401 U.S. 265 (1971)
On September 10, 1960, three days before the New Hampshire Democratic Party’s primary election of candidates for the United States Senate, the Concord Monitor, a daily newspaper in Concord, New Hampshire, published a syndicated “D. C. Merry-Go-Round” column discussing the forthcoming election.1 The column spoke of political maneuvering in the primary campaign, referred to the criminal records of several of the candidates, and characterized Alphonse Roy, one of the candidates, as a “former small-time bootlegger.”2
Roy was not elected in the primary, and he subsequently sued the Monitor Patriot Co. and the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA), the distributor of the column, for libel.3
The newspaper and NANA offered “truth” as their primary defense at trial, and evidence was presented on the issue of whether or not Roy had in fact been a bootlegger during the prohibition era.4 The defendants also alleged that they had published in good faith, without malice, with a reasonable belief in the probable truth of the charge, and on a lawful occasion.5 At the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury at great length on the law to be applied to the case.6
The jury returned a verdict of $20,000, of which $10,000 was against the newspaper and $10,000 against NANA.7 On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional issues presented by the case.9
Whether the actual malice standard applies to a libel claim brought by a candidate for the United States Senate?10
The First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a public official or candidate from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct or fitness for office.11 Recovery is allowed only if the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.12
Yes. Roy was a candidate for the United States Senate in the New Hampshire Democratic primary when the Concord Monitor published the column three days before the election characterizing him as a former small-time bootlegger.13 The established facts show that Roy subsequently sued the newspaper and NANA for libel after losing the primary, and the trial court treated him as a public official while instructing the jury on the public-private distinction.14 The rule therefore extends the actual malice requirement to statements about candidates.15
This follows because the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to the conduct of campaigns for political office, and the bootlegger charge concerned a matter that might touch on fitness for office.16
The actual malice standard applies to the libel claim brought by the candidate for the United States Senate.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurred in the judgment for the reasons set out in his concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, his concurring and dissenting opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, and Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Garrison v. Louisiana.18 He dissented from those portions of the opinions which would permit the libel cases to be tried again under a different set of jury instructions.19 Justice Black maintained that it is time for the Court to abandon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.20
He urged adoption of the rule to the effect that the First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments.21
Whether a jury may determine under a preponderance standard that a charge of prior criminal conduct against a candidate concerns private rather than public matters and therefore falls outside the actual malice requirement?22
A charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fitness for office for purposes of application of the knowing falsehood or reckless disregard rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and a jury may not be permitted to make its own unguided determination of relevance under a preponderance standard.23
No. The jury returned a verdict of $20,000 after being instructed to decide whether the bootlegger charge was a public affair on a par with official conduct or instead a private matter, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed that approach.24 The established facts demonstrate that the trial judge allowed the jury to apply a lower standard of liability if it found the publication fell in the private sector.25 Yet the constitutional rule requires that the actual malice standard govern regardless of any jury finding on relevance.26 A standard of relevance is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of suppressing protected political speech.27
A jury may not determine under a preponderance standard that a charge of prior criminal conduct against a candidate concerns private rather than public matters and therefore falls outside the actual malice requirement.28