432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York.1 After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta.2 Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson.3
Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law.4 There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence.5 He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head.6 Patterson was charged with second-degree murder.7
At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup.8 The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder.9 The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.10
The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder.11 The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.12 While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur.13 The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process.14 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a prosecution for second-degree murder?16
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged.17 However, this requirement does not extend to the absence of every affirmative defense that might be raised.18 The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not negative any of the elements of second-degree murder, which are intent to cause death and causing the death of another person.19 Instead, it constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.20
No. The elements of second-degree murder are intent to cause the death of another person and causing the death of such person.21 The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not negative either of these elements.22 Rather, it constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion.23
The New York Legislature has chosen to treat extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense.24 This choice does not offend the Due Process Clause because the defense does not relate to an element of the crime.25 The State's policy in this regard does not offend principles of justice rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.26 The Constitution does not require the State to prove the nonexistence of every affirmative defense that might be raised with respect to a particular crime.27
The Due Process Clause does not require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a prosecution for second-degree murder.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment.29 He emphasized that the decision does not undermine the principle established in In re Winship that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.30 In this case the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not negative any element of the crime of murder.31
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of intent and causation.32 The defendant has the burden of proving the separate issue of extreme emotional disturbance.33 The decision is consistent with Hankerson v. North Carolina in which the burden of proof as to the affirmative defense of self-defense could constitutionally be placed on the defendant.34
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented.35 In his view the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of extreme emotional disturbance when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.36 The Court's decision permits the State to convict a defendant of murder without proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.37
This result is inconsistent with the principle established in In re Winship and Mullaney v. Wilbur.38 The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance is closely related to the element of intent.39 By placing the burden of proof on the defendant the State has effectively relieved itself of the burden of proving the full extent of the defendant's culpability.40
He would reverse the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.41
Justice Stevens dissented.42 The New York statute places an unconstitutional burden on the defendant to prove an issue that is essential to determining the degree of his culpability.43 The distinction between murder and manslaughter should turn on the presence or absence of extreme emotional disturbance and the prosecution should be required to prove the absence of that condition beyond a reasonable doubt.44
The Court's attempt to distinguish this case from Mullaney v. Wilbur is unpersuasive.45 In both cases the issue is whether the defendant acted with the degree of culpability necessary for a murder conviction.46 The Constitution requires the State to bear the burden of proof on that issue.47