555 U.S. 223 (2009)
In 2002, Brian Bartholomew, who had been charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine, became an informant for the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force.1 Bartholomew informed Officer Jeffrey Whatcott that Afton Callahan had arranged to sell methamphetamine later that day.2 That evening Bartholomew arrived at Callahan's residence at about 8 p.m., went inside, confirmed that Callahan had methamphetamine available for sale, and left to obtain money.3
Bartholomew met with task force members at about 9 p.m. The officers searched him, determined that he had no controlled substances, gave him a marked $100 bill and a concealed electronic transmitter, and agreed on a signal he would give after completing the purchase.4 The officers drove Bartholomew back to Callahan's trailer home, where Callahan's daughter let him inside.5 Callahan retrieved a large bag containing methamphetamine from his freezer and sold Bartholomew a gram of methamphetamine for the marked bill.6
After Bartholomew gave the arrest signal, the officers entered the trailer through a porch door.7 In the enclosed porch they encountered Bartholomew, Callahan, and two other persons, saw Callahan drop a plastic bag later determined to contain methamphetamine, and conducted a protective sweep of the premises.8 The officers recovered the marked bill from Callahan, a small bag containing methamphetamine from Bartholomew, and drug syringes from the residence, leading to Callahan's arrest and charge with unlawful possession and distribution of methamphetamine.9
The trial court upheld the warrantless arrest and search on exigent circumstances grounds.10 On appeal from Callahan's conviction the Utah attorney general conceded the absence of exigent circumstances but argued inevitable discovery; the Utah Court of Appeals rejected that argument and vacated the conviction.11 Callahan then brought this damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering his home without a warrant.12
In granting the officers' motion for summary judgment, the District Court assumed the consent-once-removed doctrine might ultimately be rejected. The court held the officers entitled to qualified immunity because they could reasonably have believed the doctrine authorized their conduct. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the officers' conduct violated Callahan's Fourth Amendment rights and that the right was clearly established.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and directed the parties to address whether the mandatory procedure set out in Saucier v. Katz should be retained.14
Whether the mandatory two-step procedure set out in Saucier v. Katz for resolving qualified immunity claims should be retained?15
No. The established facts demonstrate that the Tenth Circuit applied the Saucier sequence.19 It first held that the officers' warrantless entry after Bartholomew's consensual entry violated Callahan's Fourth Amendment rights and then concluded that the right was clearly established.20 Yet the Supreme Court determined that district and circuit judges should exercise sound discretion to decide which prong to address first. This discretion applies in light of the circumstances of each case, including when the constitutional question is factbound or when briefing is inadequate.
The Saucier procedure should not be regarded as mandatory, and lower courts may address the clearly established prong first when doing so will best facilitate fair and efficient disposition of the case.21
Whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that it was not clearly established at the time of the search that their conduct was unconstitutional?22
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.23 An officer is entitled to rely on lower court decisions accepting a doctrine even if the officer's own circuit has not yet ruled on it.24
Yes. Applying the rule to the established facts, the officers entered Callahan's trailer in 2002 after Bartholomew, who had been voluntarily admitted by Callahan's daughter and had completed the drug sale, gave the arrest signal, and at that time the consent-once-removed doctrine had been accepted by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Paul, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bramble, and other courts, so clearly established law did not show that the entry violated the Fourth Amendment.25
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time of the search.26