484 U.S. 97 (1987)
Omni Capital International, Ltd., and Omni Capital Corporation, New York corporations, marketed an investment program involving commodity-futures trades on the London Metals Exchange.1
They employed Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., a British corporation with its offices in London, as a broker to handle trades on that Exchange.2 James Gourlay, a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom, served as Wolff's representative in soliciting this business from Omni.3
A number of corporate and individual investors who participated in Omni's investment program then sued Omni in four separate actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in each action charged that, by misrepresenting its tax benefits and future profits, Omni fraudulently induced them to participate in the investment program.4 The original complaints, filed in 1980 and 1981, charged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rule 10b-5, and the Securities Act of 1933, along with pendent state-law claims.5 After this Court decided Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran recognizing an implied private cause of action under the Commodity Exchange Act, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to allege violations of sections 4b and 9(b) of the CEA.6
Omni impleaded Wolff and Gourlay, contending that its liability, if any, was caused by their improper trading activities.7 Wolff and Gourlay moved to dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction.8 In its initial opinion dated May 13, 1983, the District Court dismissed the securities law claims as having been pre-empted by the CEA but concluded that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over Wolff and Gourlay.9
After the Fifth Circuit decided DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., the District Court granted reconsideration.10 Upon its reconsideration, the District Court concluded that, in accord with DeMelo, unless jurisdiction can be asserted under the Louisiana long-arm statute, there is no personal jurisdiction over Wolff or Gourlay.11 Because, in its view, the requirements of the Louisiana long-arm statute were not met, the District Court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Wolff and Gourlay, and it directed the entry of a final judgment dismissing all claims against them.12 The Fifth Circuit decided the ensuing appeals en banc in the first instance and, by a 9-to-6 vote, affirmed in Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415 (1986).13 Because of a possible conflict with views of the Sixth Circuit expressed in Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 732 F.2d 1265 (1984), we granted certiorari to decide whether, in this federal-question litigation arising under the CEA, the District Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Wolff and Gourlay.14
Whether, in this federal-question litigation arising under the Commodity Exchange Act, the District Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Wolff and Gourlay?15
Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.16 Absent consent, there must be authorization for service of summons on the defendant under a federal statute or, under Rule 4(e), the long-arm statute of the state in which the district court sits.17
No. The Commodity Exchange Act contains no provision authorizing service of process on Wolff and Gourlay in a private action.1819 The Louisiana long-arm statute does not reach them on the facts presented because they did not regularly do business or derive substantial revenue in Louisiana.20 Rule 4(e) therefore supplies no basis for amenability to service.21 The District Court initially found jurisdiction but reconsidered after DeMelo and dismissed the claims against the foreign defendants.2223
The Fifth Circuit affirmed that dismissal en banc.24
The District Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over Wolff and Gourlay.25
Whether the Commodity Exchange Act implicitly authorizes nationwide service of process for private causes of action?26
When a federal statute is silent as to service of process, a federal court looks to the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits under the second sentence of Rule 4(e).27 Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service when it wishes to do so, as shown by its explicit provisions in other sections of the CEA and in the securities laws.28
No. Although other enforcement provisions of the CEA explicitly authorize nationwide service, the private right of action recognized in Curran and later codified in section 22 contains no such provision.2930 The legislative history confirms that Congress did not intend to extend nationwide service to private litigants under the CEA.31
The Commodity Exchange Act does not implicitly authorize nationwide service of process for private causes of action.32
Whether federal courts should create a common-law rule authorizing service of process to fill a gap in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?33
Specific legislative authorization of extraterritorial service of summons has always been required for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person outside the district.34 Courts should not devise common-law service-of-process provisions when Congress has acted on the assumption that federal courts cannot add to the scope of service Congress has authorized.35
No. Creating an ad hoc rule authorizing service on alien defendants in federal-question cases would exceed the proper judicial role.3637 Such a step would undermine the statutory scheme Congress enacted section by section.38 It would also ignore the availability of alternative forums such as British courts that may enforce the CEA.39 The Court declines to fashion such a rule even if it had the power to do so.40
Federal courts should not create a common-law rule authorizing service of process to fill a gap in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.41