246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966)
In 1964 Donald Odorizzi worked as an elementary school teacher for the Bloomfield School District under a contract to continue teaching the following year as a permanent employee.1 On June 10 he was arrested on criminal charges of homosexual activity.2 The next day he signed and delivered a written resignation to his superiors, which the district accepted on June 13.3
In July the criminal charges against Odorizzi were dismissed under Penal Code section 995.4 In September he sought to resume his employment with the district, but the district refused to reinstate him.5 Odorizzi then filed suit for declaratory and other relief and later amended his complaint.6
The amended complaint alleged that Odorizzi was under severe mental and emotional strain at the time he signed the resignation, having just completed the process of arrest, questioning by the police, booking, and release on bail and having gone for 40 hours without sleep, rendering him incapable of rational thought or action.7 While in this condition the superintendent of the district and the principal of his school came to his apartment.8 They stated they were trying to help him and had his best interests at heart, that he should take their advice and immediately resign his position, that there was no time to consult an attorney, that if he did not resign immediately the district would suspend and dismiss him from his position and publicize the proceedings causing him extreme embarrassment and humiliation, but that if he resigned at once the incident would not be publicized and would not jeopardize his chances of securing employment as a teacher elsewhere.9
A demurrer to the amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend, resulting in a judgment dismissing the complaint.10 Odorizzi appealed from that judgment to the California Court of Appeal.11
Whether the amended complaint states facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of duress or menace?12
Duress consists in unlawful confinement of another’s person, or relatives, or property, which causes him to consent to a transaction through fear.13 Menace is technically a threat of duress or a threat of injury to the person, property, or character of another.14 The action or threat in duress or menace must be unlawful, and a threat to take legal action is not unlawful unless the party making the threat knows the falsity of his claim.15 The school officials acted in good faith in the performance of their duties under the Education Code when announcing their intention to initiate suspension and dismissal proceedings.16
No. The established facts show that Odorizzi was arrested on June 10 on criminal charges and signed his resignation the next day on June 11, after which the district accepted it on June 13.17 The school superintendent and principal announced their intention to initiate suspension and dismissal proceedings under Education Code sections 13403, 13408 et seq. at a time when the filing of such proceedings was not only their legal right but their positive duty as school officials under Education Code section 13409.18 Because the threat to take legal action was lawful and made in good faith, the amended complaint does not plead the required element of an unlawful act or threat necessary for duress or menace.19
The amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of duress or menace, so that theory cannot support relief.20
Whether the amended complaint states facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of fraud?21
Actual fraud involves conscious misrepresentation, or concealment, or non-disclosure of a material fact which induces the innocent party to enter the contract.22 It requires pleading of misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage.23 Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary relationship to another which induces justifiable reliance by the latter to his prejudice.24 No presumption of a confidential relationship arises from the bare fact that parties to a contract are employer and employee.25 Additional ties must be brought out to create the presumption of a confidential relationship between the two, especially where the parties are negotiating to bring about a termination of their relationship.26
No. The established facts indicate that the superintendent and principal came to Odorizzi’s apartment while he was in a weakened condition and made statements about helping him and the consequences of resignation versus suspension, yet the amended complaint failed to assert the elements of knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance, and justifiable reliance needed for actual fraud.27 The facts further show only the employer-employee relationship between the district representatives and Odorizzi, with no additional ties pleaded to support a confidential relationship, and the negotiations concerned termination of that relationship where each party is expected to look after his own interests.28 Therefore the amended complaint lacks the required elements for either actual or constructive fraud.29
The amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of fraud, so that theory cannot support relief.30
Whether the amended complaint states facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of mistake?31
The doctrine of mistake customarily involves such errors as the nature of the transaction, the identity of the parties, the identity of the things to which the contract relates, or the occurrence of collateral happenings.32 The material facts of the transaction must be unknown to one party while the other takes advantage, and errors in evaluating the probable consequences or predicting the future course of events do not constitute mistake.33
No. The established facts demonstrate that both Odorizzi and the school district representatives knew the material facts of the arrest on June 10, the signing of the resignation on June 11, and the acceptance on June 13, with the discussion principally attempting to evaluate the probable consequences of Odorizzi’s predicament and to predict the future course of events.34 The amended complaint discloses no facts suggesting that consent had been obtained through a mistake of fact or of law.35 Neither party was laboring under any misapprehension of law of which the other took advantage, and the speculations about future events do not qualify as the type of error required for mistake.36
The amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of mistake, so that theory cannot support relief.37
Whether the amended complaint states facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of undue influence?38
Undue influence is persuasion which tends to be coercive in nature, persuasion which overcomes the will without convincing the judgment, and includes taking an unfair advantage of another’s weakness of mind or taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another’s necessities or distress.39 It involves the combination of undue susceptibility in the servient person and excessive pressure by the dominating person, which may be shown by a pattern of elements such as discussion at an unusual time, consummation in an unusual place, insistent demand that the business be finished at once, extreme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay, use of multiple persuaders, absence of third-party advisers, and statements that there is no time to consult an attorney.40
Yes. The established facts establish that Odorizzi was under severe mental and emotional strain at the time he signed the resignation on June 11, having just completed the process of arrest, questioning, booking, and release on bail and having gone for 40 hours without sleep, rendering him incapable of rational thought or action and creating the requisite undue susceptibility.41 While in this condition the superintendent and principal came to his apartment, assured him they were trying to help, insisted he resign immediately with no time to consult an attorney, emphasized that failure to resign would lead to suspension, dismissal, and publicizing the proceedings causing extreme embarrassment, but that resignation would avoid publicity and protect future employment prospects, thereby applying the excessive pressure through multiple elements of the undue influence pattern at an unusual time and place with insistent demands and warnings about delay.42 These facts pleaded both the subjective element of weakened capacity and the objective element of overpersuasion sufficient to put in issue whether Odorizzi’s free will had been overborne.43
The amended complaint states facts sufficient to rescind the resignation on the ground of undue influence, so the judgment dismissing the complaint must be reversed to allow the claim to proceed.44