440 U.S. 268 (1979)
On February 26, 1974, a final decree of divorce was entered dissolving the marriage of William Orr and Lillian Orr.1 The decree directed Mr. Orr to pay Mrs. Orr $1,240 per month in alimony pursuant to a settlement agreement that the parties had entered and that the Lee County Circuit Court incorporated into the decree.2
On July 28, 1976, Mrs. Orr initiated a contempt proceeding in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, alleging that Mr. Orr was in arrears on his alimony payments.3 At the August 19, 1976 hearing on the petition, Mr. Orr submitted a motion requesting that the Alabama alimony statutes be declared unconstitutional because they authorize courts to place an obligation of alimony upon husbands but never upon wives.4
The Circuit Court denied Mr. Orr's motion and entered judgment against him for $5,524 covering back alimony and attorney fees.5 Mr. Orr appealed the judgment to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the constitutionality of the statutes.6 The Alabama Supreme Court granted Mr. Orr's petition for a writ of certiorari but on November 10, 1977, without opinion, quashed the writ as improvidently granted.7
Mr. Orr then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.8 Neither Mrs. Orr nor the Alabama courts objected to the timeliness of the constitutional claim.9 The lower courts reached and decided the federal question on the merits.10
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge where the claim was first raised more than two years after the divorce decree in a contempt proceeding?11
When state courts consider and decide a federal constitutional question on the merits without objection to timeliness and without resting on an adequate and independent state ground, the Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction to review the judgment even if the federal claim was presented for the first time in post-decree contempt proceedings.12
Yes. The Alabama Circuit Court denied Mr. Orr's motion and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed after expressly reaching the federal equal protection claim.13 Neither Mrs. Orr nor the Alabama courts raised any timeliness objection, and the lower courts treated the constitutional issue as properly before them.14 The Alabama Supreme Court later quashed certiorari without opinion, yet the federal question had already been decided on the merits below.15
Because the state courts deemed the federal constitutional question to be before them and resolved it adversely to the federal right asserted, no adequate and independent state ground bars review.16
The Supreme Court therefore possesses jurisdiction to decide the constitutional challenge.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell argued that the Court should abstain from deciding the equal protection issue because two unsettled questions of Alabama law could moot the federal question.18 The first concerned whether the constitutional challenge was timely when raised for the first time in a contempt proceeding more than two years after the divorce decree.19 The second involved whether the settlement agreement created an independent contractual obligation enforceable under state law.20
He contended that principles of federalism and the Pullman abstention doctrine required remand to the Alabama Supreme Court to resolve these state-law issues before reaching the constitutional claim.21 This approach would avoid unnecessarily deciding a federal question of considerable importance.22
Whether Mr. Orr has standing to challenge the Alabama alimony statutes when he did not request alimony for himself and his obligation arose from a stipulated settlement agreement?23
A party required to bear a burden under a gender-based statute possesses standing to challenge its constitutionality even if success might not ultimately relieve the burden, because the State could respond either by extending the benefit to the previously excluded class or by withdrawing the benefit from both classes.24
Yes. Mr. Orr bears the concrete burden of paying $1,240 monthly in alimony and the $5,524 judgment for arrears, a burden that would not exist if he were female.25 Although he never sought alimony for himself and the obligation originated in a stipulated agreement incorporated into the decree, the possibility that Alabama might neutralize the statutes by extending alimony rights to needy husbands or by abolishing alimony altogether means that success here could relieve his obligation.26 The burden itself establishes the personal stake necessary for standing in an equal protection attack on an underinclusive statute.27
Mr. Orr therefore has standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the Alabama alimony statutes.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger
Justice Rehnquist maintained that Mr. Orr lacked standing because he never claimed entitlement to alimony.29 His obligation arose from a private settlement agreement that might remain enforceable under state contract law independent of the statutes.30 There was no substantial likelihood that invalidation of the statutes would free him from payment.31
He argued that the Court had dealt too casually with Article III requirements by assuming answers to unresolved state-law questions that could eliminate any case or controversy.32 The possibility that Alabama would respond by abolishing alimony was, as a practical matter, nonexistent.33
Whether the Alabama alimony statutes that authorize awards only to wives and impose obligations only on husbands violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?34
Gender-based classifications must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives; a statute that imposes alimony obligations on husbands but never on wives fails this test when the asserted purposes of compensating for past discrimination or aiding needy spouses can be served equally well by a gender-neutral scheme that already provides for individualized hearings on financial need.35
Yes. The Alabama statutes expressly discriminate on the basis of gender by authorizing alimony awards only to wives and imposing payment obligations only on husbands.3637 Although assisting needy spouses and compensating for past discrimination against women constitute important objectives, the classification is not substantially related to either goal.38 Individualized hearings already occur at which relative financial circumstances are examined, so sex is unnecessary as a proxy for need.39
The statutes also provide no compensation to women who were not dependent during marriage and instead confer an advantage only on financially secure wives whose husbands are needy.40 Because a gender-neutral statute would achieve the same purposes without reinforcing stereotypes, the classification violates the Equal Protection Clause.41
The Alabama alimony statutes therefore violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the merits as well.43 He argued that men and women are not similarly situated with respect to the financial consequences of divorce because women have traditionally been dependent on husbands.44 He viewed the statutes as a reasonable means of compensating for that historical dependency.45
He maintained that the Court had wrongly concluded they were not substantially related to the compensatory objective.46 The Equal Protection Clause requires only that persons similarly situated be treated alike, and the Alabama scheme recognized a real difference in dependency.47
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment that the statutes are unconstitutional but wrote separately to emphasize that the decision does not render all gender-based classifications invalid.48 He noted that some differences between men and women may justify differential treatment in appropriate circumstances.49 Yet the Alabama scheme lacked sufficient justification for its rigid gender line.50
The Court has recognized that there are some differences between men and women that may justify different treatment in some circumstances.51