276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960)
Jasper W. Hall, a South Carolina resident, died on March 20, 1953, when an airplane operated by Transocean Air Lines, Inc., crashed in California.1 Transocean was a California corporation with its principal place of business in that state.2 An administrator appointed in South Carolina, the widow in her individual capacity, and the widow as guardian ad litem for the minor child brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.3 The administrator resided in New York, while the widow and child resided in South Carolina.4
Mrs. Hall had married in South Carolina shortly after turning fifteen.5 She reached the age of eighteen on November 17, 1954, and the age of twenty-one on November 17, 1957.6 The complaint was filed on November 7, 1958.7 Under South Carolina law, persons remain minors until age twenty-one.8
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by the California one-year statute of limitations incorporated through New York's borrowing provision.9 Judge Levet granted the motion and entered judgment dismissing the action.10 Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.11
The Second Circuit heard argument on January 5, 1960.12 Circuit Judges Lumbard, Moore, and Friendly sat on the panel, with Judge Friendly writing the opinion.13 The court issued its decision on March 2, 1960.14
Whether the New York borrowing statute applies to bar the administrator's claim despite the administrator's New York residence?15
Section 13 of the New York Civil Practice Act provides that where a cause of action arises outside of this state, an action cannot be brought in a court of this state to enforce such cause of action after the expiration of the time limited by the laws either of this state or of the state or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon the cause of action.16 This rule is subject to an exception that where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident of this state, the time limited by the laws of this state shall apply.17
Yes. Although the administrator resides in New York, the case does not fall within the exception to section 13 of the New York Civil Practice Act for causes of action that originally accrued in favor of a resident of the state.18 The court concluded that New York courts would not allow the policy against entertaining time-barred foreign claims by nonresidents to be circumvented through the appointment of a local administrator.19 The decedent was a resident of South Carolina, the administrator was appointed in South Carolina, and the widow and child are South Carolina residents.20
The underlying claim thus did not accrue to a New York resident. The borrowing statute therefore incorporates California's one-year limitations period, which began to run from the date of death.21
The administrator's claim is barred by the California statute of limitations as borrowed by New York law.22
Whether California law or South Carolina law determines the duration of the widow's minority for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations?23
In applying section 13 of the Civil Practice Act, the New York courts would take into account not only the one-year limitation of California applicable to actions for wrongful death but all its accouterments including the provision tolling the statute during minority.24 The question here is one of statutory construction whether the California legislature intended section 25 of the Civil Code to apply only to Californians or to persons acting with respect to California.25
Yes. California law determines the duration of Mrs. Hall's minority for tolling purposes.26 Although matters of status are generally regulated by the law of the domicile, capacity to act is determined by applying the law of the state deemed to have the most significant connection with the act.27 The question is one of statutory construction whether the California legislature intended section 25 of the Civil Code to apply only to Californians or to persons acting with respect to California.28
When the California legislature considered that its own brides of eighteen had sufficient responsibility to conduct suits in California on their own account, it would hardly demand a greater age of a South Carolina bride to do the same.29 Mrs. Hall reached the age of eighteen on November 17, 1954, after her marriage, and the action was begun on November 7, 1958, after the one-year period had expired even with tolling.30
The widow's claim is barred by the California statute of limitations.31
Whether the minor child's wrongful death claim is barred under California decisions treating the action as a single joint cause of action when the adult parent's claim is untimely?32
Yes. The New York courts would follow the California decisions that are directly in point holding that the action is barred as to the minor infant when barred as to the adult parent.35 Although there are other decisions concerning contributory negligence that appellants claim are inconsistent in theory, it is not for the court to say whether the two lines of cases are logically reconcilable.36 Judge Levet was right that the New York courts would not refuse to follow California decisions directly on point simply because of other decisions of courts of the same level alleged to be inconsistent with but in no way reflecting on the pertinent authorities.37
Since the widow's claim is barred, the child's claim asserted through the guardian ad litem is likewise barred.38
The minor child's claim is barred.39