424 U.S. 693 (1976)
In June 1971 Edward Charles Davis was arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, on a shoplifting charge while employed as a photographer at a retail store. The charge was arraigned in September 1971.1 Davis pleaded not guilty. The charge was filed away with leave to reinstate.2 It was ultimately dismissed in December 1972 after the events at issue.3
In late 1972 Louisville Police Chief Paul and Jefferson County Police Chief McDaniel combined their departments' efforts.4 They distributed a five-page flyer containing mug shots and names to approximately 800 merchants in the Louisville metropolitan area.5 The flyer was headed "NOVEMBER 1972 CITY OF LOUISVILLE JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS ACTIVE SHOPLIFTERS" and listed Davis among the individuals shown.6 The persons depicted had been arrested during 1971 and 1972.7
Davis's photograph and name appeared on page two.8 The flyer stated it was distributed so merchants could inform security personnel to watch for the subjects.9 At the time the flyer circulated, Davis was employed as a photographer by the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times.10 The flyer came to the attention of Davis's supervisor.11 The supervisor called him in to discuss the matter.12 The supervisor informed Davis he would not be fired but warned him not to find himself in a similar situation again.13
Davis then filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.14 He alleged that the police chiefs' distribution of the flyer deprived him of liberty without due process of law and violated his right to privacy.15 The District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.16 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.17 It held that the distribution implicated a liberty interest and required prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional questions presented.19
Whether the distribution by police officials of a flyer identifying an individual as an active shoplifter deprived him of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?20
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberty interests recognized by the Constitution or by state law.21 Reputation alone is not a protected liberty interest.22 Defamation by state officials does not implicate due process unless accompanied by a change in legal status or the deprivation of a right previously held under state law.23
No. In June 1971 Edward Charles Davis was arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, on a shoplifting charge while employed as a photographer at a retail store.24 The distribution of the flyer did not alter any right previously held under state law or impose any legal disability. Reputation alone, apart from a change in legal status, is not a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
The distribution of the flyer did not deprive Davis of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented.26 He argued that the official branding of Davis as an active shoplifter without any procedural safeguards implicated a liberty interest.27 The flyer seriously stigmatized Davis and would impair his employment opportunities.28
Brennan contended that the majority's distinction from Constantineau was unpersuasive.29 The stigma alone was sufficient to trigger due process protections.30 The Court's holding would allow arbitrary official condemnation without safeguards.31
He emphasized that the interest in reputation falls within the broad concept of liberty.32 Brennan warned that the decision represents a retreat from prior precedents protecting against governmental stigmatization.33
Whether defamation by state officials, standing alone and apart from any other governmental action, states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment?34
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights under color of state law.35 The Fourteenth Amendment does not convert every defamation by a state official into a due process violation.36 A claim requires the invasion of a liberty or property interest recognized by the Constitution or state law, not mere injury to reputation.37
No. The police chiefs distributed the flyer containing Davis's name and photograph as part of a program to alert merchants to active shoplifters.38 The flyer noted that Davis had been arrested for shoplifting but did not impose any legal disability on him or foreclose his employment opportunities.39 Davis remained employed as a photographer.40 The flyer did not alter any right he held under Kentucky law.41 The consequences, while potentially serious, did not rise to the level of a protected liberty interest because no alteration of legal status occurred.42
Respondent's claim therefore fails to state a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment actionable under § 1983.43
Defamation by state officials, standing alone, does not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.44
Whether respondent stated a claim under the Constitution for violation of a right to privacy arising from the public disclosure of his arrest record?45
The Constitution recognizes zones of privacy created by specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights that impose limits on government power.46 These zones have been limited to matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.47 Disclosure of an official arrest record does not fall within these zones.48
No. Respondent claimed constitutional protection against the disclosure of the fact of his arrest on a shoplifting charge.49 His claim is based not upon any challenge to the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be private.50 It rests instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest.51 None of the substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this.52
The Court declines to enlarge them in this manner.53
Respondent did not state a claim under the Constitution for violation of a right to privacy arising from the public disclosure of his arrest record.54