578 U.S. 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016)
In 2008, brothers Hernan Alexis Moreno Mejia and Edwin Javier Mejia co-owned and operated the Majestic Auto Repair Shop in Baltimore.1 Majestic was struggling to attract customers, so the brothers made a deal with Baltimore police officer Jhonn Corona.2 In exchange for kickbacks, Corona referred motorists whose cars were damaged in accidents to Majestic for towing and repairs.3
Corona spread word of the arrangement to other members of the force, and eventually as many as 60 other officers sent damaged cars to Majestic in exchange for payments of $150 to $300 per referral.4 Petitioner Samuel Ocasio, a Baltimore police officer, began participating in the scheme in 2009.5
On several occasions from 2009 to 2011, Ocasio convinced accident victims to have their cars towed to Majestic.6 He often called Moreno from the scene to confirm that the make, model, damage, and insurance coverage would allow profitable repairs before directing the vehicle.7 After directing a vehicle to Majestic, Ocasio would call Moreno and request his payment.8
The scheme substantially increased Majestic's business volume and profits, and by early 2011 it provided the shop with at least 90 percent of its customers.9 In 2011 Moreno, Mejia, Ocasio, and nine other Baltimore officers were indicted.10 The shopowners and most of the other officers eventually pleaded guilty, but Ocasio did not.11
In a superseding indictment Ocasio was charged with three counts of violating the Hobbs Act by obtaining money from Moreno under color of official right.12 He was also charged with conspiring with another officer and the shopowners to commit such violations under 18 U.S.C. § 371.13 Before trial Ocasio requested a jury instruction requiring proof that the conspiracy was to obtain money from a person outside the conspiracy, citing a Sixth Circuit decision.14 The District Court denied the request and instead gave standard conspiracy instructions.15
The jury convicted Ocasio on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 18 months in prison.16 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
Whether a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right?18
The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, makes it a crime to conspire to commit any offense against the United States.19 Under established principles of conspiracy law, a conspirator need not agree to commit every element of the substantive offense or even be capable of committing it.20 It is sufficient that the conspirator agreed that the underlying crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy capable of committing it, as illustrated by precedents such as Salinas v. United States, United States v. Holte, and Gebardi v. United States.21 These principles apply directly to a Hobbs Act conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right under 18 U.S.C. § 1951.22
Yes. Petitioner Ocasio and the shopowners Moreno and Mejia reached an agreement with the common purpose that Ocasio and other police officers would obtain money from the shopowners under color of official right.23 Although the shopowners could not commit the substantive offense themselves because they were not public officials, they could conspire to have the officers commit it, consistent with precedents like United States v. Holte and Gebardi v. United States.24 The evidence showed that Ocasio called Moreno to confirm profitable repairs and requested payments after referrals, and the scheme provided the shop with 90 percent of its customers by early 2011.
The District Court properly denied the requested instruction requiring proof of agreement to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy and gave standard conspiracy instructions requiring an unlawful agreement, knowing membership, an overt act, and furtherance of the objective, which the jury followed in convicting Ocasio on all counts.25
A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right. Ocasio's conspiracy conviction is therefore affirmed.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority but noted that Evans v. United States may have been wrongly decided.27 He observed that the Court decided Evans without the benefit of full briefing on extortion's common-law history.28 The present case underscores problems that Evans raises because courts and juries must draw difficult distinctions between the somewhat involuntary behavior of a bribe payor and the voluntary behavior of the same bribe payor.29
These distinctions may determine whether there is or is not a conspiracy.30 Nevertheless Breyer joined the majority's opinion in full because Evans must be taken as good law.31
Justice Thomas argued that the Court should not extend the error of Evans, which wrongly equated extortion with bribery, to the conspiracy context.32 Under the correct common-law understanding the payor is a victim and not a participant, so an extortionist cannot conspire with the person he is extorting.33 The record confirms that the scheme here did not involve extortion as the common law understood that crime because the shopowners participated as full partners and benefited from the referrals.34
The Government itself does not maintain that the repair-shop owners paid Ocasio based on his assertion of a false pretense of official right.35 The decision further expands federal criminal liability in a way that conflicts with principles of federalism.36
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts
Justice Sotomayor, joined by the Chief Justice, contended that the natural reading of obtaining property from another requires the conspirators to agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy.37 The majority's interpretation is atextual and relies on an unsupported assumption that the Hobbs Act's use of from another takes as its reference point the vantage of Ocasio alone rather than the conspiratorial group.38 This approach risks exposing innocent victims of extortion to conspiracy charges whenever they agree to pay a bribe.39
The Court offers no explanation grounded in the text of the statute or age-old principles of conspiracy law for why its assumption is correct.40