878 P.2d 1275, 1287 (Cal. 1994)
Lakeside Village is a 530-unit condominium development in Culver City consisting of 12 separate three-story buildings whose residents share common lobbies, hallways, laundry, and trash facilities.1 In April 1978 the developer recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions that included the provision that no animals, defined to mean dogs and cats, livestock, reptiles, or poultry, shall be kept in any unit.2 Plaintiff Natore Nahrstedt purchased a unit in January 1988 and moved in with her three cats, which she kept entirely inside the unit.3
When the Lakeside Village Condominium Association learned of the cats it demanded their removal and levied successive monthly fines against Nahrstedt.4 Nahrstedt then filed suit against the Association, its officers, and two employees seeking declaratory relief that the pet restriction was unreasonable as applied to her indoor cats, invalidation of the assessments, damages for invasion of privacy and emotional distress, and injunctive relief.5 The complaint alleged that the cats were noiseless, created no nuisance, and had not damaged any portion of her unit or the common areas, and it incorporated by reference the grant deed, the declaration, and the condominium plan.6
The Association demurred to the complaint on the ground that the restriction was reasonable as a matter of law.7 The trial court sustained the demurrer as to every cause of action and dismissed the complaint.8 A divided Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal, concluding that Nahrstedt had stated a claim for declaratory relief because the reasonableness of enforcing the restriction against her particular cats presented a factual question.9 The dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal maintained that the recorded restriction should be treated as presumptively valid under the law of equitable servitudes.10 On the Association's petition the Supreme Court granted review.11
Whether a use restriction contained in the recorded declaration of a common interest development is enforceable as an equitable servitude unless shown to be unreasonable?12
Under Civil Code section 1354, covenants and restrictions in the declaration of a common interest development are enforceable equitable servitudes unless unreasonable, meaning they are presumed valid and enforced unless the challenger shows they are arbitrary, violate fundamental public policy, or impose burdens on affected land that substantially outweigh benefits to the development as a whole.13
Yes. The recorded declaration at Lakeside Village included the no-cats-or-dogs restriction from the developer's 1978 recording, and Nahrstedt purchased her unit subject to that declaration with knowledge of its terms.14 The restriction promotes health, sanitation, and noise concerns for the 530-unit project sharing common areas.15 Nahrstedt's complaint alleged only facts personal to her three indoor cats and did not allege any effect on the development as a whole or any arbitrary character, public-policy violation, or disproportionate burden.16
The pet restriction is enforceable as an equitable servitude because Nahrstedt failed to allege facts showing it unreasonable under the standards of section 1354.17
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Joined by George, J.
Justice Kennard would have applied a less deferential standard to developer-imposed restrictions than to those adopted by owners after completion.18 She reasoned that developer restrictions lack the democratic legitimacy of owner-adopted rules.19 Therefore courts should test such restrictions by whether they are rationally related to protection or operation of the property.20
Applying that test, she concluded the absolute pet ban was unreasonable because the Association offered no evidence that pets had caused any actual disturbance in the project.21
Whether the reasonableness of a recorded use restriction in a common interest development is determined by reference to its effect on the development as a whole rather than its application to an individual unit owner?22
Reasonableness under section 1354 is measured by the restriction's effect on the common interest development as a whole, not by its application to any particular owner; the focus is whether the restriction is arbitrary, violates public policy, or imposes project-wide burdens substantially outweighing project-wide benefits.23
Yes. The Court of Appeal had held that Nahrstedt could obtain declaratory relief if enforcement against her three indoor cats would be unreasonable on the facts she alleged.24 The Supreme Court rejected that unit-specific approach, holding instead that the inquiry looks to the restriction's uniform operation across all 530 units and the 12 buildings sharing common facilities.25 Nahrstedt's allegations concerned only her own cats and did not address any project-wide impact.26
Reasonableness is determined by reference to the development as a whole, so Nahrstedt's individualized allegations were legally insufficient.27
Whether a recorded restriction prohibiting cats and dogs but permitting other pets in condominium units is arbitrary or imposes burdens on affected property that substantially outweigh its benefits?28
A recorded use restriction is not arbitrary if it bears a rational relationship to health, sanitation, or noise concerns in a high-density project; it does not impose disproportionate burdens when the only alleged harm is the owner's inability to keep the prohibited pets inside her unit while other pets remain allowed.29
No. The restriction rationally addresses noise, odors, and sanitation risks in a 530-unit complex with shared lobbies, hallways, laundry, and trash facilities.30 Nahrstedt alleged no facts showing that the burden on owners who wish to keep cats or dogs substantially outweighs those benefits to the entire development.31 The complaint's focus on her noiseless indoor cats did not rebut the presumption of validity that attaches to a recorded restriction.32
The restriction is neither arbitrary nor disproportionately burdensome and therefore remains enforceable.33
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Justice Arabian dissented on the ground that the pet restriction was patently arbitrary and unreasonable.34 He emphasized the long-standing human companionship with household pets.35 He noted the absence of any benefit when animals are confined inside a unit and create no nuisance.36
In his view the restriction imposed a substantial and disproportionate burden on quality of life while serving only the board's ability to enforce an inflexible rule.37 He would have held the pleadings sufficient to state a claim that the restriction was unenforceable under section 1354.38