5 Cal. App. 4th 234, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (1992)
Michael Osborn was born on January 28, 1983, with isolated ventricular inversion, a rare heart condition.1 On February 24, 1983, he underwent surgery at the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center to repair the condition.2 During the procedure he received 12 units or components of blood supplied by Irwin Memorial Blood Bank.3 Michael showed no symptoms of AIDS for over four years but tested positive for HIV in August 1987 after receiving a letter from the University recommending testing for recipients of pre-1985 transfusions.4
He was later diagnosed with an AIDS-related brain tumor and underwent surgery for its partial removal.5 We have been advised that he has died during the pendency of this appeal.6 The donor whose blood transmitted the virus was never identified.7
Three days before the February 1983 surgery, Michael's parents spoke with Irwin's receptionist after learning of AIDS risks from newspapers and television.8 They had lined up seven family members and thirty-five coworkers willing to donate.9 The receptionist stated that donations could not be earmarked for Michael's specific use.10 The receptionist advised them that their donations would be credited to Michael’s account, but could not be reserved specifically for his use.11 Irwin's internal February 4, 1982 memorandum from medical director Dr. Herbert Perkins indicated directed donations were discouraged but would be accepted if the patient and physician insisted.12 The receptionist did not recall any policy at the time of trial.13
The suit was filed in May 1988.14 After the November 1988 jury trial, the court granted nonsuit and directed verdict motions eliminating most claims against both defendants.15 The jury returned a 9-3 general verdict against Irwin for $550,000 to Michael and $200,000 to his parents on the remaining claims of negligence and intentional and negligent misrepresentation.16 Irwin moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.17 The court granted JNOV on intentional misrepresentation and negligence, leaving only negligent misrepresentation, then conditionally granted a new trial subject to plaintiffs' acceptance of a reduced MICRA-conformed judgment of $416,307 with periodic future payments.18
At trial, evidence showed Irwin began adding AIDS-related questions to donor histories on January 7, 1983, after the December 1982 CDC report of possible transfusion-associated AIDS, and expanded questioning on February 8, 1983.19 Irwin ordered 10,000 anti-HBc test kits on February 10, 1983, but did not begin testing until March 1983.20 No blood bank performed anti-HBc surrogate testing for AIDS in January or February 1983.21 Plaintiffs' experts Dr. Thomas Asher, Dr. William O'Connor, and Dr. J. Garrott Allen opined that Irwin's actions were inadequate.22
The University moved for and received nonsuit and directed verdict on all claims against it, including medical malpractice, misrepresentation, negligence, emotional distress, battery, and breach of contract.23 Plaintiffs accepted the reduced judgment and appealed, as did Irwin.24
Whether Irwin Memorial Blood Bank was negligent in its donor screening and blood testing practices in January and February 1983?25
In cases of professional negligence against a blood bank, the standard of care is that degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by other blood banks under similar circumstances.26 This standard is established by expert testimony on accepted professional practices at the time.27 Compliance with such accepted practice is generally conclusive evidence of due care.28 A plaintiff cannot prevail by showing only that an entire profession lagged behind theoretical recommendations.29
No. The established facts show that in January and February 1983 Irwin began adding AIDS-related questions to donor histories on January 7 after the December 1982 CDC report and expanded questioning on February 8, while ordering 10,000 anti-HBc test kits on February 10 but not beginning testing until March.30 No blood bank performed anti-HBc surrogate testing for AIDS during those months.31 Although plaintiffs' experts Dr. Asher, Dr. O'Connor, and Dr. Allen opined that Irwin's actions were inadequate, the absence of any blood bank performing the recommended tests means the opinions did not establish a departure from accepted practice.32
The court therefore properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the negligence claim because there was no substantial evidence that Irwin failed to meet the professional standard.33
Irwin Memorial Blood Bank was not negligent as a matter of law.34
Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Michael Osborn's rare blood type on the issue of proximate cause for the negligent misrepresentation claim?35
Evidence is relevant to proximate cause if it tends to show that the harm would have occurred even absent the defendant's conduct.36 Erroneous exclusion of such evidence on a material issue in a close case is prejudicial if it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached without the error.37
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Michael had type A-negative blood, a rare type possessed by only 6 percent of donors, that none of his family members could donate compatible blood, and that the 35 coworkers lined up by his parents likely could have supplied only a small fraction of the 12 units or components needed.38 Irwin sought to introduce this evidence to show that directed donations would not have been feasible and thus the receptionist's misrepresentation could not have proximately caused the harm.39 The trial court excluded the evidence, but it was relevant to whether the misrepresentation affected the outcome.40
Given the 9-3 verdict after more than three days of deliberation and the close nature of the case, the exclusion was prejudicial and requires a new trial on the negligent misrepresentation claim.41
The trial court erred in excluding the evidence, necessitating a new trial on negligent misrepresentation.42
Whether the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center was entitled to nonsuit and directed verdict on the claims of misrepresentation, negligence, and emotional distress?43
A nonsuit or directed verdict is proper when, giving the plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict on any element of the claim, including duty, breach, causation, or outrageous conduct.44
Yes. The established facts show that Dr. Stanger told the Osborns only that directed donations were not possible at the University because it obtained all blood from Irwin under contract.45 He suggested they take the matter up with Irwin.46 These statements were not representations about the safety of the blood supply or Irwin's directed-donation policy.47 No expert testimony supported claims that the University was negligent in using Irwin as its sole supplier or in failing to perform surrogate tests.48 There was likewise no evidence of outrageous conduct or any negligence by University personnel that could support emotional-distress claims.49
The court therefore properly granted nonsuit and directed verdict on all claims against the University.50
The University was entitled to nonsuit and directed verdict on the claims.51
Whether MICRA damage limitations applied to the judgment against Irwin Memorial Blood Bank?52
MICRA's damage limitations apply to claims of professional negligence by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services.53 The court need not reach the issue when liability has already been resolved against the plaintiff on other grounds or when the parties have not briefed the threshold applicability question.54
No. The established facts indicate that after granting JNOV on negligence and intentional misrepresentation, the trial court conditionally granted a new trial subject to acceptance of a reduced judgment conforming to MICRA.55 The appellate court expressly declined to address MICRA's application. The parties had not briefed whether a negligent-misrepresentation claim by a receptionist constituted professional negligence. Liability on the remaining claim remained unresolved after the finding of prejudicial evidentiary error. The court therefore did not decide whether MICRA applied.56
The court did not reach or decide whether MICRA applied.57