453 U.S. 454 (1981)
On April 9, 1978, New York State Trooper Douglas Nicot stopped a vehicle traveling at an excessive speed on the New York Thruway.1 The car contained four men including respondent Roger Belton.2 Nicot smelled burnt marihuana and observed an envelope marked Supergold on the floor that he associated with marihuana.3
Nicot directed the men to exit the car and placed them under arrest for unlawful possession of marihuana.4 He patted each man down and separated them into four areas along the Thruway.5 Nicot then searched the passenger compartment and found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton on the back seat.6
Nicot unzipped a pocket of the jacket and discovered cocaine inside.7 He placed the jacket in his own vehicle and transported the four arrestees to a nearby police station.8 Belton was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance.9
In the trial court Belton moved to suppress the cocaine.10 The motion was denied and he pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense while preserving his constitutional claim.11 The Appellate Division upheld the search and seizure.12 The New York Court of Appeals reversed.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether when the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest the constitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his arrest includes the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was riding?15
When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile and may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.16
Yes. Trooper Nicot made a lawful custodial arrest of Belton after smelling burnt marihuana and observing the Supergold envelope on the floor of the car in which Belton was a passenger.17 Nicot directed the four men out of the vehicle, patted them down, and separated them along the Thruway before searching the passenger compartment.18 The black leather jacket belonging to Belton was located on the back seat inside that passenger compartment, and Nicot unzipped a pocket to discover the cocaine.19
Because the arrest was lawful and the jacket was found within the passenger compartment, the search was a valid contemporaneous incident of the arrest under the rule.20
The search of the passenger compartment and the jacket was a valid search incident to Belton's lawful custodial arrest. It did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion of the Court. He explained that because it is apparent that a majority of the Court is unwilling to overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643 (1961), and because the Court does not find it necessary to consider the automobile exception in its disposition of this case, he joined the opinion of the Court.22
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He explained that for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Robbins v. California, he agreed with Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist that these two cases should be decided in the same way, and he also agreed with The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist that this judgment should be reversed.23
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, arguing that the Court had turned its back on the principles of Chimel v. California by adopting an arbitrary bright-line rule that expands the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest beyond the area within the arrestee's immediate control at the time of the search.24 He emphasized that the justifications of officer safety and evidence preservation cease once the arrestee is safely in custody and separated from the vehicle, as occurred here when the men were removed, patted down, and separated before the search.25
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice White dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, contending that the decision represents an extreme extension of Chimel. The ruling authorizes searches of the interior of the car and any container found therein incident to arrest, even absent probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime will be found.26 As to luggage, briefcases, or other containers, this goes too far in overriding the separate privacy interest in containers.
Justice White therefore could not subscribe to the majority's approach.27