378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1964)
The petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor concerning a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey, piers.1 After refusing to answer questions about the stoppage on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York.2 When they persisted in their refusal to answer the questions on the additional ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, they were held in civil and criminal contempt of court.3
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the criminal contempt conviction on procedural grounds but affirmed the civil contempt judgments on the merits.4 The court relied on prior decisions holding that a state may constitutionally compel a witness to give testimony which might be used in a federal prosecution against him.5
At a prior hearing, petitioners had refused to answer the questions on the ground that the Commission lacked statutory authority to investigate the work stoppage.6 That claim was litigated through the state courts and rejected. Petitioners purged themselves of an earlier contempt before raising the self-incrimination objection.7
The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor is a bistate body established under an interstate compact approved by Congress.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional questions involved in this case.9
The New Jersey statute under which immunity was granted provided that the witness could not be prosecuted under the laws of New Jersey or New York for any matter concerning which he testified.10 It did not purport to grant immunity from federal prosecution.11
Whether the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?12
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental principle of our federal system of government.13 It is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state invasion.14 The amendment secures against the states the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against the federal government.15
Yes. In Malloy v. Hogan the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement.16 The Court rejected any notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states only a watered-down version of the Bill of Rights.17 The petitioners were subpoenaed by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.18
That body is a bistate entity established under an interstate compact approved by Congress.19 Petitioners refused to answer questions on self-incrimination grounds.20 They received immunity only from New Jersey and New York prosecution.21 They were held in contempt by the New Jersey courts on the ground that the privilege did not apply to the states.22
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Whether one jurisdiction within the federal structure may compel a witness, whom it has immunized from prosecution under its own laws, to give testimony that might be used to convict the witness of a crime against another jurisdiction?24
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law.25 A state may not compel a witness to give testimony which may be used against him in a federal criminal prosecution even when the state has granted immunity from its own prosecution.26
No. The New Jersey statute granted petitioners immunity from prosecution under New Jersey and New York law.27 It did not purport to grant immunity from federal prosecution. Petitioners persisted in their refusal to answer on the ground that answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law.28 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the civil contempt judgments on the authority of United States v. Murdock, Feldman v. United States, and Knapp v. Schweitzer.29
The privilege protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself whether the compulsion comes from the federal government or a state government.30 The fact that the state grants immunity from state prosecution does not protect the witness from federal prosecution.31 The federal government is not bound by the state's grant of immunity.32
One jurisdiction within the federal structure may not compel a witness, whom it has immunized from prosecution under its own laws, to give testimony that might be used to convict the witness of a crime against another jurisdiction.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurred in the result but would rest the decision on different grounds.34 He viewed the privilege as a personal right of the witness rather than a prohibition directed at the federal government.35 When a state compels testimony under a grant of immunity the federal government is not compelling the testimony.36
Therefore the federal government should be permitted to use the testimony in a federal prosecution provided the testimony was not compelled by the federal government.37 In this case the state immunity statute did not purport to grant immunity from federal prosecution.38 Therefore the witness could properly refuse to testify on the ground that his testimony might tend to incriminate him under federal law.39
Joined by Justice Clark
Justice Harlan joined by Justice Clark concurred in the result but could not join the Court's opinion.40 He believed the Court had gone too far in holding that the states are prohibited from compelling testimony which may be used in a federal prosecution.41 The privilege is a prohibition against the use of compulsion by the government to obtain incriminating testimony.42
When a state grants immunity and compels testimony it is the state which is using compulsion and the federal government is not.43 Therefore the federal government should be permitted to use the compelled testimony.44 However the New Jersey courts did not adequately protect the petitioners' federal rights because the state immunity grant did not protect against federal use of the testimony.45
Therefore the petitioners were entitled to refuse to testify.46