407 F.3d 501 (1st Cir. 2005)
Gail M. Norton, a Rhode Island resident, met Russell L. Hoyt, a Connecticut resident, in July 1974.1 Hoyt initially led Norton to believe that he was divorced, but shortly after their adulterous relationship began Norton discovered that Hoyt was actually married.2 At that time Hoyt told Norton he was getting a divorce.3 On or about January 5, 1975, Hoyt told Norton that he had moved out of the marital residence to effectuate the divorce process.4 Because of these statements and similar alleged representations over the years, Norton remained in the relationship with Hoyt for twenty-three years while Hoyt remained married throughout.5
At the outset of the relationship Norton was employed as an elementary school teacher in the Bristol, Rhode Island public school system, a position she had held for some years.6 Norton resigned her teaching position in 1980, offering in her resignation letter that she was resigning to better pursue creative endeavors, though she later claimed the resignation responded to Hoyt's urging that she leave so she could spend more time with him and travel around the world.7 Norton enjoyed an extravagant lifestyle as a result of her relationship with Hoyt, traveling around the world with him while he paid the rent on homes they shared in Vermont and Rhode Island, purchased and maintained her automobiles, allowed her the use of his luxury yachts, and presented her with lavish gifts.8 Norton states that she trusted Hoyt and believed that he would get a divorce, that the couple occasionally discussed plans for their wedding, and that she became pregnant by Hoyt but suffered a spontaneous miscarriage.9
In March 1998 Hoyt formally ended the relationship with Norton.10 Norton was distraught by this turn of events and sought counseling and medical attention to deal with the depression and anxiety she was experiencing.11 She suffered from headaches and stomachaches as well as vomiting and weight loss.12 She reported that she was not able to resume work and possibly would not ever be able to commit to another relationship.13 A registered nurse and licensed social worker who treated Norton recorded that the presenting problem was her twenty-three year relationship in turmoil and noted that Norton was very shocked and experiencing loss of concentration.14 A psychiatrist, Dr. Henry Altman, also worked with Norton, and Hoyt joined Norton in several sessions with Dr. Altman during which Hoyt allegedly told Norton and the doctor that he would continue to support Norton financially and suggested that she would probably be able to live on about $70,000 to $80,000 per year.15
Hoyt supported Norton financially for two years following the break-up, providing her with more than $80,000 in total.16 Norton asserts that when Hoyt broke off the relationship he promised he would place $100,000 in her bank account and establish a trust to support her for life.17 Hoyt told her he had given a letter to his attorney David McOsker that would ensure Norton would be provided for in the event anything happened to Hoyt.18 When she contacted McOsker to request a copy of the letter, Norton discovered that no such letter existed.19 On March 3, 2001, Norton sued Hoyt in Rhode Island Superior Court claiming promissory estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, the tort of outrage, fraud, and breach of promise to marry.20 Hoyt invoked the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction to remove the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.21 Hoyt passed away before the appeal was argued, and as a result David J. McOsker, the executor of Hoyt's estate, replaced him as defendant on appeal.22 The district court dismissed the tort of outrage, fraud, and breach of promise to marry claims and granted Hoyt's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, after which Norton appealed.23
Whether the district court properly asserted diversity jurisdiction over claims arising from the dissolution of an intimate relationship under the domestic relations exception?24
The domestic relations exception divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.25 The aim of the exception is to keep federal courts from meddling in a realm that is peculiarly delicate, that is governed by state law and institutions, and in which inter-court conflicts in policy or decrees should be kept to an absolute minimum.26 Despite the breadth of the phrase domestic relations exception and the potential reach of the exception's aim, the exception is narrowly limited.27 In general, lawsuits affecting domestic relations, however substantially, are not within the exception unless the claim at issue is one to obtain, alter or end a divorce, alimony or child custody decree.28
Yes. The claims brought by Norton do not sound in family law, let alone the specific areas of divorce, alimony, and child custody.29 Norton brought tort and contract claims after the relationship ended.30 The Rhode Island Family Court would have no jurisdiction in this case.31
Even if the Rhode Island Family Court did have jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception would not apply because Norton did not bring any claim related to a divorce, alimony, or a child custody decree.32 The district court therefore properly asserted jurisdiction over the case under diversity jurisdiction.
The district court correctly exercised its diversity jurisdiction because the claims were ordinary tort and contract claims not seeking to alter any domestic relations decree.33
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim?34
Rhode Island law recognizes a claim for promissory estoppel.35 This doctrine is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.36 Traditionally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been invoked as a substitute for consideration, rendering a gratuitous promise enforceable as a contract.37 Rhode Island law also extends the doctrine to situations in which the promisee's reliance on the promise was induced, and injustice may only be avoided by enforcement of the promise.38 To establish promissory estoppel under Rhode Island law, the plaintiff must prove three conditions: (1) A clear and unambiguous promise; (2) Reasonable and justifiable reliance upon the promise; and (3) Detriment to the promisee, caused by his or her reliance on the promise.39 Historically, any promise by one who has a living spouse to make an engagement to marry another is void as against public policy, and the doctrine of estoppel has no application to a contract which is void because it violates the dictates of public policy.40 Rhode Island has never recognized a cause of action for palimony, which is a court's award of post-relationship support or compensation for services, money, and goods contributed during a long-term nonmarital relationship.41
Yes. Norton's promissory estoppel claim fails for two principal reasons.42 First, her claim does not satisfy the conditions required to make out a claim of promissory estoppel.43 The alleged promise is probably too vague to be legally enforceable.44
Norton's alleged reliance on the promise was unreasonable because she discovered very early in her relationship with Hoyt that he had not been honest with her about his marital status.45 Then, for twenty-three long years he continually failed to make good on his promise to divorce his wife and marry her.46 Throughout that time, he repeatedly broke his promises.47 The record shows that Hoyt continued to engage in family events and, at least at times, to live in his marital home with his wife and children.48
Second, her claim sounds in palimony, which is a cause of action that has not been recognized in Rhode Island.49 Norton did not have a property sharing agreement with Hoyt.50 Norton seeks enforcement of a promise for future support payments, which is palimony and not a valid cause of action in Rhode Island.51
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim because Norton failed to meet the elements of the claim and because Rhode Island does not recognize palimony actions.52
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim?53
Rhode Island has adopted the standard for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim set forth in section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.54 Under this standard, liability is only imposed after four factors have been proven: (1) the conduct must be intentional or in reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress in question must be severe.55 In addition, unlike many states that have adopted the Restatement, Rhode Island also requires that there be some medical proof establishing physical symptoms of distress.56 The Rhode Island Supreme Court uses a combined standard for the analysis of whether the claim meets the first two elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.57 This standard requires that the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.58 Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!59
Yes. Norton has failed to prove intentional infliction of emotional harm.60 At the threshold of the analysis of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the relationship comprises the kind of soil in which the seeds of a section 46 claim for emotional harm may sprout.61 Since the Rhode Island Supreme Court has shown no signs of limiting this cause of action to a select few relationships, the availability of the claim is assumed in this case.62
In her affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, Norton states that the actions of the defendant in breaking his promises and his abandonment of your affiant have caused affiant to become nervous, anxious, crying, depressed and extremely vulnerable.63 However, merely breaking-up an extramarital affair does not constitute outrageous conduct.64 Although Norton was understandably devastated and depressed by Hoyt's termination of their affair, Hoyt was entitled to break up with his girlfriend.65 The actor is never liable where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress.66
Having found that Norton failed to establish the first two elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the claim cannot prevail.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the conduct was not extreme and outrageous.67