311 U.S. 457 (1940)
The controversy is over a 1/64th interest in profits from operation of Colorado oil properties.1 Transcontinental on August 31, 1922, contracted to pay Meyer 4/64ths of those profits.2 Milliken asserted a claim to a two-thirds interest in that 4/64ths share.3 As a settlement of that dispute Transcontinental on May 3, 1924, contracted to pay Milliken a 2/64ths interest and Milliken assigned to Transcontinental all his claims against Meyer pertaining to the lands in question and to Meyer’s 4/64ths interest in the profits.4
Later Milliken instituted suit in the Wyoming court alleging a joint adventure with Transcontinental and Meyer and charging a conspiracy on their part to defraud him of his rights.5 He sought a cancellation of the contracts of May 3, 1924, and an accounting from Transcontinental and Meyer.6 Meyer, who was asserted to be a resident of Wyoming, was personally served with process in Colorado pursuant to the Wyoming statutes but he made no appearance in the Wyoming cause.7 Transcontinental appeared and answered.8 On July 11, 1931, the court entered an in personam judgment against Meyer for the profits which Meyer had withheld from Milliken, together with interest thereon, and enjoined Transcontinental from paying, and Meyer from receiving, more than 3/64ths of the net profits.9 Thereafter the 1/64th share was withheld from Meyer and paid over to Milliken.10
In 1935 respondent instituted this suit in the Colorado court praying, inter alia, for a judgment against Milliken for the sums withheld under the Wyoming judgment and paid to Milliken, for an injunction against Milliken attempting to enforce the Wyoming judgment, and for a decree that the Wyoming judgment was a nullity for want of jurisdiction over Meyer or his property.11 The bill alleged, inter alia, that Meyer at the time of service in the Wyoming court had long ceased to be a resident of Wyoming and was a resident of Colorado.12 Milliken’s answer alleged, inter alia, that Meyer was a resident of Wyoming at the time of the Wyoming action and that the Wyoming judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado under the federal constitution.13 The Colorado court, on issues joined, found that Meyer was domiciled in Wyoming when the Wyoming suit was commenced, that the Wyoming statutes for substituted service were constitutional, that the affidavit for constructive service on Meyer was filed in good faith, substantially conformed to the Wyoming statute and stated the truth, and that the bill should be dismissed.14
That judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of Colorado.15 It did not pass on the question of whether or not the Wyoming court had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter.16 It held that the Wyoming decree was void on its face because of an irreconcilable contradiction between the findings and the decree.17
Whether a judgment rendered in one state may be challenged in another for want of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter?18
Where a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter is of course open to inquiry.19 But if the judgment on its face appears to be a record of a court of general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction over the cause and the parties is to be presumed unless disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by the record itself.20 In such case the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based.21
Yes. The rule permits a limited inquiry into jurisdiction when a judgment from one state faces challenge in another.22 The ESTABLISHED FACTS show that the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court without addressing jurisdiction and instead found the Wyoming decree void due to inconsistency between findings and decree.23 That approach exceeds the scope of permissible review under the rule because the facts establish that the Wyoming court was one of general jurisdiction whose judgment must be presumed valid absent extrinsic disproof of jurisdiction.24
A judgment rendered in one state may be challenged in another for want of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter but not on grounds of internal inconsistency once jurisdiction is established.25
Whether the Wyoming court had jurisdiction over Meyer based on his domicile in Wyoming at the time of the suit and the substituted service employed?26
Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.27 The adequacy of such substituted service, so far as due process is concerned, depends on whether the form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.28
Yes. Domicile supplies the constitutional foundation for personal jurisdiction through substituted service when the method used gives reasonable notice.29 The ESTABLISHED FACTS record that the Colorado trial court found Meyer domiciled in Wyoming when the suit commenced, that the Wyoming statutes for substituted service were constitutional, that the affidavit for constructive service substantially conformed to the statute and stated the truth, and that personal service occurred in Colorado pursuant to those statutes.30 Those facts satisfy every element of the rule because domicile persisted despite absence and the service method provided actual notice.31
The Wyoming court had jurisdiction over Meyer based on his domicile in Wyoming at the time of the suit and the substituted service employed.32
Whether an irreconcilable contradiction between the findings and the decree rendered the Wyoming judgment void on its face?33
If the Wyoming court had jurisdiction over Meyer, the holding by the Colorado Supreme Court that the Wyoming judgment was void because of an inconsistency between the findings and the decree was not warranted.34 The full faith and credit clause precludes any inquiry into the logic or consistency of the decision.35
No. An internal inconsistency does not void a judgment on its face when jurisdiction exists.36 The ESTABLISHED FACTS establish that the Colorado trial court found domicile and valid service, thereby confirming jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of Colorado never disturbed that finding.37 Because jurisdiction was present, the rule forbids using any contradiction between findings and decree as a basis to nullify the judgment.38
An irreconcilable contradiction between the findings and the decree did not render the Wyoming judgment void on its face.39