558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009)
In 2007 Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and Georgia laws.1 According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termination followed an e-mail he sent to a member of Mohawk’s human resources department stating that the company was employing undocumented immigrants.2 At the time Carpenter sent the e-mail, he was unaware that Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit, Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., No. 4:04-cv-00003-HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004), of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws.3
Company officials directed Carpenter to meet with Mohawk’s retained counsel in the Williams case.4 Counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements about the company’s hiring practices.5 When Carpenter refused, Mohawk fired him under what he maintains were false pretenses.6 After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the Williams plaintiffs sought an evidentiary hearing to explore his allegations.7 In its response, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as pure fantasy and recounted the true facts of his dismissal, stating that Carpenter had attempted to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker, that retained counsel had interviewed him during an immediate investigation, and that the company had terminated him for blatantly violating company policy.8
While those events unfolded in the Williams case, discovery proceeded in Carpenter’s separate action.9 Carpenter moved to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision.10 Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege.11 The District Court agreed that the privilege applied but granted the motion to compel after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representations in the Williams case.12 The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).13 The court stayed the ruling to allow Mohawk to pursue other appellate avenues, including a petition for mandamus or an appeal under the collateral order doctrine.14
Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit.15 The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541.16 The Eleventh Circuit also denied the mandamus petition.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.18
Whether disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine?19
Courts of appeals have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. §1291, which encompasses a small class of collateral orders that are conclusive, resolve important questions separate from the merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment, but disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine because postjudgment review and other mechanisms such as certification under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), mandamus, and contempt appeals suffice to protect the privilege.20
No. In 2007 Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and Georgia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termination came after he informed a member of Mohawk’s human resources department in an e-mail that the company was employing undocumented immigrants. At the time, unbeknownst to Carpenter, Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws. Company officials directed Carpenter to meet with the company’s retained counsel in the Williams case, and counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements.
When he refused, Carpenter alleges, Mohawk fired him under false pretenses. After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the plaintiffs in the Williams case sought an evidentiary hearing to explore Carpenter’s allegations. In its response to their motion, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as pure fantasy and recounted the true facts of Carpenter’s dismissal, stating that Carpenter himself had engaged in blatant and illegal misconduct by attempting to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker. While those events were unfolding in the Williams case, discovery was underway in Carpenter’s case.
Carpenter filed a motion to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The District Court agreed that the privilege applied to the requested information but granted Carpenter’s motion to compel disclosure after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representations in the Williams case. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).
Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order within the meaning of Cohen. Effective appellate review can be had by postjudgment review vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material is excluded.21 Other review mechanisms such as section 1292(b) certification, mandamus, and contempt appeals suffice to protect the attorney-client privilege without the costs of allowing collateral order appeals for this category of orders.22
Disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment and in Part II-C of the Court’s opinion.24 He wholeheartedly agreed that Congress’s designation of the rulemaking process as the way to define or refine when a district court ruling is final and when an interlocutory order is appealable warrants the Judiciary’s full respect.25 Justice Thomas would affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment on the ground that any avenue for immediate appeal beyond the three avenues addressed in the Court’s opinion must be left to the rulemaking process.26
He emphasized that the scope of federal appellate jurisdiction is a matter the Constitution expressly commits to Congress.27 He stated that the Cohen doctrine should not be perpetuated through case-by-case adjudication that subordinates the statutory text to judicial policy judgments about costs and benefits.28