451 U.S. 527 (1981)
In 1976 respondent Taylor, an inmate at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, ordered hobby materials valued at $23.50 by mail.1 He paid for them with two drafts drawn on his inmate account by prison officials.2 The packages arrived at the complex and were signed for by two employees who worked in the prison hobby center.3 One employee was a civilian and the other was an inmate.4 At the time Taylor was in segregation and not permitted to receive the materials.5 Normal prison procedures required that packages either be delivered to the prisoner who signs a receipt or that the prisoner be notified to pick up the package and sign a receipt.6 No inmate other than the addressee was supposed to sign for a package.7
After his release from segregation Taylor contacted several prison officials regarding the whereabouts of the packages.8 The officials were never able to locate them or determine what caused their disappearance.9 Taylor then commenced this action against the warden and hobby manager of the prison in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.10 He sought to recover the value of the hobby materials.11 He alleged that the officials' negligence had deprived him of property without due process of law.12
On October 25, 1978 the District Court granted Taylor's motion for summary judgment.13 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam order.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
The State of Nebraska maintained a tort claims procedure that provided a remedy to persons who suffered tortious losses at the hands of the State, including prisoners.16 Taylor did not use that procedure.17 The facts underlying the dispute are not seriously contested.18 The suit proceeded on the assumption that the loss resulted from the officials' negligence.19
Whether an inmate may bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the negligent loss of his property by prison officials deprived him of property without due process of law?20
Section 1983 requires proof that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution.21 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivations of property without due process of law, yet when the deprivation results from a random and unauthorized negligent act by a state employee rather than an established state procedure, an adequate postdeprivation remedy provided by the state satisfies the constitutional requirement.22
No. Taylor, an inmate at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, ordered hobby materials valued at $23.50 and paid with drafts drawn on his inmate account.23 The packages arrived and were signed for by two employees at the prison hobby center, yet after Taylor's release from segregation the officials could not locate them.24 The loss occurred because the employees failed to follow normal prison procedures that required delivery only to the addressee or proper notification.25 This was a random and unauthorized negligent act, not the product of any established state procedure.26
Nebraska maintained a tort claims procedure that allowed prisoners to recover for such losses, and Taylor did not pursue it.27 Because the state supplied a meaningful postdeprivation remedy capable of fully compensating the loss, the deprivation did not occur without due process of law.28
An inmate may not bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on these facts because the negligent loss did not violate the Due Process Clause.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred only in the result.30 He would have held that negligent acts by state officials never constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of any postdeprivation remedy.31 In his view the Due Process Clause requires an intentional act or at least a deliberate decision not to prevent loss.32
Treating mere negligence as a constitutional violation would trivialize the amendment and convert every state tort into a federal claim.33
Whether the availability of a state tort claims procedure satisfies any procedural due process requirements arising from the negligent loss of a prisoner's property by state employees?34
Yes. The facts show that the hobby materials disappeared after prison employees signed for the packages in violation of established procedures.37 The state could not practicably have provided a hearing before the unpredictable loss occurred.38 Nebraska's tort claims procedure, set out in Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 81-8,209 et seq., permitted prisoners to present claims for negligent loss of property and to receive compensation.39 That procedure was in place at the time of the loss and offered a full and adequate opportunity to obtain redress after the fact.40 The existence of this remedy therefore satisfied the requirements of procedural due process.41
The availability of Nebraska's tort claims procedure satisfied the procedural due process requirements in this case.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart joined the opinion of the Court but expressed strong doubt that the property loss here, even though caused by the negligence of state agents, constituted a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 He observed that if such a loss qualified, then damages to a person's automobile resulting from a collision with a vehicle negligently operated by a state official would likewise raise a constitutional claim, thereby trivializing the amendment.44 On the understanding that Nebraska had done all the Fourteenth Amendment requires by making a reparations remedy available, he joined the judgment of the Court.45
Justice Blackmun joined the Court's opinion but stressed its narrow reach.46 He noted that the case involved only property, only supervisory personnel, and only assumed negligence that was never actually proved.47 He cautioned that the decision should not be read to apply to deprivations of life or liberty.48
He also warned that the decision should not suggest that intentional acts by state officials could be cured merely by the later availability of a tort remedy.49
Whether state remedies must afford the same forms of relief available under § 1983 to satisfy due process in such cases?50
No. Taylor argued that Nebraska's tort claims procedure was inadequate because it allowed suit only against the state rather than individual employees, provided no punitive damages, and offered no right to a jury trial.53 The established facts demonstrate that the procedure nevertheless permitted full compensation for the $23.50 loss of hobby materials.54 The Court held that due process requires only that the state remedy be sufficient to make the claimant whole, not that it match every procedural or remedial feature of a federal civil rights action.55 Because the state procedure could have fully compensated Taylor, it met constitutional standards even though it differed from the relief available under § 1983.56
State remedies need not afford the same forms of relief available under § 1983 to satisfy due process.57
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part.58 He agreed that negligent conduct can support a § 1983 claim and that an adequate postdeprivation state remedy can satisfy due process.59 He concluded that the Nebraska procedure was not adequate on these facts because Taylor was a prisoner with limited access to information and prison officials never informed him of the tort claims procedure.60
He would have held that the state could not rely on an uninformed remedy as an adequate alternative to a federal action.61
Justice White joined the opinion of the Court but with the reservations stated by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion.62 He therefore shared Blackmun's view that the decision should be narrowly confined to deprivations of property and should not be understood to apply to deprivations of life or liberty. Justice White also agreed that the opinion should not suggest that postdeprivation remedies could cure intentional deprivations by state officials.
This reservation ensures the holding remains limited to the specific context of negligent property loss.