470 U.S. 298 (1985)
In December 1981, the home of Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert Gross in Salem, Oregon, was burglarized, with art objects and furnishings valued at $150,000 missing.1
A witness implicated 18-year-old Michael James Elstad, a neighbor and friend of the Grosses' teenage son.2 Officers Burke and McAllister arrived at Elstad's home with an arrest warrant. Elstad's mother led them to his bedroom where he lay on his bed. The officers asked him to get dressed and accompany them to the living room.3
Officer Burke asked Elstad if he knew why they were there and if he knew the Gross family. Burke then stated he felt Elstad was involved in the burglary, and Elstad responded, "Yes, I was there."4
The officers arrested Elstad and transported him to the Polk County Sheriff's office.5 Approximately one hour later, the officers joined Elstad in an interrogation room.6 Detective McAllister advised Elstad of his Miranda rights from a printed card. Elstad indicated he understood his rights and wished to speak with the officers.7 He then provided a full statement explaining that he had known the Gross family was out of town, had been paid to lead acquaintances to the residence, and showed them how to enter through a defective sliding glass door.8 The statement was typed, reviewed, corrected, initialed, and signed by Elstad and the officers.9 Elstad added a sentence about receiving a bag of grass.10
Elstad was charged with first-degree burglary.11 He waived his right to a jury trial.12 Before trial, he moved to suppress both his oral statement at home and his signed confession at the station.13 The trial court suppressed the initial statement but admitted the written confession, finding it was given freely, voluntarily, and knowingly after a valid waiver.14 Elstad was convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment plus $18,000 in restitution.15
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.16 The court held that the second statement was inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree because the connection between the inadmissible first statement and the written confession was not sufficiently attenuated.17 The Oregon Supreme Court declined review.18 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether the Self-Incrimination Clause requires suppression of a confession made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission.19
Whether the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression of a confession made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the suspect?20
The Self-Incrimination Clause does not require the suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the suspect.21 A simple failure to administer Miranda warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion, does not so taint the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver of Miranda rights and a properly obtained confession must be excluded from evidence.22 Miranda is a prophylactic rule designed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is not a constitutional right in itself.23
Yes.
The officers obtained an initial statement from Elstad in the living room of his parents' home without first administering Miranda warnings, but the exchange involved no threats, promises, or other coercive tactics.24 Elstad was then transported to the sheriff's office where, approximately one hour later, Detective McAllister read the full Miranda warnings from a printed card.25 Elstad stated that he understood his rights, signed the waiver card, and provided a detailed typed confession that he reviewed, corrected, initialed, and signed.26 The trial court expressly found that the second statement was given freely, voluntarily, and knowingly after a valid waiver and was not tainted by the earlier brief exchange.27
Because the initial statement was voluntary though unwarned, and because the subsequent interrogation was conducted after complete warnings and a knowing waiver with no evidence of exploitation or improper tactics, the second confession is admissible.28 The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not apply to this Fifth Amendment prophylactic violation in the same manner as to a Fourth Amendment violation, and the trial court's voluntariness finding is supported by the record.29
The second confession should not have been suppressed, and the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals is reversed.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissents, contending that the majority delivers a potentially crippling blow to Miranda by rejecting the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine for Miranda violations.31 He argues that the majority's rule will encourage police to engage in two-step interrogations, first obtaining an unwarned admission and then administering warnings to obtain a second confession, thereby undermining Miranda.32 Brennan maintains that the majority's distinction between a Miranda violation and a constitutional violation is unpersuasive because Miranda is a constitutional decision grounded in the Fifth Amendment.33
He would affirm the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals.34
Justice Stevens joins Justice Brennan's dissent and writes separately to emphasize that the majority's decision is inconsistent with the principles underlying Miranda v. Arizona.35 He maintains that the prophylactic rules established in Miranda are constitutional in character and that a violation of those rules requires suppression of the evidence obtained.36 Stevens contends that the majority's approach creates an incentive for police misconduct by allowing officers to ignore Miranda in the first instance, secure an admission, and then cure the violation with subsequent warnings.37
This cannot be squared with the Fifth Amendment.38
Whether a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet noncoercive questioning is disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings?39
A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet noncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.40 The Miranda warnings serve to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, and the presumption is that a suspect who has been properly advised of his rights will understand them and will not be coerced into speaking.41
No. Elstad answered the initial noncoercive question at home without warnings.42 After receiving complete Miranda warnings at the station and affirming that he understood his rights, he executed a written waiver and gave a full confession.43 The warnings cured the condition that had rendered the first statement inadmissible, and Elstad's subsequent choice to speak is highly probative of a knowing and voluntary waiver.44
A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet noncoercive questioning is not disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after proper Miranda warnings.45
Whether the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to Miranda violations so as to require suppression of a subsequent confession obtained after proper warnings when an initial statement was taken without warnings?46
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to violations of the Fourth Amendment. It does not apply in the same way to Miranda violations.47 Miranda is a prophylactic rule designed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It is not a constitutional right in itself, and a violation of Miranda does not necessarily mean that the Fifth Amendment has been violated.48
No. The Oregon Court of Appeals applied Wong Sun and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis to the Miranda violation, but that doctrine does not govern here.49 The admissibility of the second statement turns on whether, after the Miranda warnings, Elstad's waiver of the right to remain silent was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, including the manner of the subsequent interrogation.50
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not require suppression of the second confession.51