142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022)
New York has regulated public carriage of handguns since the early twentieth century.1 The Sullivan Law of 1911 made possession of a handgun without a license a crime.2 It was later amended to require that applicants for a license to have and carry concealed a pistol or revolver prove good moral character and other statutory criteria.3 The present scheme makes it a crime to possess any firearm without a license, whether inside or outside the home.4 Possessing a loaded firearm outside one’s home or place of business without a license is a felony.5
A license to possess a firearm at home or in a place of business requires a licensing officer to be satisfied as to good moral character and other statutory criteria.6 To carry a firearm outside the home for self-defense, an applicant must obtain an unrestricted license to have and carry a concealed pistol or revolver by proving that proper cause exists.7 If an applicant does not demonstrate proper cause, he may receive only a restricted license allowing carry for limited purposes such as hunting, target shooting, or employment.8 No New York statute defines proper cause.9 New York courts have held that an applicant shows proper cause only if he can demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community.10
Brandon Koch and Robert Nash are law-abiding adults from Rensselaer County.11 Both sought unrestricted licenses to carry handguns in public for self-defense without claiming any special individualized threats.12 Each was denied an unrestricted license and given a restricted license instead.13
Koch and Nash sued state licensing officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the denials violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.14 The District Court dismissed the complaint.15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision upholding New York’s proper-cause standard.16
Whether New York’s proper-cause requirement for an unrestricted license to carry a concealed handgun in public violates the Second Amendment as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment?17
When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and the government must demonstrate that the challenged regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.18
Yes. The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the public carry of handguns for self-defense by law-abiding citizens such as Koch and Nash.19 They are adult residents of Rensselaer County seeking unrestricted licenses without any claim of special individualized threats.20
New York requires applicants to prove proper cause.21 Its courts interpret this as a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community.22 This must be shown before issuing an unrestricted license to carry a concealed pistol or revolver outside the home.23 Without such a showing, only restricted licenses limited to purposes such as hunting or target shooting are available.24
The historical record from medieval England through the late nineteenth century reveals no American tradition of broadly prohibiting public carry of commonly used firearms by law-abiding citizens.25 It also reveals no tradition of requiring demonstration of a special need before exercising the right.26 Colonial statutes targeted carrying that spread terror or dangerous weapons.27 Antebellum laws regulated manner or intent but preserved peaceable carry.28 Later territorial regulations were too localized and temporary to establish a national tradition.29
Because New York's proper-cause requirement prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising the right to keep and bear arms in public, the regulation is inconsistent with the historical tradition that delimits the Second Amendment.30 Therefore, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment.31
New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Second Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Alito joined the opinion of the Court in full but wrote separately to respond to the dissent.33 He stressed that the narrow holding recognizes the right of law-abiding people to carry a gun outside the home for self-defense.34 New York’s Sullivan Law effectively prevents such carry and thus violates the Second Amendment.35
He noted that the decision leaves untouched regulations on who may possess firearms.36 It also leaves purchase requirements, permissible weapons, and prohibitions on possession by felons or the mentally ill untouched.37 Alito criticized the dissent’s reliance on gun-violence statistics as irrelevant to the constitutional question presented.38
He pointed to amicus examples of defensive firearm uses that prevented harm.39
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts
Justice Kavanaugh joined by Chief Justice Roberts concurred to emphasize two limits on the decision.40 First, the ruling addresses only discretionary may-issue regimes like New York’s that require a special need.41 The forty-three shall-issue states may continue using objective criteria such as background checks and training.42
Second, the Second Amendment permits a variety of reasonable regulations.43 These include those identified as presumptively lawful in Heller such as prohibitions on felons and the mentally ill, sensitive-place restrictions, and commercial-sale conditions.44
Justice Barrett joined the Court's opinion and wrote separately to highlight methodological points the Court did not resolve.45 She noted that the Court did not conclusively determine how and when postratification practice may bear on the original meaning of the Constitution, mentioning competing scholarly frameworks such as liquidation, tradition, and precedent along with unresolved questions about time limits and forms of practice that might carry weight.46
Second, Barrett noted an ongoing debate. Courts might primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 rather than when the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791.47 The Court's decision avoids resolving that debate because the public understanding in both 1791 and 1868 aligned on the issue here.48 She cautioned that the decision should not be read to endorse freewheeling reliance on mid- to late-19th-century practice to establish original meaning.49
Joined by Justices Sotomayor And Kagan
Justice Breyer joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan dissented on the ground that the Court should have applied means-end scrutiny rather than a near-exclusive history-based test.50 He argued that the Court should not have decided the case without a developed evidentiary record.51 He maintained that the historical sources demonstrate a longstanding tradition of regulating public carry.52
Breyer contended that New York’s law is substantially related to important public-safety interests.53 He maintained that empirical disputes over the effects of shall-issue regimes belong to legislatures, not courts employing an unworkable historical analogue approach.54
Whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the public carry of handguns for self-defense by law-abiding citizens?55
Nothing in the operative clause of the Second Amendment draws a home/public distinction, and the word 'bear' naturally encompasses public carry of arms.56
Yes. The parties conceded that petitioners Koch and Nash are among the people protected by the Second Amendment.57 They also conceded that handguns are weapons in common use today for self-defense.58 The plain text therefore presumptively protects their conduct of carrying handguns publicly for self-defense.59 Nothing in the operative clause draws a home or public distinction.60 The word bear naturally encompasses public carry.61
The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the public carry of handguns for self-defense by law-abiding citizens.62