130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)
Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years and served in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War.1 He faced criminal charges in Kentucky after being arrested for transporting a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer.2
Before entering a guilty plea to the drug distribution charges, Padilla's counsel did not advise him that the conviction would trigger deportation proceedings.3 Counsel instead told him that he did not have to worry about his immigration status because he had lived in the country so long.4 Padilla relied on that advice when he pleaded guilty and later alleged that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had received accurate information.5
In postconviction proceedings Padilla claimed that his attorney's erroneous advice about deportation constituted ineffective assistance.6 The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, treating deportation as a collateral consequence outside the protection of the Sixth Amendment.7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether federal law imposed on counsel an obligation to advise Padilla that his guilty plea would result in removal from the country.8
Whether the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise a noncitizen defendant that his guilty plea carries a risk of deportation?9
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts because Jose Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years who served in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War, faced deportation after pleading guilty to drug distribution charges in Kentucky.
Before entering the guilty plea, his counsel failed to advise him that the conviction would trigger deportation proceedings. Counsel instead told him that he did not have to worry about his immigration status because he had lived in the country so long. Padilla relied on that erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty, and he later alleged that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had received accurate information.
Under the governing standard from Strickland v. Washington, counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because the weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.12 The terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction.13 The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied relief on the ground that deportation is a collateral consequence, but that distinction is ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.14
The Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise a noncitizen defendant that his guilty plea carries a risk of deportation.15
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment. He argued that a criminal defense attorney fails to provide effective assistance if the attorney misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequences of a conviction.16 In his view, such an attorney must refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney.17
Alito did not agree with the Court that the attorney must attempt to explain what those consequences may be.18 He noted that immigration law can be complex and is a legal specialty of its own.19 Alito warned that the Court's vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and needless litigation.20
He emphasized that the longstanding position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction.21
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented. He argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a lawyer for his defense against a criminal prosecution, not for sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction.22 Scalia contended that the Constitution is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world.23
Extending the Sixth Amendment to require advice on collateral consequences like deportation has no logical stopping point.24 He noted that adding to counsel's duties an obligation to advise about a conviction's collateral consequences would lead to years of elaboration upon new issues in the lower courts.25 Scalia maintained that the Sixth Amendment as originally understood meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel or use volunteered services.26
He concluded that because the subject of the misadvice here was not the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled to effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application.27
Whether advice regarding deportation consequences falls within the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel even though deportation is a collateral consequence of conviction?28
The Court has never distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in defining the scope of constitutionally reasonable professional assistance required under Strickland.29 The unique nature of deportation makes the distinction ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim.30 Advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.31
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts because the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about deportation concerned only collateral matters.3233
Deportation is intimately related to the criminal process, which makes it uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.34 Changes to immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.35 This confirms that deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.36
Because that distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation, advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.37 Strickland applies to Padilla's claim.
Advice regarding deportation consequences falls within the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel even though deportation is a collateral consequence of conviction.38
Whether counsel's failure to advise or provision of incorrect advice about deportation can satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland v. Washington?39
To satisfy Strickland's first prong, counsel's representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community. The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the deportation risk.40 When the deportation consequence is truly clear, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.41
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts because Padilla's counsel not only failed to advise him of the deportation consequence before he entered the plea but also told him that he did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.4243
The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute.44 His deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect.45 Accepting Padilla's allegations as true, he has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy Strickland's first prong.46
There will be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a plea are unclear.47 In those cases a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences.48 But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.49
Counsel's failure to advise or provision of incorrect advice about deportation satisfies the deficiency prong of Strickland v. Washington.50