426 U.S. 833 (1976)
The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 specifically excluded the States and their political sub-divisions from its coverage.1 Amendments in 1961 extended coverage to employees of enterprises engaged in commerce, and 1966 amendments removed the exemption for employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools.2 The Supreme Court upheld the 1966 amendments in Maryland v. Wirtz in 1968.3
In 1974, Congress amended the Act to include a public agency within the definition of employer and to deem employees of public agencies as engaged in commerce.4 These amendments applied the Act's requirements to almost all public employees of the States and their subdivisions, subject only to the general exemption for executive, administrative, or professional personnel and certain officeholders.5 Appellants consisting of the National League of Cities, numerous States, and municipalities challenged these amendments.6
The appellants alleged in their complaint that compliance would impose significant additional costs, including $938,000 per year for the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for police and fire protection, $2.5 million annually for Arizona, and between $8 million and $16 million for California.7 They further claimed that the overtime provisions would force reductions in training programs, such as shortening the California Highway Patrol academy from 2,080 to 960 hours, and curtail affirmative action and internship programs in cities like Inglewood and Clovis.8
A three-judge district court was convened and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, stating that it was bound by Maryland v. Wirtz despite finding the contentions substantial.9 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, heard initial argument in 1975, reargued the case in March 1976, and issued its decision on June 24, 1976.10
Whether the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause when applied to employees of the States and their political subdivisions?11
The Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to enact legislation that directly displaces the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.12
Yes. The 1974 amendments extended the FLSA to almost all public employees of the States and their subdivisions, including those in police protection, fire prevention, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.13 These are areas of traditional governmental functions.14 The appellants alleged substantial costs and forced changes in programs such as the California Highway Patrol academy and Inglewood's affirmative action program.15 The amendments directly supplant the States' policy choices regarding wages and hours for employees performing these functions.16
The 1974 amendments are unconstitutional insofar as they apply to the States in their capacities as sovereign governments performing traditional governmental functions.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion.18 Although he had joined the decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, the experience of the intervening years convinced him that the decision was incorrect.19 The balance between federal and state authority requires the result reached today.20
He joined the Court's opinion with the understanding that it adopts a balancing approach.21 This approach does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential.22 His concurrence thus supports a pragmatic recognition of limits on federal power without broadly invalidating all regulation touching state activities.23
Joined by Justice White And Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion.24 He argued that the Court repudiates principles settled since Chief Justice Marshall that restraints on the commerce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial process.25 The Tenth Amendment is a truism and does not bar federal regulation of activities affecting commerce even when carried out by the States.26
The distinction between traditional and nontraditional functions is unworkable and inconsistent with principles of federalism.27 He would affirm the district court judgment because the amendments represent a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce among the several States.28
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion and joined Justice Brennan's dissent.29 He added that the Court's opinion creates unnecessary confusion in an area of the law that was previously settled.30 The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.31
The provision of public services by state governments clearly meets that test.32 The Tenth Amendment should not be interpreted to create an implied limitation on an express federal power.33 His separate writing emphasizes that the statute is valid because no identifiable limitation on federal power would leave other permissible regulations intact.34 He noted that the Federal Government may require the State to act impartially when it hires or fires the janitor at the state capitol and to observe safety regulations, indicating that the majority's distinction is difficult to perceive.35
Whether the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Maryland v. Wirtz should be overruled?36
A prior decision may be overruled when reexamination shows it is inconsistent with the constitutional limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause as they affect state sovereignty.37
Yes. Maryland v. Wirtz upheld the application of the FLSA to state hospitals and schools.38 Upon reexamination the distinction between traditional and nontraditional functions is not always clear.39 The statute displaces the States' freedom to structure employment relationships in areas such as police protection and fire prevention.40 The reasoning in Wirtz is no longer authoritative because the 1974 amendments affect core governmental functions in the same manner.41
Maryland v. Wirtz is overruled.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun noted that he joined the opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz but the experience of the intervening years has convinced him that the decision was incorrect.43 The balance between federal and state authority requires the result reached today. His concurrence therefore supports overruling Wirtz as part of restoring proper limits on federal power over the States.
He joined the opinion with the understanding that it adopts a balancing approach that recognizes limits on federal power without broadly invalidating regulation in areas where federal interests predominate.
Joined by Justice White And Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan argued that the Court overrules Wirtz without justification and discards a long line of precedents in a roughshod manner.44 He contended that the decision repudiates settled principles and that the reasoning of Wirtz remained authoritative.45 The overruling is presented as an ipse dixit reflecting mere displeasure with a congressional judgment rather than a principled constitutional analysis.46
He emphasized that the distinction between traditional and nontraditional functions is unworkable and that the amendments represent a valid exercise of commerce power.
Justice Stevens joined Brennan's dissent which includes the overruling of Wirtz as part of the erroneous approach.47 He emphasized that the statute remains valid and that no limitation on federal power can be identified that would not also invalidate other unquestionably permissible regulations of state activities.48 His separate writing stresses that the federal power over the labor market is adequate to embrace these employees without creating an unworkable distinction.49
He observed that the Federal Government may require the State to withhold taxes and observe safety regulations, showing that the majority creates confusion without a workable limit on federal power.50