421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975)
In June 1966, a jury convicted Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. of murder in a Maine state court.1 The prosecution introduced Wilbur's pretrial statement describing how he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room after a homosexual advance, together with circumstantial evidence of the killing.2 Although the defense presented no evidence at trial, it argued that Wilbur lacked criminal intent or that the homicide amounted at most to manslaughter because it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the advance.3
The trial court instructed the jury that an intentional and unlawful homicide would support a finding of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.4 After the jury twice returned for additional instructions on implied malice and the definition of heat of passion, it convicted Wilbur of murder.5 Wilbur appealed his conviction to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment.6
Wilbur then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.7 The district court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that decision.8 After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in State v. Lafferty reaffirming its view of state law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration.9 On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to consider the constitutional question presented by the Maine homicide law as applied to Wilbur's case.11
Whether the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case?12
The Due Process Clause, as defined in In re Winship, requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.13 When a state distinguishes degrees of homicide based on the presence or absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation, that fact is an essential element.14 The prosecution must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt if the distinction imposes substantially different penalties and stigma.15
Yes. The rule applies directly because Maine law treats the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation as the sole fact distinguishing murder from manslaughter and determining whether a life sentence or a lesser penalty attaches.16 The trial court instructed the jury that malice aforethought would be conclusively implied from an intentional and unlawful killing unless the defendant proved heat of passion by a fair preponderance of the evidence.17 This allocation placed on the defendant the burden of negating an element that controls both the degree of culpability and the severity of punishment.18
The interests in verdict reliability, protection against erroneous conviction, and community confidence in the criminal law, which Winship identified as central to due process, are implicated even more strongly here than in Winship itself because the sentencing differential ranges from a nominal fine to mandatory life imprisonment.19 Historical practice and the trend in other jurisdictions confirm that the prosecution must carry this burden when the issue is properly presented.20
The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.21
Related opinions on this issue
Rehnquist joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to note the unusual procedural posture of the case.22 Although the defendant made no objection to the burden-of-proof instruction at trial, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed the constitutional claim on the merits.23 Rehnquist observed that the case therefore presented the abstract legal question in isolation.24
He agreed that Winship requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element constituting the crime.25 He saw no inconsistency with Leland v. Oregon because insanity as defined by state law does not negate the mens rea elements of the offense.26 Maine's scheme affirmatively shifted the burden on a fact essential to the distinction between murder and manslaughter.27