140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020)
Agnes Morrissey-Berru taught fifth and sixth grade at Our Lady of Guadalupe School, a Roman Catholic primary school in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, for many years under annual employment agreements that set out the school's mission to develop and promote a Catholic School Faith Community.1 She held a B.A. in English Language Arts with a minor in secondary education and a California teaching credential, and at the school's request she took religious education courses while on the faculty.2 Her agreements required her to perform all duties within that overriding commitment, to model and promote Catholic faith and morals, to participate in school liturgical activities as requested, and to comply with the faculty handbook; the pastor of the parish had to approve her hiring each year.3 She taught religion daily using a textbook designed for Catholic students, prepared students for Mass, communion, and confession, selected students to read at Mass, took students to Mass weekly and on feast days, prayed with students daily including the Hail Mary, Apostle's Creed, and Nicene Creed, directed an annual passion play, and was evaluated on whether Catholic values were infused through all subject areas.4
In 2014 Our Lady of Guadalupe School asked Morrissey-Berru to move from full-time to part-time status and the following year declined to renew her contract.5 She filed a charge with the EEOC, received a right-to-sue letter, and sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, alleging the decisions were made to replace her with a younger teacher.6 The school maintained that its decisions rested on classroom performance difficulties with a new reading and writing program introduced to maintain accreditation.7
Kristen Biel worked at St. James School, another Catholic primary school in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, first as a long-term substitute first-grade teacher and then as a full-time fifth-grade teacher under an employment agreement nearly identical to Morrissey-Berru's.8 She held a B.A. in liberal studies and a teaching credential, and during her employment she attended a religious conference on incorporating God into lesson plans.9 Her agreement and the faculty handbook required her to serve the school's religious mission, model the faith, integrate Catholic thought into secular subjects, prepare students to receive the sacraments, and comply with similar expectations; she taught religion two hundred minutes each week using a textbook selected by the principal, administered weekly religion tests, prayed with students daily, taught students about Catholic practices such as the Eucharist and confession, prepared students to participate at Mass, attended monthly Masses with her students, and was evaluated on whether she infused Catholic values in all teaching.10
After Biel requested a leave of absence to obtain treatment for breast cancer, St. James School declined to renew her contract.11 She filed charges with the EEOC, received a right-to-sue letter, and sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, alleging the nonrenewal was because of her request for medical leave.12 The school maintained that the decision rested on poor performance, including failure to observe the planned curriculum and maintain an orderly classroom.13
Both schools moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suits were barred by the ministerial exception.14 The district courts granted summary judgment to the schools in both cases, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in both cases.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.16
Whether the First Amendment requires dismissal of employment-discrimination claims brought by elementary school teachers at Catholic schools whose responsibilities include teaching religion, praying with students, preparing students for Mass and sacraments, and integrating Catholic principles into lessons?17
The First Amendment's Religion Clauses foreclose the adjudication of employment-discrimination claims against religious institutions when the employee performs vital religious duties essential to the institution's mission of educating students in the faith.18
Yes. Morrissey-Berru and Biel performed vital religious duties as detailed in the established facts, including teaching religion daily using prescribed textbooks, praying with students, preparing them for Mass and sacraments, and integrating Catholic principles into lessons under employment agreements that expressly tied their performance evaluations to fulfillment of the schools' religious mission.19 These functions lie at the core of the schools' mission, so the ministerial exception bars the claims.20
The First Amendment requires dismissal of the teachers' employment-discrimination claims.21
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Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. He stressed that the analysis should focus on the religious functions performed rather than formal titles.22
Courts should defer to a religious organization's good-faith determination that an employee's position is ministerial.23 Judges lack the requisite understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition.24
Deference is necessary to avoid judicial entanglement in theological questions.25 The record confirms the sincerity of the schools' claims that the teachers held ministerial roles in carrying out the religious mission.26
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Sotomayor dissented. She argued that the majority dramatically expands the ministerial exception beyond Hosanna-Tabor by collapsing the inquiry into a single functional consideration.27
The teachers here are not ministers because they lack formal titles and training while their primary duties involve secular subjects.28 The decision strips thousands of schoolteachers of legal protections and overrides Congress's carefully tailored statutory exceptions for religious employers.29
It risks allowing employers to decide for themselves whether discrimination is actionable.30
Whether the ministerial exception applies to such teachers when they lack formal ministerial titles and have limited formal religious training but perform vital religious duties as set forth in their employment agreements and faculty handbooks?31
The ministerial exception applies to any employee who performs vital religious functions in conveying the faith and carrying out the religious mission of the institution, regardless of formal titles or the extent of religious training.32
Yes. Although Morrissey-Berru and Biel lacked formal ministerial titles and had limited formal religious training, their employment agreements and faculty handbooks required them to model Catholic faith and morals, teach religion, pray with students, and integrate Catholic principles into all subjects, and they were evaluated on those religious responsibilities as set forth in the established facts.33
The ministerial exception applies to Morrissey-Berru and Biel.34
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Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Thomas concurred that the exception turns on whether the employee performs a religious function.35 He explained that deference to the religious organization's sincere understanding of the role is required because judges lack the requisite understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition.36
Deference is necessary to avoid judicial entanglement in theological questions. The schools' explanations of the teachers' roles in carrying out the church's mission warrant deference, as the record confirms the sincerity of petitioners' claims that the teachers held ministerial roles.37
Whether courts must treat the four circumstances identified in Hosanna-Tabor as a rigid checklist or instead consider all relevant circumstances with primary focus on the functions an employee performs?38
Courts must consider all relevant circumstances and focus on the functions an employee performs rather than treating the four circumstances from Hosanna-Tabor as a rigid checklist that must be satisfied in every case.39
No. The Ninth Circuit erred by treating the Hosanna-Tabor circumstances as a rigid checklist and giving undue weight to the absence of formal titles and limited training.40 The proper inquiry examines the vital religious functions Morrissey-Berru and Biel performed under their agreements and handbooks as described in the established facts.41
Courts must consider all relevant circumstances with primary focus on the functions an employee performs rather than applying a rigid checklist.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Sotomayor dissented that the majority improperly rewrote Hosanna-Tabor by elevating function above the other circumstances and abandoning the balanced, holistic analysis.
She argued that the majority dramatically expands the ministerial exception beyond Hosanna-Tabor by collapsing the inquiry into a single functional consideration. That approach prevents religious employers from claiming the exception for nearly all employees.43
The decision risks allowing employers to decide for themselves whether discrimination is actionable.44 It invites the potential for abuse against which circuit courts have long warned.45