assurance that a confession is not obtained under the influence of the compulsion inherent in interrogation and detention.52 He argued that as to statements which are the product of renewed questioning, Miranda established a virtually irrebuttable presumption of compulsion.53 Miranda established a virtually irrebuttable presumption of compulsion for statements that are the product of renewed questioning.54
Brennan maintained that adequate procedures such as arraignment or presence of counsel are necessary before resumption to eliminate the coercive atmosphere.55
Justice Marshall joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. He would also point out that the second interrogation in this case was not truly about a "different" crime. The murder and the robbery both occurred at the same bar and grill.
The police had reason to believe that the respondent was involved in both crimes. The police should not be allowed to circumvent the Miranda rule by dividing one investigation into multiple parts.