545 U.S. 211 (2005)
Thomas Joe Miller-El was convicted of capital murder in a Texas state court following a robbery at a Holiday Inn in Dallas in late 1985.1
During that robbery, Miller-El and his accomplices bound and gagged two hotel employees and Miller-El shot each twice in the back, killing one and leaving the other a paraplegic.2 The jury that convicted Miller-El and sentenced him to death was selected after prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove ten of the eleven qualified black members of the 108-person venire panel.3
Miller-El first challenged the strikes under Swain v. Alabama. He presented evidence at a pretrial hearing that included testimony from nine witnesses about practices in the Dallas County District Attorney's Office and excerpts from newspaper articles and a manual on jury selection.4
After this Court decided Batson v. Kentucky while Miller-El's direct appeal was pending, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for a Batson hearing.5 At that hearing before the same trial judge, the prosecution offered race-neutral explanations for its strikes.6 Miller-El did not even attempt to rebut the State's racially neutral reasons at the hearing. He presented no evidence and made no arguments.7 The trial court accepted the prosecutors' explanations as credible and found no purposeful discrimination.8 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that determination.9
Miller-El then pursued federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, again raising his Batson claim.10 The federal district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.11 This Court granted certiorari, reversed the denial of the certificate of appealability in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), and remanded for further proceedings.12 On remand the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability but rejected the Batson claim on the merits.13 This Court again granted certiorari to review that decision.14
The evidence Miller-El presented included the voir dire transcript showing prosecutors' use of jury shuffles when black panelists were seated near the front.15 Prosecutors used a graphic script describing lethal injection with 53% of black panelists but only 6% of white panelists.16 They informed 94% of white venire members of the statutory minimum sentence but only 12.5% of African-American venire members.17 Prosecutors also marked the race of each prospective juror on their juror cards, and the Dallas County District Attorney's Office had a documented history of excluding black venire members from juries.18
Whether the state court’s rejection of Miller-El’s Batson claim resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding?19
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2).20 The state court’s factual findings are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence under §2254(e)(1).21 In evaluating a Batson claim, the court must consider the totality of the facts about a prosecutor's conduct during the defendant's own trial.22 This includes statistical evidence of strikes, side-by-side comparisons of struck and accepted jurors, disparate questioning, jury shuffles, and historical practices of the prosecutor’s office.
Yes. The statistical evidence shows that prosecutors used peremptory strikes against 91% of the eligible black venire members, a disparity unlikely to have happened by chance.23 Side-by-side comparisons demonstrate that the prosecution's reasons for striking black venire members such as Billy Jean Fields and Joe Warren applied equally to white venire members such as Sandra Hearn who were accepted by the State.24 The prosecution used jury shuffles to move black venire members to the back of the panel.25 Prosecutors used disparate questioning with a graphic script on 53% of black panelists but only 6% of white panelists. They informed 94% of white venire members of the statutory minimum sentence but only 12.5% of African-American venire members. These patterns further support the inference of racial discrimination.26
The documented history of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office systematically excluding black venire members from juries confirms that the prosecutors' strikes were motivated in substantial part by race.27 The state court unreasonably accepted the prosecutors' race-neutral explanations despite this cumulative evidence of pretext and discrimination.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race is a continuing problem in the criminal justice system.31 The practice of using peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of race undermines the integrity of the judicial system and the public’s confidence in the fairness of our courts.32 The Batson framework has not been effective in eliminating this practice.33
He continues to believe that the only way to eliminate the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is to eliminate peremptory challenges altogether.34
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Scalia, J., Joined As To Parts I, Ii, And Iii, And Scalia, J., Joined As To Part Iv
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the state trial court conducted a thorough hearing on Miller-El’s Batson objection and concluded that the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges was not motivated by race.35 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that determination. The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Batson.36
He contended that the majority improperly relied on evidence never presented to the Texas state courts, such as additional juror questionnaires, and that based on the evidence actually presented, the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Batson.37