427 U.S. 297 (1976)
The City of New Orleans amended its municipal code in 1972 to ban pushcart food vendors from the Vieux Carre outside of Mardi Gras season, while carving out an exception for any vendors who had continuously operated the same business in that area for eight or more years before January 1, 1972.1
Appellee, who sold food from pushcarts across New Orleans but had done so in the Vieux Carre for only two years when the amendment took effect, found herself excluded from that historic district.2 She had already initiated litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the prior version of the ordinance and amended her complaint to contest the new grandfather clause.3
The Vieux Carre forms the centerpiece of the city's tourist economy, and the City Council acted under powers granted by the state constitution and the city's Home Rule Charter to protect its distinctive character.4 Only two vendors satisfied the eight-year requirement: one hot-dog seller and one ice-cream vendor, each with more than twenty years of continuous operation in the area.5 Most of appellee's sales, particularly during the summer, took place inside the Vieux Carre.6
The District Court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on cross-motions without issuing an opinion.7 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in 1974.8 The Supreme Court postponed consideration of its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) until argument on the merits, after which the Court of Appeals had remanded solely for a state-law severability determination.9
The original complaint invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4), and 2201-2202, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.10
Whether the Court of Appeals decision finding the grandfather clause unconstitutional as applied is final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2)?11
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the courts of appeals holding a state statute invalid as repugnant to the Constitution.12 A municipal ordinance qualifies as a state statute for this purpose.13 Although there may be a finality requirement, it is satisfied when the constitutional issue has been definitively decided and only a state-law severability issue remains on remand.14
Yes. The case arose when the City of New Orleans amended its municipal code in 1972. The amendment banned pushcart food vendors from the Vieux Carre outside of Mardi Gras season. It carved out an exception for any vendors who had continuously operated the same business in that area for eight or more years before January 1, 1972. Appellee sold food from pushcarts across New Orleans. She had done so in the Vieux Carre for only two years when the amendment took effect. Thus she found herself excluded from that historic district. The Court of Appeals has definitely and finally adjudicated the unconstitutionality of the ordinance as applied to the appellee vendor. Only the state-law question of severability of the grandfather provision remains to be decided on remand to the District Court.
There is no federal question left to be resolved below.15 The policy of ensuring that state laws are not erroneously invalidated supports immediate review by the Supreme Court.16 Furthermore, a decision upholding the ordinance would obviate further proceedings and end the disruption of the city's economic affairs.17
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).18
Whether the grandfather clause in the 1972 amendment to the New Orleans ordinance, which permits only vendors with eight or more years of continuous operation in the Vieux Carre before January 1, 1972 to continue selling foodstuffs from pushcarts there, denies equal protection of the laws to other vendors?19
When a local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause and does not trammel fundamental personal rights or draw upon suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, the classification is presumed constitutional and need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.20 States have wide latitude in regulating their local economies.21 Legislatures may implement reforms step by step.22
No. The grandfather clause rationally furthers the city's legitimate objective of preserving the appearance and custom of the Vieux Carre valued by residents and attractive to tourists.23 The established facts demonstrate that the Vieux Carre is the heart of New Orleans's tourist industry and an integral component of the city's economy.24 The City Council could reasonably conclude that street peddlers tend to interfere with the charm and beauty of a historic area.25 Vendors with only recent operations, such as the appellee who had sold there for just two years, were less likely to have built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation.26 In contrast, the two vendors who qualified under the clause—one hot dog seller and one ice cream vendor, each with over twenty years of continuous operation—had themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm that distinguishes the Vieux Carre.27
This gradual approach to the problem by first eliminating vendors of more recent vintage is not constitutionally impermissible.28 Legislatures may address the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. They need not strike at all evils at the same time. The Court of Appeals erred by relying on Morey v. Doud as its chief guide.29 That decision is overruled because it departs from proper equal protection analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation.30
The grandfather clause does not deny equal protection of the laws.31