538 U.S. 721 (2003)
William Hibbs worked for the Nevada Department of Human Resources Welfare Division.1 In April and May 1997, Hibbs sought leave under the FMLA to care for his ailing wife who was recovering from a car accident and neck surgery.2 The Department granted his request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and authorized him to use the leave intermittently as needed between May and December 1997.3
Hibbs used the leave until August 5, 1997.4 In October 1997, the Department informed Hibbs that he had exhausted his FMLA leave, that no further leave would be granted, and that he must report to work by November 12, 1997.5 Hibbs failed to return to work by that date and was terminated.6
Hibbs sued the Nevada Department of Human Resources and two of its officers in the United States District Court seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of the FMLA.7 The District Court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that the FMLA claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.8 Hibbs appealed and the United States intervened to defend the validity of the FMLA's application to the States.9 The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment.10
When it enacted the FMLA, Congress considered evidence including a 1990 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey showing that 37 percent of surveyed private-sector employees were covered by maternity leave policies while only 18 percent were covered by paternity leave policies.11 Congress also heard testimony that parental leave for fathers is rare and that men receive discriminatory treatment in requests for such leave.12 A 50-state survey demonstrated that the proportion and construction of leave policies available to public sector employees differs little from those offered private sector employees.13 Many States offered women extended maternity leave that far exceeded the typical period of physical disability due to pregnancy and childbirth but very few States granted men a parallel benefit.14
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether an individual may sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the FMLA's family-care provision.15
Whether an individual may sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?16
Yes. The FMLA satisfies the clear statement rule because the Act enables employees to seek damages against any employer including a public agency in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.19 Congress has defined public agency to include the government of a State or political subdivision thereof.20 Congress abrogated states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted the FMLA.21
This case turns on whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority when it sought to abrogate the States' immunity for purposes of the FMLA's family-leave provision.22 The FMLA is a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Act's family-care provision is congruent and proportional to the injury that Congress sought to prevent.23 Applying the rule to the established facts, Hibbs was denied additional leave and terminated after using FMLA leave for his wife's care.24 His suit for damages proceeds because the abrogation is valid under § 5.25
An individual may sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the family-care provision of the FMLA.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Ginsburg And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Souter joins the Court's opinion without conceding the dissenting positions on the scope of congressional power under § 5. He emphasizes that even on the Court's narrow view of § 5 authority the FMLA is undoubtedly valid legislation and its application to the States is constitutional.27 The same conclusions follow a fortiori from his own broader understanding of § 5.28
Souter writes separately only to stress that the evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by the States remains overwhelming and that the history of sex discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is well documented.29
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment because he has never been convinced that an Act of Congress can amend the Constitution and because he is uncertain whether the congressional enactment was truly needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 He rests the decision on broader grounds than the majority.31 The plain language of the Eleventh Amendment poses no barrier because respondents are citizens of Nevada.32
The sovereign immunity defense is based on judge-made common law rather than constitutional text.33 Congress may abrogate that common-law defense pursuant to its power to regulate commerce among the several States.34 The family-care provision is unquestionably a valid exercise of a power broad enough to support federal legislation regulating the terms and conditions of state employment.35
Whether Congress acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it sought to abrogate the States' immunity for purposes of the FMLA's family-leave provision?36
Valid § 5 legislation must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.37 The FMLA aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.38 Statutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are subject to heightened scrutiny.39
Yes. Congress had before it significant evidence of a long and extensive history of sex discrimination with respect to the administration of leave benefits by the States, which is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.40 The impact of the discrimination targeted by the FMLA is significant because it is based on mutually reinforcing stereotypes that only women are responsible for family caregiving and that men lack domestic responsibilities.41 Congress' chosen remedy, the FMLA's family-care provision, is congruent and proportional to the targeted violation because the Act is narrowly targeted at the faultline between work and family and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship, with many limitations including unpaid leave only and exclusion of high-ranking officials.42
Applying the rule to the established facts, the Nevada Department of Human Resources granted Hibbs 12 weeks of leave to care for his wife but terminated him after exhaustion.43 The suit for damages is permitted because the legislative record of state gender discrimination in leave policies supports the abrogation as a valid § 5 measure.44
Congress acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it sought to abrogate the States' immunity for purposes of the FMLA's family-leave provision.45
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Scalia And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Kennedy dissents because the Court is unable to show that States have engaged in a pattern of unlawful conduct which warrants the remedy of opening state treasuries to private suits.46 The inability to adduce evidence of alleged discrimination, coupled with the inescapable fact that the federal scheme is not a remedy but a benefit program, demonstrates the lack of the requisite link between any problem Congress has identified and the program it mandated.47 Congress does not have authority to define the substantive content of the Equal Protection Clause; it may only shape the remedies warranted by violations of that guarantee.48
The evidence considered by Congress concerned discriminatory practices of the private sector, not those of state employers.49 The federal-state equivalence upon which the Court places emphasis is deficient because the States appear to have been ahead of Congress in providing gender-neutral family leave benefits.50 Thirty States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had adopted some form of family-care leave in the years preceding the Act's adoption.51
Justice Scalia joins Justice Kennedy's dissent in all but Part IV.52 He writes separately to express that the constitutional violation that is a prerequisite to prophylactic congressional action to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is a violation by the State against which the enforcement action is taken.53 There is no guilt by association, enabling the sovereignty of one State to be abridged under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because of violations by another State, or by most other States, or even by 49 other States.54
Today's opinion for the Court does not even attempt to demonstrate that each one of the 50 States covered by the family-care provision was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 It treats the States as some sort of collective entity which is guilty or innocent as a body.56 Prophylaxis in the sense of extending the remedy beyond the violation is one thing; prophylaxis in the sense of extending the remedy beyond the violator is something else.57