440 U.S. 568 (1979)
The New York City Transit Authority operates the subway system and certain bus routes in New York City.1 It employs about 47,000 persons, many of whom hold safety-sensitive positions such as subway motormen, conductors, bus operators, crane operators, and high-voltage equipment handlers.2
In 1971 the Authority adopted a rule forbidding the employment of persons who use narcotics.3 Methadone, a synthetic narcotic, is covered by this rule.4 Rule 11(b) forbids employees from using or possessing narcotics, tranquilizers, drugs of the amphetamine group, or barbiturate derivatives except with written permission of the medical director.5 Methadone is regarded as a narcotic within the meaning of Rule 11(b). No written permission has ever been given by TA’s medical director for the employment of a person using methadone.6
Methadone maintenance programs in New York City treat approximately 40,000 persons, of whom about 26,000 participate in five major public or semipublic programs and 14,000 participate in roughly 25 private programs.7 State regulations require that patients appear at clinics at least three times per week for observed ingestion of methadone, counseling, and testing for illicit drug or alcohol use, with the frequency of visits decreasing only after satisfactory progress over multiple months.8
The District Court found that the strong majority of patients who remain in such programs for at least one year abstain from illicit drugs.9 Yet 20 to 30 percent of those with more than twelve months' tenure continue to experience drug or alcohol problems.10 Four named plaintiffs—Beazer, Reyes, Frasier, and Diaz—filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of all persons who had been or would be denied employment by the Authority because of participation in a methadone maintenance program.11
Two plaintiffs had been discharged while receiving methadone and two had been rejected for employment while participating in or shortly after completing such programs.12 The complaint alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The plaintiffs introduced evidence concerning the success rates of methadone programs, the employability of participants, and the fact that between 62 and 65 percent of methadone-maintained persons in New York City are black or Hispanic.14
After a lengthy trial, the District Court held that the Authority's blanket exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clause as applied to persons who had participated in methadone maintenance for at least one year and had been free from illicit drug use for at least one year.15 The court later issued a supplemental opinion finding a Title VII violation based on two statistics and awarded attorney's fees.16 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the constitutional holding and the fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 without reaching the statutory claim.17
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, noting both the lower courts' departure from the usual sequence of addressing statutory claims before constitutional claims and concern that the merits had been decided erroneously.18 After certiorari was granted, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to address discrimination against handicapped individuals, a category that arguably includes certain former drug abusers and current methadone users.19
Whether the New York City Transit Authority's policy of refusing to employ persons who use methadone violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?20
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.21 The Clause announces a fundamental principle that the State must govern impartially.22 General rules that apply evenhandedly to all persons within the jurisdiction unquestionably comply with this principle.23 Only when a governmental unit adopts a rule that has a special impact on less than all the persons subject to its jurisdiction does the question whether this principle is violated arise.24 Legislative classifications are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State's objectives.25
No. The Transit Authority's Rule 11(b) places a meaningful restriction on all of its employees and job applicants.26 In that sense the rule is one of general applicability and satisfies the equal protection principle without further inquiry.27 Even as interpreted to apply to the limited class of persons who regularly use narcotic drugs, including methadone, the classification is rationally related to the legitimate objectives of safety and efficiency.28 The Authority employs many persons in safety-sensitive positions attended by unusual hazards that must be performed by persons of maximum alertness and competence.29
The District Court found that 20 to 30 percent of those with more than twelve months' tenure in methadone programs continue to experience drug or alcohol problems.30 This finding supports the legitimate inference that as long as treatment continues a degree of uncertainty persists.31 The rule need not be the least restrictive means.32 The Constitution does not authorize a federal court to interfere in the policy decision.33
The Transit Authority's policy does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court sustaining the policy as applied to current methadone users.35 He concluded that the Court had decided only a portion of the case presented.36 Powell would have affirmed the judgment below with respect to the class of persons who are former methadone users.37
He found no rational basis for an absolute bar against the employment of persons who have completed successfully a methadone maintenance program and who otherwise are qualified for employment.38
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment insofar as it holds that the policy does not violate Title VII.39 He dissented from the holding that the policy does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.40 Brennan concluded that the policy creates a classification that is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.41
The policy sweeps too broadly by excluding all methadone users, including those who have been successfully rehabilitated and who pose no greater risk than other employees.42
Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's opinion dissenting from the equal protection holding.43 He emphasized that the Transit Authority's policy is not a rational means of achieving its stated objectives of safety and efficiency.44 Marshall argued that the policy stigmatizes persons who have overcome heroin addiction through methadone maintenance and denies them the opportunity to prove their individual fitness for employment.45
This approach, he concluded, is inconsistent with the principles of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because it fails to consider the successful rehabilitation of many participants.46
Whether the Transit Authority's policy violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?47
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment practices that have the effect of denying members of one race equal access to employment opportunities.48 A prima facie violation may be established by statistical evidence showing disproportionate impact, but even if established the showing is rebutted if the practice is job related.49 The statute is violated if the exclusionary policy has a discriminatory effect against blacks and Hispanics, but the policy must be shown to operate to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of protected group members.50
No. The two statistics on which the District Court relied do not prove a violation of Title VII.51 The statistic that 81 percent of employees referred for suspected violation of the narcotics rule were black or Hispanic tells nothing about the racial composition of employees suspected of using methadone.52 The statistic that 62 to 65 percent of methadone-maintained persons in New York City are black or Hispanic reveals little about the racial composition of the class of Transit Authority job applicants and employees receiving methadone treatment, particularly those who have participated for over a year.53 Even assuming a prima facie case, it is rebutted by the demonstration that the narcotics rule is job related.54
The District Court's finding that the rule was not motivated by racial animus forecloses any claim that it was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.55
The Transit Authority's policy does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.56
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice White dissented and would have found that respondents made out a sufficient prima facie case by proving that about 63 percent of those using methadone in the New York City area are black or Hispanic while only about 20 percent of the population of New York City belongs to one of those groups.57 He concluded that the statistics establish that blacks and Hispanics suffer three times as much from the operation of the challenged rule as one would expect from a neutral practice.58 White stated that the Court was unjustified in displacing the District Court's acceptance of uncontradicted relevant evidence.59
Whether the amendment to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires dismissal of the writ of certiorari or mandates prospective relief?60
When Congress amends a statute after certiorari is granted, the Court must determine whether the amendment moots the case or mandates particular relief.61 The Court declines to give a statute its first judicial construction at an early stage of litigation when the concerns that prompted the grant of certiorari still merit attention and the language of the statute remains ambiguous.62
No. Even if respondents correctly interpret the amendment and even if they have a right to enforce that interpretation, the case is not moot. Their claims arose before the Act itself was passed and they have been awarded monetary relief. The language of the statute even after its amendment is not free of ambiguity. No administrative or judicial opinions specifically considering the impact on methadone users have been called to the Court's attention.
The concerns that prompted the grant of certiorari would still merit attention regardless of how the Rehabilitation Act is construed.63
The amendment to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not require dismissal of the writ of certiorari or mandate prospective relief in this case.64
Whether statistical evidence concerning the racial composition of methadone users establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII?65
A prima facie violation of Title VII may be established by statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying members of one race equal access to employment opportunities.66 Statistics are competent in proving employment discrimination but are not irrefutable and their usefulness depends on all the surrounding facts and circumstances.67 Evidence showing that the figures for the general population might not accurately reflect the pool of qualified job applicants undermines the significance of such figures.68
No. The statistic that 63 percent of methadone users in public programs are black or Hispanic was not limited to those who worked for or sought to work for the Transit Authority and to those who have been successfully maintained on methadone, and it does not include those in private clinics.69 The statistic therefore reveals little if anything about the racial composition of the class of Transit Authority job applicants and employees receiving methadone treatment.70 More particularly it tells nothing about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and employees who have participated in methadone maintenance programs for over a year.71 At best the statistical showing is weak and is rebutted by the demonstration that the rule is job related.72
The statistical evidence concerning the racial composition of methadone users does not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII that survives rebuttal.73