498 U.S. 146 (1990)
In August 1986, Robert Minnick and James Dyess escaped from a county jail in Mississippi.1
The following day they broke into a mobile home in search of weapons and encountered Ellis Thomas, Lamar Lafferty, and Lafferty's infant son.2 Dyess and Minnick used the stolen weapons to kill Thomas and the senior Lafferty.3 Before the escapees could get away, two young women arrived at the mobile home.4 They were held at gunpoint, then bound hand and foot.5 The fugitives fled in Thomas' truck to New Orleans, continued to Mexico where they fought, and Minnick proceeded alone to California.6
Minnick was arrested in Lemon Grove, California, on a Mississippi warrant some four months after the murders.7 He was taken into custody on Friday, August 22, 1986.8 The day following the arrest, Saturday, two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents came to the jail to interview him.9 The FBI report indicates that the agents read petitioner his Miranda warnings, and that he acknowledged he understood his rights.10 He refused to sign a rights waiver form, however, and said he would not answer very many questions.11 Minnick stated Come back Monday when I have a lawyer, and stated that he would make a more complete statement then with his lawyer present.12
After the FBI interview, an appointed attorney met with petitioner.13 Petitioner spoke with the lawyer on two or three occasions, though it is not clear from the record whether all of these conferences were in person.14 On Monday, August 25, Deputy Sheriff J. C. Denham of Clarke County, Mississippi, came to the San Diego jail to question Minnick.15 Denham advised petitioner of his rights, and petitioner again declined to sign a rights waiver form.16 Petitioner told Denham about the escape and then proceeded to describe the events at the mobile home.17
Minnick was tried for murder in Mississippi.18 He moved to suppress all statements given to the FBI or other police officers, including Denham.19 The trial court denied the motion with respect to petitioner's statements to Denham, but suppressed his other statements.20 Petitioner was convicted on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death.21 On appeal, petitioner argued that the confession to Denham was taken in violation of his rights to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.22 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the claims.23 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 495 U.S. 903 (1990).24
Whether the Fifth Amendment protection of Edwards v. Arizona terminates or is suspended once a suspect has consulted with counsel?25
Once an accused in custody invokes the right to counsel, officials may not reinitiate interrogation until counsel is present during questioning; consultation with counsel does not terminate or suspend this protection under the Edwards rule.26
No. The Edwards rule bars police-initiated interrogation of an accused who has requested counsel unless the accused has counsel present at the time of questioning, and this bar continues regardless of any prior consultation with an attorney.27 In the established facts, Minnick invoked his right to counsel during the FBI interview on August 23, 1986, by stating that the agents should come back Monday when he had a lawyer.28 He then consulted with appointed counsel on two or three occasions over the weekend.29 On August 25, Deputy Sheriff Denham initiated a formal interview at the San Diego jail without counsel present, and Minnick provided a detailed account of the mobile home events after again declining to sign a rights waiver form. Because this questioning was police-initiated after the invocation and occurred without counsel present, the resulting statements violate the Fifth Amendment protection.30
The rule's emphasis on counsel's presence at interrogation derives directly from Miranda and ensures that subsequent statements are not the product of coercive pressures that persist even after an initial consultation.31 Application of the rule to these facts confirms that isolated meetings with counsel outside the interrogation room do not remove the suspect from the protections against further police-initiated questioning.32
The Fifth Amendment protection of Edwards v. Arizona does not terminate or become suspended once a suspect has consulted with counsel, rendering the statements to Denham inadmissible.33
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Scalia dissents on the ground that the Edwards irrebuttable presumption of involuntariness should cease once a suspect has actually consulted with counsel.34 He maintains that after such consultation the suspect knows an advocate is available and has heightened awareness of the right to remain silent, so the presumption that any police-prompted statement is coerced lacks factual basis.35 In these facts, Minnick consulted his attorney multiple times, received explicit advice not to speak or sign waivers, and still chose to respond to Denham after fresh Miranda warnings; Scalia would therefore permit the State to prove a voluntary waiver under the Zerbst standard rather than impose a perpetual bar.36
He views the majority's extension as an unwarranted expansion of prophylaxis that protects suspects from their own decisions rather than from genuine compulsion.37