7 L. Ed. 732 (1830)
In 1825 plaintiffs who were citizens of Louisiana commenced suit by attachment in the parish court of New Orleans against William Parsons, a citizen of Massachusetts.1
The action arose from sales of tobacco made by Eben Fiske as factor and agent for Parsons to the plaintiffs, along with bills of exchange drawn by Fiske on Parsons that were dishonored.2 Upon petition by the defendant, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.3
In the district court the defendant filed an answer containing a general traverse and a petition of reconvention for ten thousand dollars in damages.4 The parties consented to trial before a special jury in March 1826.5 The jury returned a verdict against the defendant.6 The defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled and the court entered final judgment on the verdict.7
Two bills of exceptions were taken by the defendant.8 The first concerned the admission of Fiske as a witness after he received a release from liability from the plaintiffs; this exception was later abandoned.9 The second bill of exceptions arose when the defendant moved the court to direct the clerk to take down the testimony of witnesses in writing.10 This was required by Louisiana practice under the state constitution and laws and pursuant to the Act of Congress of May 26, 1824.11 The court refused the motion expressing the view that the United States court was not governed by Louisiana state practice.12 No charge or advice whatsoever was given or asked from the court to the jury on any matter of law or fact in the case. Nor was any question whatever raised of the competency or admissibility of such evidence, other than the specific exception before taken to the competency of Fiske, on the sole objection of interest.13 The substance of the facts proved by him being in no manner drawn in question before the court.14
The record included documentary evidence consisting of the protested bills of exchange with an admission that they had been regularly protested and that the plaintiffs were the holders.15 It also included letters from Parsons to Fiske spanning from March 1823 to August 1825 demonstrating Fiske's role as agent.16 The defendant then sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.17
Whether the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was required under the Act of Congress of May 26, 1824 to direct the clerk to take down witness testimony in writing according to Louisiana practice?18
The act of congress of May 26, 1824, provides that the mode of proceeding in civil causes in the courts of the United States, established in Louisiana, shall be conformable to the laws directing the mode of practice in the district courts of that state.19 The act is subject to a proviso authorizing the judge to alter times and make rules to adapt the state procedures to the organization of the federal court and to avoid any discrepancy with federal law.20
Yes. The 1824 Act incorporated Louisiana practice as the governing rule for the district court unless the court had adopted a special rule superseding that practice to avoid discrepancy with federal law.21
The record contains no indication that any such special rule had been adopted by the district court.22 The defendant moved the court to direct the clerk to take down the testimony of witnesses in writing pursuant to the Louisiana act of 1817 and the 1824 federal statute.23 Yet the court refused the motion and expressed the view that the United States court was not governed by state practice.24
Because no superseding federal rule appears in the record, the district court remained bound to follow the state procedure for recording testimony when a party requested it.25
The district court was required under the 1824 Act to order the clerk to record the witness testimony according to Louisiana practice.26
Whether the Supreme Court of the United States may re-examine facts tried by a jury upon a writ of error from a judgment rendered in the district court sitting in Louisiana?27
The seventh amendment declares that in suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact once tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examinable in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.28 The rules of the common law permit re-examination only through a new trial granted by the court where the issue was tried, or a venire facias de novo awarded by an appellate court for an error of law.29
No. The seventh amendment operates as a direct prohibition on any re-examination of facts found by a jury except through the limited common-law mechanisms of a new trial in the trial court or a venire facias de novo for legal error.30
The judiciary act of 1789 grants the Supreme Court appellate power to correct errors of law and to award new trials on that basis.31 It does not authorize review of the sufficiency or weight of the evidence underlying a jury verdict.32 The 1824 Act regulates only the mode of proceeding in the district court and contains no language altering the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction or empowering it to re-examine facts in cases arising from Louisiana.33
Even if the omitted testimony had been placed on the record, the Court would lack authority to reverse the judgment on the ground that the jury reached an erroneous conclusion on the facts.34
The Supreme Court may not re-examine facts tried by a jury upon a writ of error from a judgment rendered in the district court sitting in Louisiana.35
Related opinions on this issue
Justice M’Lean dissented on the ground that the proceeding was not a suit at common law within the meaning of the seventh amendment.36
He observed that Louisiana had adopted a system peculiar to itself that blended elements of the civil law and chancery practice.37 Under that system the same petition and answer procedure applied whether the claim sounded in debt or sought equitable relief.38 Because the action originated by petition, proceeded without common-law forms, and permitted the appellate court to review facts found by a jury, M’Lean concluded that the seventh amendment’s restriction on re-examination of jury findings did not apply.39
He noted that the Court had already examined testimony taken down under the 1824 Act in the companion case of Parsons v. Armor and reversed on the facts.40 The same authority should extend here.41 In his view the refusal to record the testimony deprived the defendant of a right secured by federal statute, and the judgment should be reversed with directions to order the testimony taken down at a new trial.42
Whether the district court's refusal to order the testimony recorded constitutes reversible error on writ of error to the Supreme Court?43
Matters of practice in inferior courts ordinarily do not furnish grounds for reversal on writ of error unless the appellate court would have been entitled, had the omitted material been before it, to review the evidence and set aside the verdict for error in the jury’s factual determination.44
No. Although the district court’s refusal to direct the clerk to record the testimony may have violated the 1824 Act, the error is not reversible on writ of error because the Supreme Court would have lacked power to act on the evidence even if it had been preserved.45
The sole purpose of recording the testimony was to enable the appellate court to review the jury’s factual conclusions, a review the seventh amendment forbids.46 The defendant could have preserved legal questions arising from the evidence through timely requests for instructions or bills of exceptions.47 Yet no such steps were taken.48
Consequently the refusal to record the testimony caused no prejudice cognizable by the Supreme Court and supplies no basis for reversing the judgment.49
The district court’s refusal to order the testimony recorded does not constitute reversible error on writ of error to the Supreme Court.50