475 U.S. 412 (1986)
On the evening of June 29, 1977, Brian Burbine was arrested by Cranston, Rhode Island, police officers in connection with a local burglary after Detective Ferranti received information from a confidential informant linking a man known as "Butch" living at a specific address to an earlier murder.1
Burbine, who lived at that address and was known by that name, was taken to the Cranston police station where Cranston detectives advised him of his Miranda rights; he initially refused to sign a written waiver form.2
At approximately 7:45 p.m. that same evening, Burbine's sister telephoned the Public Defender's Office in Providence to request legal assistance for her brother on the breaking-and-entering charge.3 Attorney Allegra Munson from that office telephoned the Cranston police station at 8:15 p.m., identified herself as Burbine's counsel, and was told by an officer that the police would not be questioning Burbine or placing him in a lineup and that they were through with him for the night.4
Munson was not informed that Providence police were present or that Burbine was a suspect in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey.5 Less than an hour later, three Providence detectives arrived at the Cranston station and began questioning Burbine about the murder.6
Prior to each of three interview sessions, Burbine was advised of his Miranda rights, and on three separate occasions he signed written forms acknowledging that he understood his rights and expressly waiving them; he then provided three written statements admitting responsibility for the murder.7 At no time during the questioning was Burbine informed that his sister had retained an attorney for him or that Attorney Munson had telephoned the station.8
Prior to trial in Rhode Island Superior Court, Burbine moved to suppress the statements.9 The trial court denied the motion, finding that Burbine had been fully advised of his Miranda rights, had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them, and that the statements were voluntary.10 Burbine was convicted of first-degree murder.11 The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether the police's failure to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him affects the validity of his waiver of Miranda rights?13
The Miranda warnings are designed to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.14 A suspect who has been informed of his Miranda rights and who has indicated that he understands those rights may waive them provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.15 Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.16 Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.17
No. Burbine was fully advised of his Miranda rights on three separate occasions by the Providence detectives after they arrived at the Cranston station.18 He indicated that he understood those rights and signed written waiver forms on each occasion before providing the three incriminating statements.19 The attorney telephone call from Allegra Munson occurred outside Burbine's presence and was entirely unknown to him at the time of the waivers.20 There is no evidence in the record that the failure to inform Burbine of the call was intended to deprive him of his right to counsel or that it affected his decision to waive that right.21
Burbine never requested an attorney during any of the interrogation sessions, and the trial court found that he had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.22
The police's failure to inform Burbine of the attorney's efforts to reach him did not affect the validity of his waiver of his Miranda rights.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented on this issue. He argued that the police's failure to inform Burbine of Attorney Munson's call was inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the Miranda rule, which is to ensure that any waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and intelligent.24 Stevens emphasized that the facts were particularly troubling. Munson had been assured that Burbine would not be questioned further that night.25 Yet the Providence detectives proceeded with interrogation without informing Burbine of the attorney's availability and efforts to represent him.26
He maintained that the majority's holding creates an incentive for the police to withhold information from suspects. By allowing the police to conceal the availability of counsel, the Court encourages deceptive practices that are fundamentally at odds with the principles of fairness and due process.27
Whether the police's failure to inform a suspect of an attorney's telephone call deprives him of his Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel during interrogation?28
No. Burbine had not been formally charged with the murder at the time of the interrogation sessions at the Cranston police station.31 The questioning by the Providence detectives occurred prior to arraignment, and no adversary judicial proceedings had been initiated against him for the Hickey murder.32 Therefore, Burbine's Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel during interrogation had not yet attached when the statements were obtained.33
The police's failure to inform Burbine of the attorney's telephone call did not deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel during interrogation.34
Whether the police's conduct in failing to inform a suspect of an attorney's telephone call violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?35
No. The totality of the circumstances indicates that Burbine's waiver of his right to remain silent was voluntary.38 The interrogation sessions were not so prolonged or coercive as to overbear Burbine's will, and he was left alone with access to a telephone on at least two occasions during the evening.39 The police conduct in failing to inform Burbine of Munson's call was not so egregious as to shock the conscience under the standard established in Rochin v. California.40
The police's conduct in failing to inform Burbine of the attorney's telephone call did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented on this issue as well. He contended that police interference with communications between an attorney and a suspect in custody violates the due process requirement of fundamental fairness.42 Stevens maintained that the deliberate deception of Munson combined with the failure to inform Burbine of her call effectively drove a wedge between attorney and client. This constituted governmental misconduct on a matter of central importance to the administration of justice.43
He argued that the police may not deceive an attorney by giving her false information about whether her client will be questioned. He also argued that the police may not deceive a suspect by failing to inform him of his attorney's communications and efforts to represent him.44
Whether the level of police culpability in failing to inform a suspect of an attorney's telephone call has any bearing on the validity of his Miranda waiver?45
The Miranda rule is a prophylactic rule that is not itself a right protected by the Constitution.46 The level of police culpability in failing to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts has no bearing on the validity of the waiver.47 The state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness of the suspect's election to abandon his rights.48
No. Whether the police conduct was intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the officers is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness of Burbine's election to abandon his rights.49 The trial court found that there was no conspiracy or collusion on the part of the Cranston police department to secrete Burbine from his attorney, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court treated those findings as presumptively correct.50 Even deliberate deception of an attorney could not affect Burbine's decision to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least aware of the incident.51
The level of police culpability in failing to inform Burbine of the attorney's telephone call had no bearing on the validity of his Miranda waiver.52