257 P.3d 383 (Mont. 2011)
On July 25, 2003, eighteen-year-old Brandon Patch was pitching in an American Legion baseball game when he was struck in the head by a batted ball hit using Hillerich & Bradsby Company’s model CB-13 aluminum bat.1 Brandon died from his injuries.2 In 2006 Brandon’s parents, individually and as representatives of his estate, sued Hillerich & Bradsby in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, asserting strict products liability claims for survivorship and wrongful death damages on theories of manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn.3
The complaint alleged that the CB-13 bat increased batted-ball exit velocity and thereby decreased infielders’ reaction times.4 Before trial the district court granted Hillerich & Bradsby summary judgment on the manufacturing-defect claim but denied summary judgment on the design-defect and failure-to-warn claims.5 The court also granted the plaintiffs’ motion in limine excluding the assumption-of-the-risk defense.6 The remaining claims were tried to a jury in October 2009.7
The jury found that the bat was not defectively designed but determined that it was in a defective condition because of Hillerich & Bradsby’s failure to warn of the enhanced risks associated with its use.8 The jury awarded the plaintiffs an $850,000 verdict on the failure-to-warn claim.9 After trial the district court denied Hillerich & Bradsby’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law.10 Hillerich & Bradsby appealed.11
Whether the District Court properly denied H&B’s summary judgment motion on Patches’ failure to warn claim?12
Under Montana law adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer.13 The terms user and consumer are defined broadly.14 They include those who prepare the product for consumption.15 They also include family members, employees, guests, and those passively enjoying the benefit of the product.16 The feasibility of providing a warning is a question for the jury rather than a basis for summary judgment.17
Yes. The realities of baseball demonstrate that the risk of harm from the CB-13 bat’s increased exit speed extends to all players on the field, making Brandon a user or consumer placed at risk by the product. Genuine issues of material fact existed on the scope of the warning and causation because warnings could have been communicated through advertisements, posters, or media releases rather than solely on the bat itself.18 The workability of providing such warnings is reserved for jury determination.19
The District Court properly denied H&B’s summary judgment motion on Patches’ failure to warn claim.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rice concurred that Patches stated a legally valid claim.21 All players including Brandon were users or consumers in the context of a baseball game.22 This rendered the statute facially broad enough to encompass the strict products liability claim.23
He remained troubled by the evidentiary basis.24 Patches did not articulate specifically what a warning should have contained or how it would have changed the result.25 Yet he deferred to the jury’s judgment on the difficult task of determining whether a viable theory of warning and causation had been presented.26
Whether the District Court properly denied H&B’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law?27
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when there is a complete lack of evidence that would justify submitting an issue to the jury.28 This determination is made after considering all evidence and legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In failure to warn cases, plaintiffs must prove the product was sold in a defective condition due to inadequate warning.29 They must also prove the defect caused the injury.30 The defect must be traceable to the defendant.31 Montana applies a flexible standard of proof in products liability cases.32 This standard accounts for the death of the plaintiff.33 It does not rigidly require direct testimony that a warning would have altered conduct.34
Yes. The District Court properly denied H&B’s Rule 50(b) motion because there was not a complete lack of evidence to justify submitting the failure to warn claim to the jury.35 Testimony that Brandon followed guidelines and that his teammates quit using aluminum bats after his death supported an inference that a warning would have been heeded.36 This approach is consistent with the flexible standard of proof applicable when the plaintiff is deceased.37
The District Court properly denied H&B’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law.38
Whether the District Court properly granted Patches’ motion in limine regarding H&B’s assumption of the risk defense?39
Under § 27-1-719(5)(a), MCA, a manufacturer may assert assumption of the risk only where the user or consumer discovered the defect or the defect was open and obvious and the user or consumer unreasonably made use of the product and was injured by it.40 The defense is inapplicable as a matter of law without evidence that the victim actually knew he or she would suffer serious injury or death and, knowing that, voluntarily exposed himself or herself to the danger, evaluated under a subjective standard.41
Yes. The District Court properly granted Patches’ motion in limine because there is no evidence that Brandon actually knew he would be seriously injured or killed when pitching to a batter using the CB-13 aluminum bat.42 H&B failed to show that Brandon was aware of the enhanced risks associated with that specific bat and voluntarily proceeded to pitch anyway.43
The District Court properly granted Patches’ motion in limine regarding H&B’s assumption of the risk defense.44
Whether the District Court properly instructed the jury?45
Jury instructions must fully and fairly inform the jury of the law applicable to failure-to-warn claims in products liability cases.46 The party challenging an instruction must demonstrate prejudice.47 A court does not abuse its discretion when the instructions as a whole correctly state the law of the case.48 Any inconsistency between an instruction and the verdict form is harmless if it does not prejudice the substantial rights of a party.49
Yes. The District Court properly instructed the jury because Instruction No. 15, as a whole with the verdict form, correctly informed the jury of the law on failure to warn.50 This included the requirement that the failure to provide adequate warning caused injury to the plaintiff.51 The substitution of bystander language did not prejudice H&B given the verdict form’s focus on the user of the product.52
The District Court properly instructed the jury.53
Whether the verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted?54
No. The verdict should not be set aside.57 A new trial should not be granted.58 H&B’s arguments regarding causation evidence and the rejection of its Riley-based position merely rehashed issues already properly resolved against it.59 Those issues were resolved in the denial of summary judgment and the Rule 50(b) motion.60
The verdict should not be set aside and a new trial should not be granted.61