569 U.S. 141 (2013)
In the early morning hours, a Missouri police officer on highway patrol stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck at approximately 2:08 a.m. after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline.1
The officer noticed several signs that McNeely was intoxicated, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath.2 McNeely acknowledged that he had consumed a couple of beers at a bar, appeared unsteady on his feet when he exited the truck, and performed poorly on a battery of field-sobriety tests before declining to use a portable breath-test device.3
The officer placed McNeely under arrest and began transporting him to the station house.4 When McNeely indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer changed course and took him to a nearby hospital for blood testing without attempting to secure a warrant.5 Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer read McNeely a standard implied consent form explaining that refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to immediate revocation of his driver’s license for one year and could be used against him in a future prosecution under Missouri law.6 McNeely nonetheless refused consent.7
The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample, which was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m.8 Subsequent laboratory testing measured McNeely’s blood alcohol concentration at 0.154 percent.910 McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated.11 He moved to suppress the blood test result, arguing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.12
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the exigency exception did not apply because, apart from the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency in which he could not practicably obtain a warrant.13 The Missouri Court of Appeals stated an intention to reverse but transferred the case directly to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the suppression order.14 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.15
Whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases?16
The Fourth Amendment requires warrants for searches of the person unless a recognized exception such as exigent circumstances applies.17 That exception is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances rather than a categorical per se rule.18 The natural dissipation of alcohol does not by itself create an exigency sufficient to dispense with the warrant requirement in every drunk-driving case.19
No. In the early morning hours a Missouri police officer on highway patrol stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck at approximately 2:08 a.m. after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline.20 The officer noticed bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol.21 McNeely admitted consuming a couple of beers, appeared unsteady, performed poorly on field-sobriety tests, and declined a portable breath test.22
The officer placed McNeely under arrest and began transporting him to the station but changed course to a nearby hospital for blood testing when McNeely indicated he would refuse a breath sample.23 The officer made no attempt to secure a warrant.24 The officer read McNeely a standard implied-consent form warning of license revocation and evidentiary use upon refusal.25 McNeely still declined consent.26
The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample at approximately 2:35 a.m.27 Laboratory testing later showed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.154 percent.28 McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated. He moved to suppress the result on Fourth Amendment grounds.29
The trial court granted suppression because no circumstances beyond ordinary dissipation suggested an emergency preventing a warrant.30 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed after finding this a routine DWI stop without the special facts present in Schmerber.31 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the per se exigency question.32
Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances standard to these specific facts demonstrates that the natural metabolization of alcohol alone did not create an exigency justifying the warrantless blood draw.33 The officer had time and means to seek a warrant.34 The stop involved no accident investigation or other delay-creating events.35 The routine nature of the encounter confirms that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant under the established facts.36
The natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.37
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy joined Parts I, II-A, II-B, and IV of the majority opinion.38 He wrote separately to note that the case as presented did not require detailed consideration of the modified per se approach discussed in Part II-C.39 He emphasized that while every case must be decided on its own facts, the Fourth Amendment analysis in this area remains open to the development of practical rules and guidelines.40
These guidelines could give arresting officers clear instruction in recurring drunk-driving situations.41 Kennedy observed that states and localities are free to adopt procedures meeting Fourth Amendment reasonableness.42 Such procedures provide helpful direction to law enforcement.43
He indicated that the Court might later address a case offering more concrete guidance than the present record permitted.44
Joined by Breyer And Alito, Jj.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Alito, concurred in part and dissented in part.45 He agreed that the state’s proposed per se rule was overbroad but proposed his own categorical approach.46
If there is time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn, the police must seek one.47 If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant, or he applies for one but does not receive a response before blood can be drawn, a warrantless blood draw may ensue. Roberts stressed that the natural dissipation of alcohol creates an ongoing destruction of evidence that qualifies as exigency unless the warrant process can be completed in the available window.48 He faulted the majority for providing insufficient practical guidance to officers facing typical drunk-driving stops.49
Justice Thomas dissented.50 He contended that the body’s natural metabolization of alcohol constitutes an exigent circumstance in every case because it inevitably destroys evidence of the crime.
The rapid destruction of evidence acknowledged by the parties, the majority, and Schmerber’s exigency determination occurs in every situation where police have probable cause to arrest a drunk driver. In turn, that destruction of evidence implicates the exigent-circumstances doctrine.51 He criticized the majority’s totality-of-the-circumstances test as unworkable for officers in the field who lack information about exact intoxication levels or warrant-processing times.
The Court should not adopt a rule that requires police to guess whether they will be able to obtain a warrant before too much evidence is destroyed, for the police lack reliable information concerning intoxication levels or warrant-processing times. Thomas would have held that the warrantless blood test in this case satisfied the Fourth Amendment.52