413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980)
In 1952 plaintiff and defendant began living together and holding themselves out to the community as husband and wife.1 Defendant acknowledges that the two children born of the relationship are his.2
Plaintiff alleges that since the inception of the relationship she has performed domestic duties and business services at the request of defendant with the expectation that she would receive full compensation for them.3 Defendant has always accepted her services knowing that she expected compensation for them.4 They have filed joint tax returns over the past several years.5 Plaintiff seeks judgment in the amount of $250,000 on her first cause of action.6
The second cause of action realleges the first and adds that in 1952 the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement under which plaintiff would furnish domestic services and defendant would have full charge of business transactions.7 Under the agreement defendant would support, maintain and provide for plaintiff in accordance with his earning capacity, take care of the plaintiff and do right by her, and the net profits from the partnership were to be used for and applied to the equal benefit of plaintiff and defendant.8 Defendant commanded that plaintiff not obtain employment or he would leave her.9 Since 1952 defendant has collected large sums of money from companies and business dealings.10 Since December of 1975 defendant has dishonored the agreement, failed to provide support or maintenance, and refused her demands for an accounting.11
Special Term dismissed the complaint.12 The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of both causes of action.13 The case is presented on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals with the questions whether a contract as to earnings and assets may be implied in fact from the relationship of an unmarried couple living together and whether an express contract of such a couple on those subjects is enforceable.14
Whether a contract as to earnings and assets may be implied in fact from the relationship of an unmarried couple living together?15
New York requires the explicit and structured understanding of an express contract.16 It declines to recognize a contract implied from the rendition and acceptance of services by persons living together.17 This is because it is not reasonable to infer an agreement to pay when the relationship makes it natural that services were rendered gratuitously.18
No. Plaintiff alleges that since 1952 she performed domestic duties and business services at the request of defendant with the expectation of compensation.19 Defendant accepted her services.20 The parties held themselves out as husband and wife and filed joint tax returns.21 Yet the first cause of action rests solely on an implied contract arising from that relationship without any express agreement.22
The first cause of action was properly dismissed.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judge Jasen
Judge Jones agrees with the majority that the first cause of action fails to state a ground for relief under the law of this jurisdiction.24 He states that dismissal is appropriate because an implied agreement between cohabiting persons not married to each other does not support recovery.25 Judge Jones would go further and dismiss the second cause of action on separate grounds of vagueness and indefiniteness.26
On the implied contract issue his position aligns with the majority view that New York law does not recognize such recovery.27
Whether an express contract of such a couple on those subjects is enforceable?28
An express agreement between unmarried persons living together is enforceable provided illicit sexual relations were not part of the consideration of the contract.29
Yes. The second cause of action alleges that in 1952 the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement under which plaintiff would furnish domestic services, defendant would have full charge of business transactions and support plaintiff in accordance with his earning capacity, and net profits would be applied to the equal benefit of both, with defendant having collected large sums from business dealings since 1952.30
The second cause of action is sustained.31
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judge Jasen
Judge Jones would dismiss the second cause of action as well because the express agreement alleged is too vague and indefinite to be enforced.32 The obligation to support and maintain plaintiff in accordance with earning capacity lacks any standard of support or measure of the agreed life-style.33 The reference to net profits from the agreement is wholly unelucidated and fatally uncertain because no profit-making activity by defendant is alleged.34
Judge Jones concludes that the promise is indefinite and runs afoul of the basic premise of contract law requiring sufficient definiteness for a court to give it an exact meaning.35