342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288.
In December 1948, Morissette went hunting on a large tract of land in Michigan that the Government had used as a practice bombing range for the Air Force.1 Spent bomb casings from the range had been dumped into heaps and left exposed to the weather for four years or more.2 Morissette collected three tons of the casings, flattened them at a nearby farm, and sold them for eighty-four dollars.3
Morissette worked as a fruit stand operator in the summer and as a trucker and scrap iron collector in the winter.4 He was an honorably discharged veteran of World War II who had a good reputation among his neighbors.5 He loaded the casings onto his truck and transported them in broad daylight without any effort to conceal what he was doing.6
When authorities began an investigation, Morissette voluntarily and candidly told them the whole story, explaining that he believed the casings were abandoned and that he had no intention of stealing them.7 He was indicted for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly stealing and converting property of the United States valued at eighty-four dollars in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.8
At trial, the District Court refused to permit Morissette to show that he thought the property was abandoned or to argue that he lacked criminal intent.9 The court instructed the jury that if it believed the government testimony, Morissette was guilty, and the jury convicted him.10 The court sentenced him to two months in prison or a fine of two hundred dollars.11
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 641 requires proof of criminal intent as an element of the offense of knowingly converting government property?14
The common law requires a culpable state of mind for larceny-type offenses such as stealing and conversion, and Congress's omission of explicit intent language in codifying such offenses does not eliminate the mens rea requirement unless clearly expressed, particularly where the statute is not a public welfare regulation.15
Yes. The common law crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and conversion require proof of specific intent to deprive the owner of his property.16 Morissette collected the casings believing they were abandoned, acted openly in broad daylight, and immediately admitted his actions to authorities upon investigation.17 The statute's language 'knowingly converts' must be read against the background of the common law requiring mens rea.18
This is not a public welfare offense regulating dangerous activity but a codification of traditional property crimes.19 The Government concedes that if Morissette had taken the casings from a military installation where they were in use, the case would be different, but here the casings had been discarded and had lain untouched for years.20
Section 641 requires proof of criminal intent as an element of the offense.21
Whether the District Court erred in refusing to submit to the jury the question whether Morissette acted with criminal intent?22
Where intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury, and the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act.23
Yes. The trial court refused to allow the jury to consider Morissette's defense that he believed the property was abandoned and instructed the jury that intent was presumed by his act of taking the property.24 Morissette's belief that the casings were abandoned and his lack of felonious intent were questions that should have been decided by the jury.25 The jury was to base its decision on all the circumstances, including the appearance of the casings as unwanted junk and Morissette's good character and open conduct.26
A presumption of intent from the isolated act of taking conflicts with the presumption of innocence.27
The District Court erred in refusing to submit the question of criminal intent to the jury.28