395 U.S. 711 (1969)
Respondent Pearce was convicted in a North Carolina court upon a charge of assault with intent to commit rape and sentenced to prison for a term of 12 to 15 years.1
Several years later the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed his conviction upon the ground that an involuntary confession had unconstitutionally been admitted in evidence against him.2 He was retried, convicted, and sentenced by the trial judge to an eight-year prison term, which when added to the time he had already spent in prison amounted to a longer total sentence than that originally imposed.3 Pearce then began this habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which held that the longer sentence imposed upon retrial was unconstitutional and void, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.4
Respondent Rice pleaded guilty in an Alabama trial court to four separate charges of second-degree burglary and was sentenced to prison terms aggregating 10 years.5 Two and one-half years later the judgments were set aside in a state coram nobis proceeding upon the ground that Rice had not been accorded his constitutional right to counsel.6 He was retried upon three of the charges, convicted, and sentenced to prison terms aggregating 25 years with no credit given for the time he had already spent in prison.7
Rice then brought this habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. That court held that the state trial court had acted unconstitutionally in failing to give credit for time served and in imposing harsher sentences upon retrial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.9
Whether the Constitution requires that punishment already exacted must be fully credited in imposing a new sentence for the same offense after retrial?10
The constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully credited in imposing a new sentence for the same offense.11
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts.1213 Pearce received credit for time served under the original sentence as the sentencing judge explicitly took prior imprisonment into account when imposing the new term.14 Rice received no credit at all for the two and one-half years already spent in prison.15
This resulted in multiple punishments for the same offense in Rice's case.16 The Court held that the violation is apparent whenever time served is not subtracted from any new sentence imposed.17 Rice's new aggregate term of twenty-five years failed to account for prior imprisonment.18 This principle holds regardless of whether the original conviction was set aside on appeal or in collateral proceedings.19
The Constitution requires that punishment already exacted must be fully credited in imposing a new sentence for the same offense after retrial.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas concurred in the result but would have gone further by holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits any increase in penalty upon retrial after a successful appeal.21 He reasoned that the theory of double jeopardy is that a person need run the gantlet only once for the risk of the range of punishment imposed for particular conduct.22 The defendant risks the maximum permissible punishment when first tried. That risk need not be faced again even if an appeal is taken.23
Douglas emphasized that the second penalty imposed cannot exceed the first penalty if respect is had for the guarantee against double jeopardy.24
Whether the Constitution imposes an absolute bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence upon reconviction after a defendant has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside?25
Neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction. The original conviction has at the defendant's behest been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean as to the unserved portion of the sentence.26
No. The rule applies to the established facts.27 Both Pearce and Rice received longer total sentences upon retrial after their convictions were set aside at their own behest.28 The Court found no absolute constitutional prohibition on such increases when based on events subsequent to the first trial.29 The double jeopardy guarantee imposes no restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconviction once the slate is wiped clean as to the unserved portion.30
Equal protection analysis fails because the problem cannot be rationally cast as an invidious classification between those who seek new trials and those who do not.31
The Constitution does not impose an absolute bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence upon reconviction after a defendant has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the result on the credit issue but dissented from the holding that increased sentences are permissible.33 He argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause as interpreted in Green v. United States should bar any greater punishment on retrial.34 In each instance the defendant was once subjected to the risk of receiving a maximum punishment. It was determined by legal process that he should receive only a specified punishment less than the maximum.35
The choice to appeal should not confront the defendant with the desperate dilemma of risking a harsher sentence. The imposition of an increased sentence on retrial has the same consequences whether effected by an increase in the degree of offense or an augmentation of punishment.36
Whether due process of law requires that, whenever a more severe sentence is imposed upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for doing so must affirmatively appear and be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding?37
Due process of law requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. To assure the absence of such motivation, the reasons for a more severe sentence must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.38
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts. In both cases the state offered no reason or justification for the increased sentences beyond the naked power to impose them.39 The trial judge in Rice's case found that the conclusion was inescapable that Alabama was punishing Rice for exercising his post-conviction right of review.40
The requirement ensures that any increased sentence rests on objective post-sentencing conduct rather than retaliation for the successful appeal.41 The factual data must be made part of the record for appellate review.42
Due process of law requires that, whenever a more severe sentence is imposed upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for doing so must affirmatively appear and be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.43
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black agreed that punishment based on the impermissible motivation of penalizing a defendant for taking an appeal would violate due process.44 He dissented from the Court's promulgation of detailed procedural requirements as a matter of constitutional law.45 Black argued that the Due Process Clause does not grant the Court power to prescribe particular devices such as mandatory affirmative statements of reasons.46
Numerous other mechanisms could serve the same function of assuring the absence of improper motivation.47 He would accept the finding of fact in Rice's case but would not go further and promulgate detailed rules of procedure as constitutional commands.48
Justice White concurred in the judgment and in the opinion except that he would authorize an increased sentence on retrial based on any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding.49 He would not limit the basis solely to conduct occurring after the original sentencing.50 White joined the Court's opinion on all other points but parted company on the precise scope of information a sentencing judge or jury may consider upon retrial.51