483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California.1
A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot.2 The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary.3 The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet.4
The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it.5 On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house.6
The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall.7 On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition.8 The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing.9
After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition.10 The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck.11 While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property.12 The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court.13 The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.
Whether the California Coastal Commission's imposition of a public access easement condition on the Nollans' coastal development permit violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment?14
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, bars the government from taking private property for public use without just compensation.15 A permanent physical occupation of property effected by governmental action, including the grant of a public easement for continuous passage, constitutes a taking.16 A land-use permit condition requiring conveyance of an interest in property avoids this result only when the condition substantially advances a legitimate state interest and maintains an essential nexus to the specific impact of the proposed development.17
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that the Commission granted the permit only upon the Nollans' agreement to record a deed restriction allowing public passage across the portion of their lot between the mean high tide line and the eight-foot seawall.18 This arrangement produces a permanent physical occupation of the Nollans' beachfront property.19
The facts further establish that the Commission justified the condition by reference to increased view blockage and greater private shorefront use that would cumulatively burden public access, yet the required easement provides lateral passage rather than preserving visual access from the road.20 Because the condition therefore fails to serve the same governmental purpose that would have justified outright denial of the permit, it effects an unconstitutional taking.21
The California Coastal Commission's imposition of the easement condition constitutes an unconstitutional taking of the Nollans' property.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Even under the Court's cramped standard, the permit condition imposed in this case directly responds to the specific type of burden on access created by appellants' development.23 Appellants in this case sought to construct a new dwelling on their beach lot that would both diminish visual access to the beach and move private development closer to the public tidelands.24 The Commission reasonably concluded that such buildout, both individually and cumulatively, threatens public access to the shore.25
It sought to offset this encroachment by obtaining assurance that the public may walk along the shoreline to gain access to the ocean.26 The Court's insistence on a precise fit between the forms of burden and condition on each individual parcel along the California coast would penalize the Commission for its flexibility, hampering the ability to fulfill its public trust mandate.27 The Coastal Commission has drawn on its expertise to preserve the balance between private development and public access, by requiring that any project that intensifies development on the increasingly crowded California coast must be offset by gains in public access.28
Whether the easement condition is reasonably related to the impact of the Nollans' proposed development on public access to the beach?29
A permit condition requiring dedication of property is reasonably related to the impact of development only when it substantially advances the same legitimate state interest that would support denial of the permit and when an essential nexus exists between the condition and the specific burden created by the project.30
No. The established facts show that the Commission found the new three-bedroom house would increase ocean view blockage and private shorefront use, thereby adding to a wall of structures that psychologically deters public beach access. The condition nevertheless requires only an easement for lateral passage along the dry sand.31
That easement does not reduce view blockage from the road, alleviate any psychological barrier, or offset additional congestion on the public beaches.32 The absence of any connection between the required lateral access and the visual-access impact identified in the Commission's findings means the condition is not reasonably related to the development's effects.33
The easement condition is not reasonably related to the impact of the Nollans' proposed development.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun dissents and joins Justice Brennan's opinion.35 He emphasizes that the Commission's factual findings concerning visual blockage and increased private use are entitled to deference.36 The Commission determined that the Nollans' new house would interfere with visual access to the beach, and that determination is supported by the record.
Blackmun argues that the easement condition adequately mitigates the access difficulties created by coastal development in general and the Nollans' project in particular.37 Coastal development by its very nature makes public access to the shore generally more difficult, and the Nollans' structure diminishes the public's visual access to the ocean while decreasing the sense that physical access to the beach is available. Traditional takings analysis compels the conclusion that there is no taking here because the governmental action is a valid exercise of the police power with no economic effect on the value of the property.38
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens dissents and joins Justice Brennan's opinion in Parts I and II.39 He argues that the majority's new essential-nexus test lacks support in precedent because the cases cited by the Court do not establish such a rigid requirement.40 Even under that test, the easement condition remains reasonably related to the burdens the Nollans' larger house imposes on public access along the shifting shoreline.41
Stevens notes that the debate between the Court and Justice Brennan illustrates an extremely important point concerning government regulation of privately owned real estate.42 Intelligent public officials may disagree in good faith about the validity of specific land-use regulations, and the Court's ruling creates uncertainty that chills local land-use planning efforts.43