525 U.S. 83 (1998)
The police first learned of respondents Carter and Johns in 1994 when a confidential informant advised officers that two men were at Thompson's apartment in Eagan, Minnesota, bagging cocaine.1 The informant had observed the men packaging the cocaine in a kitchen area of the apartment.2 Officer Thielen went to the apartment building and looked through a gap in the closed blind, observing the bagging operation for several minutes.3 Carter and Johns had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine and were only there for approximately two and a half hours.4
The police obtained a search warrant for the apartment.5 When respondents left the building in a Cadillac, the police stopped the car a short distance away.6 The police observed a black, zippered pouch and a handgun on the vehicle's floor.7 The police returned to the apartment, found the door ajar, entered, and arrested Thompson.8
A further search of the apartment revealed cocaine residue on a scale, plastic bags, and a pager.9 Respondents were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime and aiding and abetting in a controlled substance crime.10 They moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the search of the apartment and the Cadillac.11 The trial court denied the motions.12
After a jury trial, respondents were convicted.13 The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.14 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that respondents had standing to claim Fourth Amendment protection.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.16
Whether respondents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment sufficient to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment?17
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches of their persons and houses.18 An individual must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place that society recognizes as reasonable.19 This inquiry examines whether the claimant had an actual subjective expectation of privacy with a source outside the Fourth Amendment, such as concepts of real or personal property law or understandings permitted by society.20 An overnight guest in a home may claim such protection because staying overnight is a longstanding social custom serving functions recognized as valuable by society.21 A person present merely for a short-term business transaction does not.22
No. Respondents were present in Thompson's apartment for the sole purpose of packaging cocaine and remained only approximately two and a half hours.23 They had never been to the apartment before and had no previous relationship with Thompson.24 Respondents were there solely for a commercial transaction in exchange for one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine.25 These facts place respondents closer to one merely permitted on the premises than to an overnight guest.26
Respondents lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment and therefore could not invoke the Fourth Amendment to suppress the evidence obtained from the search.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their host's home.28 He explained that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and that the requisite connection is an expectation of privacy society recognizes as reasonable.29 Kennedy noted that most social guests legitimately expect the homeowner to exercise discretion to include or exclude others for the guests' benefit, creating a meaningful tie under social custom.30
In this case, however, respondents established nothing more than a fleeting and insubstantial connection with Thompson's home, using it simply as a convenient processing station for a mechanical act of chopping and packing a substance.31
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court but wrote separately to argue that the case law gives short shrift to the text of the Fourth Amendment.32 He maintained that the phrase their houses means each person has the right to be secure against unreasonable searches in his own house.33 Scalia reviewed founding-era materials and English common law, including Semayne's Case, to show that a person's house is his castle and does not extend to protect a stranger or visitor who takes refuge there.34
He concluded that respondents were not searched in their house under any interpretation bearing a relationship to the well-understood meaning of the Fourth Amendment. He also maintained that the Katz test should not be used to expand constitutional protection beyond the text's enumerated objects.35
Joined by Justices Stevens And Souter
Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that when a homeowner personally invites a guest into her home to share in a common endeavor, whether for conversation, leisure, or business purposes licit or illicit, that guest should share the host's shelter against unreasonable searches and seizures.36 She explained that the power to exclude implies the power to include. The Court's approach places the homeowner's own privacy at risk by tempting police to search without a warrant when they know some potential defendants will lack standing.37 Ginsburg would extend the logic of Olson to shorter-term guests because visiting serves functions recognized as valuable by society and because a guest gains a reasonable expectation of privacy through the host's invitation.38
She would retain judicial surveillance over the warrantless searches the decision allows.39
Whether the police officer's observation through the apartment window violated respondents' Fourth Amendment rights?40
A Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government intrudes upon a legitimate expectation of privacy.41 Observation from a public vantage point generally does not constitute a search. This holds when the precautions taken by the residents would fail against an ordinary passerby, as established in cases permitting aerial observation of curtilage or areas visible from public areas.42
No. Because respondents lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, the Court did not decide whether Officer Thielen's observation through the gap in the blind constituted a search.43 The established facts indicate that Thielen stood outside the apartment's curtilage in an area used by the public for walking, playing, and storing bicycles.44 He observed the activity for several minutes through the gap.45 Even assuming respondents could assert a privacy interest, the observation from a public place where an ordinary passerby could see through the window would not violate the Fourth Amendment under precedents allowing such vantage-point surveillance.46
The Court did not reach the question whether the observation constituted a search because respondents had no legitimate expectation of privacy, and the observation from a public vantage point did not independently violate any protected interest.47
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer addressed this issue directly in his concurrence in the judgment.48 He assumed facts from the record showing the apartment was partly below ground level, that families and the public used the grassy area outside the window, and that Officer Thielen stood one to one and a half feet in front of the window for fifteen minutes looking through venetian blinds.49 Breyer concluded that the officer engaged in no unreasonable search because the location was public and the precautions taken would have failed against an ordinary passerby.50
He noted that confirming the tip from a public vantage point could save an innocent dweller from a warrant-based but physically intrusive search if no illegal activity appeared.51