904 S.E.2d 247 (Va. Ct. App. 2024)
This case raises questions about trade secrets, corporate espionage, and the proper measure of unjust enrichment damages for such offenses under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (VUTSA). The trial below resulted in the largest damages verdict in the history of the Commonwealth of Virginia—an award of over two billion dollars. A jury found Pegasystems, Inc. (Pega) used improper means to misappropriate trade secrets from Appian Corporation (Appian). On appeal, Pega asks this Court to reverse the jury verdict and enter judgment for Pega because it contends, as a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence that Pega misappropriated any trade secrets. In the alternative, Pega seeks a new trial, arguing the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence and in granting flawed jury instructions (particularly with respect to proximate cause). We reject Pega's claim that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; however, we find that the trial court committed a series of errors that require us to reverse the judgment as to Appian's trade secret claims.
This controversy involves companies engaged in the business process management (BPM) industry. Appian and Pega are competitors and "industry leaders" in the BPM field. Both companies offer platforms that enable third party business customers to build complex software applications using "low-code application development platforms." These customers purchase the BPM platform to generate programs or applications (apps) that automate processes, such as fulfilling orders or opening new customer accounts. A BPM customer might use its own employees to design a project or it might hire outside "developers" to do so.
At trial, Pega portrayed itself as having expertise in platforms catering to big, complex, and sophisticated problems with many permutations for "very large ... companies." Pega's platform put a premium on "scalability" —the ability to quickly and reliably create, customize, and modify apps used by large numbers of users. Thus, Pega suggested its BPM product was particularly useful for complex undertakings. Appian painted Pega's product as overly complex, difficult to grasp, hyper-technical, and clunky. By contrast, Appian's BPM product focused on ease-of-use, speed, and simplicity.
The gist of this dispute is that Appian contends that Pega misappropriated its trade secrets to copy and steal Appian's user-friendly features to enhance Pega's appeal with a broader base of potential customers. Appian further asserts that in the course of stealing its secrets, Pega illicitly obtained trade secrets regarding weaknesses in Appian's BPM platform and Pega used this ill-gotten knowledge for its own advantage.
Pega acknowledges that "[l]ike most companies in a competitive market, ... Pega stays abreast of its competitors." Appellant's Br. at 8. The trade secret claims in this case primarily arose from activities that Pega's then-head of competitive intelligence, John Petronio, managed from 2012 to 2014. Pega's goal was to examine how Appian's BPM platform performed from the perspective of a developer creating apps. In so doing, Pega hoped to improve its own platform and to learn of Appian's weaknesses to better market its own platform. Pega did not have access to Appian's platform because, as Appian witnesses confirmed, Appian "never made [its] software publicly available without license terms." Appian's software, including its "internal workings," remained a mystery to Pega. Internally, Pega acknowledged that Appian was "guarded" with respect to its "technology."
A. Pega Hires a Consultant, Zou, to Gain Access to Appian's Platform
Through a staffing agency, Petronio sought a source to demonstrate how developers used Appian's platform. In seeking out a consultant, Petronio informed the recruitment company that, "[a]cess to the Appian BPM tool is a must" and "make sure they aren't `loyal' to Appian because [Pega] doesn't want it getting back to Appian that Pega is doing this work." This search culminated in Pega hiring Youyong Zou to provide consulting services for Pega about Appian's BPM platform. Zou's consulting work for Pega was a side-job; he worked for Serco, a company that implemented government contracts. Zou had access to Appian's platform through his employment with Serco, which licensed Appian's platform.
As part of his consulting services, Zou provided presentations to Pega in which he demonstrated Appian's platform, illustrating strengths and weaknesses. Petronio described Zou as Pega's "spy." Appian characterized Zou as Pega's "Trojan horse." Pega took measures to hide Zou's identity by giving him an alias and blurring his username on screenshots. Over a two-and-a-half-year period, Zou spent approximately 200 hours consulting for Pega and received $23,608 in compensation.
Pega's executives observed some of Zou's demonstrations, which were recorded for training purposes. Pega recorded nearly 100 videos of Zou using Appian's platform, in which Zou would explain strengths and weaknesses of various features on Appian's BPM system. See, e.g., Pl. Ex. 853-910 (training videos). Zou also demonstrated building apps with Appian's software. At trial, Appian established Pega's widespread use of Zou's tutorials. Several of the videos "cascaded" through Pega's product management team. Zou even came to Pega's Massachusetts headquarters for an all-day meeting with Pega's senior leadership. Pega's engineers participated in meetings with Zou, including Kerim Akgonul, Pega's Head of Product Management—the group responsible for making improvements to Pega's platform. Petronio encouraged Akgonul to meet with Zou to "see something in [t]here that [Akgonul] might like for our product." Pl. Ex. 853 at 01:00-01:15. Appian's expert opined that following Zou's demonstrations, Pega made changes to its platform that had "striking similarities" to Appian's product. Moreover, Pega used the information gathered by Zou to improve its own platform and also to identify and attack Appian's weaknesses.
B. Pega Employees Access Appian's Platform Independent of Zou's Efforts
After Zou stopped consulting for Pega, Pega continued its attempts to access Appian's trade secrets via improper means. For example, in 2017, three years after Zou stopped consulting for Pega, Pega employees accessed Appian's platform using aliases to discreetly view Appian's free trials.
In 2015, Petronio and Pega parted ways. Appian hired Petronio the following year as a consultant. He later became Appian's Senior Director of Market Intelligence and Strategy. Eventually, in 2020, Petronio informed Appian about Zou and his consulting work on behalf of Pega. Appian responded by suing Pega and Zou.
Appian brought claims against Pega under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Code § 59.1-336 et seq., based on Pega's alleged misappropriation of trade secrets through its dealings with Zou, and under the Virginia Computer Crimes Act, Code § 18.2-152.1, et seq., relating to Pega's efforts to obtain improper access to Appian materials.
The trade secrets that Appian contends were misappropriated by Pega basically fell into three categories: (1) functions of Appian's platform that Appian accused Pega of copying; (2) knowledge relating to weaknesses of Appian's platform which Pega used to its own advantage; and (3) access to Appian's confidential documentation such as its user manual which assisted Pega in copying Appian's strengths and exploiting its weaknesses.
A. The Copied Functions that Improved Pega's Platform
Appian identified five functions related to "the architecture and design underlying specific features of Appian's platform" that Pega copied to improve its platform based on Zou's demonstrations. Appellee's Br. at 8. Dr. Marshall, Appian's expert witness, provided extensive testimony over the course of multiple days. He testified that it appeared Pega made improvements to its platform based on trade secrets it obtained from Appian. Marshall testified that Pega misappropriated the following features of Appian's platform, which constituted trade secrets: (1) Smart Services, (2) Custom Data Types, (3) Ease-of-Editing Functionality, (4) Out-of-the-Box Ability to Deploy Applications to Mobile, and (5) Out-of-the-Box Integrated Social View of Worklist and Tasks. These features can be briefly summarized as follows:
Pega countered that none of these features were unique to Appian, that it was commonplace for businesses to study competitors' products, and that its own software did not utilize any of Appian's innovations.
B. Pega Gains Access to Appian Documentation and Insights into Weaknesses in Appian's Platform
Zou's presentations suggested that Appian struggled with "scalability"—the ability to handle large, complex projects. Pega's head of sales concluded that Appian's "weaknesses are glaring and big." Pega's product manager for social features was "not impressed" with Appian's social features, while noting its marketing was "impress[ive]." Pega also identified significant weaknesses in Appian's mobile capabilities. Upon learning about the "internal workings" of Appian's platform from Zou, Petronio announced, "we should never lose to Appian." Prior to Zou's work for Pega, Pega's marketing materials had addressed various Appian weaknesses. However, Pega updated and bolstered these materials to reflect its competitor's shortcomings based on information Zou provided.
Appian asserted Pega's knowledge of these platform foibles constituted additional trade secrets related to the "sensitive structural limitations of Appian's platform previously unknown to Pega[.]" Appellee's Br. at 14. Most of the purported secrets were Appian product deficiencies that Appian did not want potential customers to consider when making purchasing decisions.2 Appian ultimately categorized these "weakness" trade secrets as problems involving:
This is verbatim how Appian described the weaknesses to the jury in closing argument.
Finally, Appian asserted that, through Zou, Pega obtained Appian's documentation which included private information that enabled Pega to further exploit its knowledge of Appian's platform. For example, Zou gave Pega confidential portions of Appian materials, including a document entitled "High Availability and Disaster Recovery Configurations." This document contained descriptions of Appian's software. Zou also provided Pega documentation related to Appian's mobile and social capabilities. Zou further accessed Appian's user manual through Appian Forum and provided this information to Pega. With respect to Appian's "weaknesses," Pega used the information it gained from Appian's documents to create marketing materials that attacked Appian.
Appian contended that the information Pega received was "confidential" and closely guarded. Appian's evidence demonstrated that many features of its BPM platform were protected from widespread public consumption. For example, Appian stored its software and related documentation on Appian Forum, a password protected website accessible by authorized users including Appian employees and business partners. To access Appian Forum, a prospective user had to comply with Appian's terms of use, which incorporated individual license agreements that contained some confidentiality provisions. As one witness explained, Appian "never made [its] software publicly available without license terms."
Appian asserted that any third-party companies or partners accessing its software and documentation "had licensing agreements in place" and "any individuals that were accessing... Appian Forum" had to agree to the "terms of use." Appian's "terms of use" on its Forum stated, in part, as follows:
Use of Software
You may access and download certain software.... Any Software You download or access through the Site is the copyrighted work of Appian.... Use of the Software is subject to the terms of the ... software license agreement between You and Appian which governs Your use of the Software and which triggered Your receipt of a username and password to access the Site. To the extent you do not have a ... license agreement with Appian for the Software, you are prohibited from downloading, accessing or using the Software without Appian's express prior written consent.
At the same time, Appian was involved in sales—and it encouraged its sales representatives to share information about its platform. It urged these representatives or "resellers" —who worked on commission—to demonstrate the platform to potential buyers without significant restrictions.3 Appian did not limit "the number of people who could be shown the documentation" or view demonstrations provided by its resellers.
Appian also granted latitude in its agreements with its business partners, authorizing them to "market, promote and demonstrate the Appian software to prospective customers." Business Partner Agreement at §§ 1.1, 2.2.1; see also Value-Added Service Provider Agreement. Serco was just one of many of Appian's business partners. The Business Partner Agreement provides the business partner "with a nonexclusive, nontransferable license to use, copy and display Appian's published marketing materials associated with the Appian Software, and to incorporate the Marketing Materials into Business Partner's promotional and marketing literature...." In addition to granting business partners the ability to demonstrate Appian's software for prospective customers, with certain limitations, the agreement provides that a business partner can "[e]nhance, modify and/or combine the Appian software with other software or code to develop prototypes to be demonstrated to prospective customers." The business partner agreement contained a confidentiality provision, but it did not mention any trade secrets. See Business Partner Agreement at § 6.1 (listing software as confidential).
Potential customers, who received demos from Appian partners like Serco, could share descriptions, screenshots, and videos of the demos. Further, potential customers, who received demos from Appian's business partners, were not required to sign non-disclosure agreements. Similarly, Appian offered free trials to prospective buyers. These prospective buyers were not required to sign restrictive non-disclosure agreements either (but were subject to "click-through" terms of service). Nonetheless, Appian asserted that it could impose careful supervision over prospective customers and business partners.
Notably, Zou was not an Appian employee; he was employed by Serco, a government contractor. Zou had access to Appian's platform and user manuals through his work at Serco, which was a business partner of Appian's. Zou did not have access to Appian's source code. In 2012, Zou, as a condition of employment with Serco, signed an "Employee Proprietary and Confidential Information Agreement." As part of his contract with Serco, Zou was precluded from sharing confidential information that he learned through his work. Appian claimed "all [its] developers" were governed by "[s]imilar agreements" as Zou's.4 Appellee's Br. at 6.
A. The Trial Court Grants Appian's Motion in Limine Excluding Evidence of the Number of People with Access to its Software as "Irrelevant"
Appian filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the number of people with access to its software. Appian argued, and the trial court ruled, that the number of people with access to Appian's trade secrets was "not relevant at all" to the question of whether the software was sufficiently protected to be a trade secret. The court gave the jury a specific instruction that provided, "[t]he numbers of users of the Appian Platform and Appian Forum licenses are not relevant to any issue in this case, and any evidence as to those numbers should be disregarded." In explaining its decision, the trial court stated, "Pegasystems cannot offer mere numbers as a way of showing that the trade secret—that these are not Appian's trade secrets.... Pegasystems can certainly put on evidence concerning the security that Appian attached to its licensees and require of its licensees... but it cannot just offer sheer numbers as a way to show that Appian was not maintaining the secrecy of its alleged trade secrets."
After the trial court granted Appian's motion in limine prohibiting evidence of the number of people with access to its platform, Pega proffered the following evidence, which it argued was relevant to whether Appian took reasonable measures to protect its trade secrets and whether the trade secrets were generally known:
B. The Trial Court Prevented Pega From Demonstrating its Software to the Jury to Show that it Had Not Stolen Disputed Features of Appian's Platform
Before trial, Pega timely disclosed, in an exhibit list, that it intended to introduce versions of its software as evidence, including versions 6.3 and 7.1. Per the exhibit list, Pega stated that it would present its software evidence on a "Pega Laptop" that it described as a "physical object." During discovery, Pega provided Appian with a laptop containing its software for Appian to review. Notably, despite numerous objections to the exhibit list generally, Appian did not object to Pega's exhibit list entries providing that it intended to present its software evidence to the jury. In fact, during the trial, Appian itself presented evidence of Pega's BPM platform software on a different computer than that used in discovery.
At trial, Pega sought to present its software to illustrate that many of the features Appian claimed Pega had "stolen" pre-existed Pega's contact with Zou or were developed wholly independently of his demonstrations. However, when Pega sought to introduce this software evidence at trial, on a computer that was not the same laptop on which it had transmitted a copy of the software during discovery, Appian objected because the evidence was on a different computer than used in discovery. Pega explained that the original laptop, which transported the software for discovery purposes, was simply a medium for transferring its evidence to Appian. The original, transport laptop was now inoperable and could not run the software at trial; thus, Pega argued it should be allowed to present its software evidence via another medium such as a different laptop so long as it could authenticate the software. Appian had already introduced the software on a different laptop during its case in chief. Yet Appian argued that Pega's evidence was inadmissible unless Pega used the exact same laptop on which it transmitted a copy of the software to Appian during discovery. The trial court agreed.
The trial court suggested that using a different computer might raise doubts about the software's authenticity, calling for "a trial within a trial to authenticate." Pega was prepared to authenticate the software through Stephen Bixby—the person who led development of the software at Pega. Bixby would have testified that the software introduced at trial was "the exact same thing" Pega produced to Appian during discovery. The trial court, however, refused to permit Pega to attempt to authenticate the software:
The fact that this upcoming witness may be able to authenticate what's on there, we're not doing that. We're not having a trial within a trial to authenticate that. That's something that should have been dealt with pre-trial during discovery.
I'm not going to—this is essentially what you're asking me to do is to conduct a discovery proceeding here to determine whether the information on the software is the same as other software, and I'm simply not going to do that. That should have been done during discovery pre-trial.
The court permitted Pega witnesses to testify that various features were not copied from Appian. However, the jury was not allowed to view Pega's software evidence.
C. The Damages Instruction Relating to Proximate Cause
One of the central disputes at the instructions phase of the trial concerned the appropriate proximate cause instruction in the unjust enrichment context under VUTSA. Over Pega's objection, the trial court granted Instruction 14:
If you find that plaintiff Appian has proved by greater weight of the evidence its claim for misappropriation of trade secrets against defendant Pegasystems, you must find your verdict for Appian and decide the issue of damages as to Pegasystems. You may award the amount of unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation.
For unjust enrichment, Appian is entitled to recover Pegasystems' net profits. Appian has the burden of establishing by greater weight of the evidence Pegasystems' sales; Pegasystems has the burden of establishing by greater weight of the evidence any portion of the sales not attributable to the trade secret or trade secrets and any expenses to be deducted in determining net profits.
Thus, the court instructed the jury that Appian could prove its damages simply by establishing "Pegasystems' sales" during the relevant time frame. Upon Appian proving Pega's total sales, the burden would shift to Pega to prove damages (sales) were unrelated to its wrongdoing. Accordingly, Appian produced evidence that Pega's sales for the relevant time period were in the billions of dollars. Consistent with Instruction 14, Appian stated in closing argument that "the burden is on [Pega]. If they want to show you some of those sales were innocent, right, because it's about some other feature than ours, they have to show that[,]" and further, "remember the shifting burdens, it's their burden to show you any sales they made were innocent."
D. The Trial Court Excluded Critical Damages Evidence Based on an Interrogatory Answer
Instruction 14 allowed Appian to rely on Pega's total sales to establish its damages and shifted the burden to Pega to prove which sales were not tainted. Pega was then prohibited from introducing significant evidence regarding its "total sales" based on a discovery response. Appian propounded the following interrogatory to Pega in discovery seeking information relating to revenues tied to versions of Pega's BPM software:
Interrogatory No. 18: Identify all revenues received by Pegasystems for each fiscal year from 2012 through 2021 relating to Pega 6.3, Pega 7.0 and any subsequent version broken out by year and version of the software; and identify the costs and expenses Pegasystems incurred in order to realize those revenues.
Pega responded:
Answer: Pegasystems does not record or report revenue, or any associated costs and expenses incurred by Pegasystems, based on the " version " of the product sold (e.g., Pega 6.3, Pega 7.0). There is no mechanism or process by which Pegasystems is able to determine these revenue, cost and expense amounts. As a result, Pegasystems' financial results (including total revenue and all associated costs and expenses) for each applicable fiscal year as reported to the SEC in Pegasystems' annual Form 10-K filings and quarterly Form 10-Q filings are attached as Schedule 3.
(Objections omitted; emphases added). The trial court viewed this response as a declaration that Pega "can't breakdown [its] revenue based on lines of business." Thus, it ruled that Pega could not present evidence that much of its revenue came from products with which Appian did not even compete.
Pega asserted that the fact that it did not track revenue by version of its BPM software did not mean that Pega did not track revenue by other products or lines of business. In fact, Pega submitted an expert report in discovery breaking down its revenues from other business sources. However, the trial court ruled that Pega had "essentially given up" any such defense to damages with its response to Interrogatory 18.
As a result, the trial court excluded this "other lines of business" damages evidence and Pega made a proffer of what its evidence would have been. According to the proffer, Pega's Chief Executive Officer Allen Trefler would have testified that Pega sold products that did not compete with Appian; specifically "more than 50 percent of Pega's revenue is derived from customers for these other products" that do not compete with Appian. Trefler also would have testified that Pega offers features unrelated to Appian's trade secrets. Pega's Chief Technology Officer Don Schuerman would have testified that Pega had customers who "bought things that Appian didn't sell." Schuerman was barred from testifying about 25 products unique to Pega that increased its sales and that were distinct from its BPM platform. Further, Simon Platt, who created an expert damages report for Pega, would have testified that Appian's damages should be significantly reduced to account for sales driven by Pega's unique products that "were not available from Appian." Platt would have provided that the associated revenue from these sales was attributable to Pega's own innovation rather than as a result of misappropriating Appian's trade secrets. Finally, in challenging the testimony of Appian's damages expert, James Malackowski, Pega was prevented from demonstrating that the expert's damages figure included Pega sales unrelated to Pega's BPM platform.
The jury returned a verdict in Appian's favor, finding that Pega and Zou misappropriated Appian's trade secrets, in violation of VUTSA, and awarding damages against Pega in the amount of $2,036,860,045. The jury also rendered judgment against Zou in the amount of $5,000.6 The trial court entered a written order of judgment in Appian's favor against Pega, awarding the damages verdict, plus attorney fees, costs, and interest. The trial court denied Pega's motions to strike the evidence and to set aside the verdict. The court also denied Pega's request for a new trial or remittitur. This appeal followed.
A. Standard of Review
"When ruling on a motion to strike a plaintiff's evidence, a trial court `is required to accept as true all evidence favorable to a plaintiff and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence.'" TB Venture, LLC v. Arlington Cnty., 280 Va. 558, 562, 701 S.E.2d 791 (2010) (quoting James v. City of Falls Church, 280 Va. 31, 38, 694 S.E.2d 568 (2010)). "The trial court is not to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence, and may not reject any inference from the evidence favorable to the plaintiff unless it would defy logic and common sense." Id. at 562-63, 701 S.E.2d 791 (quoting Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 Va. 134, 138, 486 S.E.2d 285 (1997)). "That same standard is applicable to [appellate] review of the decision of the trial court granting the motion to strike." Baysden v. Roche, 264 Va. 23, 26, 563 S.E.2d 725 (2002).
Pega asks this Court to enter judgment on its behalf as a matter of law on the ground that Appian failed to prove the existence of its trade secrets. Specifically, Pega argues (1) "[n]one of Appian's purported secrets were trade secrets as a matter of law because Appian exposed them without requiring confidentiality," Appellant's Br. at 19, and (2) "Appian did not identify key trade secrets with the requisite particularity." Id. at 26.
The purpose of VUTSA is "to protect the owner of a trade secret from another's misuse of that secret." Collelo v. Geographic Servs., 283 Va. 56, 68, 727 S.E.2d 55 (2012) (quoting MicroStrategy Inc. v. Li, 268 Va. 249, 263, 601 S.E.2d 580 (2004)). "To state a trade secret claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish (1) the existence of a trade secret, and (2) its misappropriation by the defendant." Preferred Sys. Sols., Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 405, 732 S.E.2d 676 (2012). Our Supreme Court has stated that "whether a trade secret exists," and "whether a trade secret has been misappropriated" are generally fact questions for the factfinder. See MicroStrategy Inc., 268 Va. at 264-65, 601 S.E.2d 580; see also Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Grp., Inc., 311 F. App'x 586, 592 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Whether or not a trade secret exists is a `fact-intensive question to be resolved at trial.'" (quoting Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 1999))).
B. Identifying Trade Secrets and Misappropriation
Under Virginia law, a "trade secret" is "information, including but not limited to, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process," that "[d]erives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use" and "[i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Code § 59.1-336; see also Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc., 240 Va. 297, 302, 397 S.E.2d 110 (1990).
Under VUTSA, "[m]isappropriation" requires:
Code § 59.1-336. "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, use of a computer network without authority, breach of a duty or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Id.; see Kent Sinclair, 1 Virginia Remedies § 29-1 (2023) (noting "the Act's definition of improper means is broad to the point of being sweeping").
"The crucial characteristic of a trade secret is secrecy rather than novelty." Dionne, 240 Va. at 302, 397 S.E.2d 110. For example, a list of contacts may have little novelty but still may be a trade secret. See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 416 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding "under the right set of [factual] circumstances" customer lists, pricing information, marketing and sales techniques, and information about products can be considered trade secrets), aff'd, 429 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Further, secrecy need not be absolute: "the owner of a trade secret may, without losing protection, disclose it to a licensee, an employee, or a stranger, if the disclosure is made in confidence, express or implied." Dionne, 240 Va. at 302, 397 S.E.2d 110; see also Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Absolute secrecy is not essential. It is enough that [plaintiff] made it difficult for others to acquire copies of the ... software through proper means" (internal citations and quotations omitted))). "Depending on the facts of a particular case, software components, as parts of a computer `program,' may be trade secrets covered by the Act." MicroStrategy Inc., 268 Va. at 263, 601 S.E.2d 580.
Pega asserts the jury verdict should be reversed because, as a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence to find that Pega misappropriated information that qualified as trade secrets. It claims that the information Zou accessed was not secret, but generic knowledge that was unprotected as it floated amidst thousands of users and various internet discussions and displays.7 Pega argues that Appian's alleged trade secrets lost legal protection because they were "generally known," "readily ascertainable," and no reasonable efforts were taken to maintain their secrecy. As a result, Pega asks this Court to enter judgment on its behalf. Similarly, Pega claims the trial court erred in denying Pega's motion to strike and motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that Appian failed to "identif[y] its alleged trade secrets with sufficient particularity." We address each argument in turn.
C. Appian did not Fail, as a Matter of Law, to Show the Misappropriated Information Qualified as Trade Secrets
Not every piece of information a business might wish to keep from its competitors is a trade secret. If a party seeks to avail itself of trade secret protections, it must make reasonable efforts under the circumstances to keep its information secret. Code § 59.1-336. If a company chooses to release or publicize the information, it cannot later wield a trade secret club against competitors who gain access to the information. See MicroStrategy Inc., 268 Va. at 262, 601 S.E.2d 580 ("[T]he owner of a trade secret is not entitled to prevent others from using public information to replicate his product, nor may the owner prevent others from making similar products which are not derived from the trade secret." (quoting Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984))).
There is an inherent tension between a company's goal of keeping its product's secret features hidden, while also promoting the product's innovative attributes to boost sales. To help businesses navigate this uncertain landscape, the law imposes certain requirements of proof on a party asserting a trade secret claim: (1) each trade secret must derive independent economic value from not being "generally known" nor "readily ascertainable by proper means"; and (2) the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information at issue. Code § 59.1-336. Thus, generally "[i]f an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligations to protect the confidentiality of the information ... his property right is extinguished." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2872, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984).
Pega asserts that Appian lost trade secret protection because it "exposed" its secrets "without requiring confidentiality." Appellant's Br. at 19. For example, Pega claims that Appian delegated to independent resellers complete discretion to disclose its software. Pega also points to Appian's agreements with its resellers as proof that strict confidentiality measures were not in place and that trade secret protection, accordingly, was not preserved. See Business Partner Agreement; Value-Added Service Provider Agreement.
Relatedly, Pega argues that Appian shared its secrets with countless independent developers and end users without taking reasonable measures to guard its secrets. Pega claims that "[j]udgment is required for the separate reason that Appian exposed its alleged secrets to thousands of independent app developers ... without imposing the required confidentiality obligation." Appellant's Br. at 23. For example, Pega asserts: "[t]here were over 6000 people with access to the alleged trade secrets through Appian Forum alone when Zou provided his demonstrations...."8
The problem with Pega's analysis is that, as our Supreme Court stated in MicroStrategy Inc., "whether a trade secret exists" and "whether certain information constitutes a trade secret" are generally questions of fact. 268 Va. at 264-65, 601 S.E.2d 580. Under VUTSA, a trade secret is information that: (1) derives economic value from being neither generally known nor readily ascertainable, and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. Code § 59.1-336. And secrecy need not be absolute. See Dionne, 240 Va. at 302, 397 S.E.2d 110. Certainly, here, a jury question was presented where the reasonableness of Appian's efforts was hotly contested—and Appian provided considerable evidence that it took careful steps to safeguard its secrets and that the information was neither "generally known" nor readily ascertainable.
Appian's evidence included extensive expert testimony regarding Appian's measures to protect its trade secrets, including through employing "terms of use and license agreements," restricting "access to documentation," and using "firewalls." Appian's expert, Dr. Cole, also described Appian's use of "multifactor authentication," "encryption ... [,] user authentication, [and] password change requirements." Ultimately, Dr. Cole opined that the steps Appian took to protect its trade secrets were reasonable under the circumstances and entirely consistent with industry standards. Courts consistently have recognized such measures as reasonable under comparable circumstances. See Sinclair, 1 Virginia Remedies, supra, § 29-1 (listing reasonable efforts to protect trade secrets).
Moreover, while Pega suggested that resellers could freely disclose the targeted information to prospective buyers, the lengthy record is devoid of any evidence of such wholesale disclosures taking place. As Appian observes, evidence from Pega's own witnesses spoke volumes as to the difficulty Pega had getting its hands on Appian's product. One Pega executive, Ben Baril, told a colleague: "Appian is very guarded about their technology so some of this information is impossible to come by without access to a system." Given Pega's access problem, when Petronio utilized a search firm to identify a developer to share the desired information, he advised the recruiter that "access to the Appian BPM tool is a must" and "make sure they aren't loyal to Appian...." Ultimately, the evidence, when viewed in best light to Appian, reveals that Pega used a "spy" to obtain access to Appian's software and confidential "documentation."
The trial court here correctly determined that Appian provided sufficient evidence to survive Pega's motions to strike and to set aside the verdict. Whether Appian established that its information constituted a trade secret was a question of fact for the jury. The voluminous record here demonstrates numerous, earnest ways in which Appian sought to protect its information; similarly, when viewed in best light to Appian, the record shows that the trade secrets were not generally known nor readily ascertainable. Accordingly, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that Appian failed to prove the existence of any trade secrets.
D. Pega's "Particularity" Argument
Pega next asserts that Appian failed to identify its secrets with sufficient particularity "to allow the finder of fact to distinguish that which is legitimately a trade secret from other information that is simply confidential but not a trade secret, or is publicly available information." MicroStrategy Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
Pega suggests that a heightened "particularity" requirement should be read into Code § 59.1-336. But, as the Utah Supreme Court has opined: "[I]f a `particularity' requirement beyond what is present in the statute is to be required in trade secret cases, it is for the legislature to implement." USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 372 P.3d 629, 649 n.44 (Utah 2016). Otherwise, a plaintiff need only "defin[e] its purported trade secret in a manner that would allow the factfinder to determine if it met the statutory requirements." Id. at 649-50. Virginia's General Assembly has implemented no "particularity" requirement here.
Nonetheless, this debate is somewhat semantic —because Appian is still required to plead and present its case under Virginia law with enough clarity that Pega is adequately informed of what it is defending. See Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & Constr. Corp., 221 Va. 1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228 (1981). In Dionne, our Supreme Court noted that "the proponent must bear the burden of proving a trade-secret claim." 240 Va. at 303 n.2, 397 S.E.2d 110; see also Preferred Sys. Sols., 284 Va. at 407, 732 S.E.2d 676 (stating plaintiff's trade secret claim must provide sufficient facts informing defendant of the nature and character of the claim asserted); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. d (explaining "[a] person claiming rights in a trade secret bears the burden of defining the information for which protection is sought with sufficient definiteness to permit a court to apply the criteria for protection ... and to determine the fact of an appropriation").
The need for such clarity is paramount in the trade secret arena because the scope of a trade secret may be quite broad, while at the same time there is no requirement that the holder must file with an administrative body either a written description or an example of the material to be protected, in contrast to patent and copyright law, respectively. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-112; 17 U.S.C. § 411. Only the plaintiff knows what it considers to be secret—and the defendant cannot harness a defense without gaining a meaningful description of the violation. See InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2020) (to "prove ownership of a trade secret, plaintiffs `must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing they exist'" (quoting MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 1993))). Similarly, the factfinder needs to know the alleged secrets' precise contours so it can determine whether the information was generally known and reasonably protected, as well as to assess its worth. See Trandes Corp., 996 F.2d at 661 (a plaintiff must "describe the subject matter of its alleged trade secrets in sufficient detail to establish each element of a trade secret").
While we decline to impose any "heightened" particularity standard that is not found in VUTSA, we do adhere to the admonition that Appian was required to identify its claims in a manner that informed the defendant of the character of the claims asserted. See Preferred Sys. Sols., 284 Va. at 407, 732 S.E.2d 676; MicroStrategy, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 418. We believe, on this record, Appian's evidence sufficiently identified its secrets to survive Pega's motions to strike and to set aside the verdict.
Appian alleged that Pega misappropriated five "architecture and design" trade secrets: i.e., information Pega lifted from Appian's platform to bolster its own product. These design secrets were Appian innovations dealing with Smart Services, Custom Data Types, Ease-of-Editing Functionality, Out-of-the-Box Ability to Deploy Applications to Mobile, and Out-of-the-Box Integrated Social View of Worklist and Tasks. We will address each feature in turn—and in each case Appian's expert, Dr. Marshall, provided testimony establishing the contours of the secret.
(a) Smart Services
Appian's Smart Services feature enabled software developers to build applications more easily by making available a pre-coded tool "shape" to perform a given task. Dr. Marshall testified that Pega "did not have Smart Services" in Versions 6.2 and 6.3 of its software. He further testified that although "[t]here was information that these services existed," information about "how they worked, how [they] were used was not publicly available. That was privileged information." According to Dr. Marshall, Pega focused on this feature in its sessions with Zou, "asking a number of questions about how Smart Services work in the context of building an application[.]"
Ultimately, according to Dr. Marshall, Pega added a Smart Services feature similar to Appian's to its own platform. Dr. Marshall testified that Pega's improvement related to Smart Services was "released in September 2013" and "there [was] a new category that ha[d] been added to the flow editor, which is the Pega equivalent of what we've just seen called smart shapes. These smart shapes are a subset of the Smart Services offered by Appian." This improvement, according to Dr. Marshall, "greatly enhance[d] [Pega's] ease of use," "greatly reduce[d] the need for training," "reduced the number of errors that developers ma[de]," "increase[d] the number of people who can use the [Pega] platform," and "increase[ed] the productivity of those people." In Pega's marketing publication, "Pega 7: Why Upgrade?" Pega touted this new feature as a reason for customers to purchase the latest version of its software.
(b) Custom Data Types and Ease-of-Editing
Appian's Custom Data Types (CDTs) were a means of improving "human understanding of data" in a project. According to Marshall, Pega had a "different mechanism" called "data classes" which was "difficult for developers to understand." Dr. Marshall testified that Pega made improvements to its platform by adding custom data types that mimicked Appian's CDTs. He further testified that "[t]hese changes significantly simplify and accelerate the data modeling process in the Pega platform." In its marketing materials, including its "Why Upgrade?" publication, Pega highlighted its new CDT-like feature that would "make[ ] it easier and faster for developers to know how to use the data and modify the application."
Appian's Ease-of-Editing Functionality feature allowed developers to transition from a simulated end-user environment to an editing environment without having to go through a complex series of navigations. Zou also disclosed this feature to Pega. According to Marshall, Pega's "editing process" did not have an equivalent feature, and Appian alleged that Pega copied this feature to improve its own platform. Dr. Marshall opined that Pega's changes to its editing features were the result of Zou's demonstrations of the platform for Pega's product management team. He further testified these changes were significant because they enabled Pega's platform to be used by "a much broader constituency of users," and allowed "business analysts, less technical people to be able to accomplish far more."
(c) Out-of-the-Box Features
According to Appian's evidence, Pega also co-opted Appian's "out-of-the-box" mobile capabilities. Appian's model did not require any coding to deliver applications to mobile devices, while "Pega had a very basic capability that was not out of the box" and "[d]idn't do very much." Marshall suggested that Pega was floundering in this arena while Appian's mobile capability "was already delivering the ability to take your applications... and deliver them to mobile devices as well as the desktop...." Ultimately, Pega added out-of-the-box ability to deploy applications to mobile devices in Version 7.1. Per Dr. Marshall: "this improvement increased developer efficiency and eliminated the need to create separate versions of an application for a phone, tablet, or desktop."
Appian's final "architecture and design" trade secret related to its "Out-of-the-Box Integrated Social View of Worklist and Tasks." This feature allowed for better social interaction among users working on a project. Again, according to Marshall, prior to meeting with Zou, Pega did not have a comparable feature, as its social capability was "extremely basic." After Zou conducted training videos on social interactions among users, Pega subsequently made an improvement to this feature. In its "Why Upgrade?" publication, Pega listed its new social capabilities as a "new and improved feature[ ]" that "enhance[d] the value of ... Pega applications," and "gives users the tools to chat easily with colleagues[,] ... advance a process or resolve a case directly from their conversation feeds, and even incorporate conversations from external social media networks."
Appian's expert identified contours of each of these "Design and Architecture" trade secrets. Marshall's testimony spanned nearly three days and over 800 transcript pages. Appian sufficiently laid out these trade secrets, letting the jury know what Pega was accused of misappropriating.
In addition to identifying its "Architecture and Design" trade secrets, Appian asserted additional trade secrets were misappropriated based on "sensitive structural limitations of Appian's platform previously unknown to Pega[.]" These secrets essentially boiled down to serious weaknesses in Appian's BPM platform that competitors could exploit. Again, VUTSA's definition of a trade secret encompasses information that derives independent economic value from not being known or readily ascertainable by competitors who "can obtain economic value for its disclosure or use." Code § 59.1-336. Appian's asserted trade secrets in this regard relate to Pega obtaining Appian's "written documentation" that included private information as well as Pega's ability to identify and exploit weaknesses in Appian's software once armed with Zou's demonstrations and Appian's documentation.9
Indeed, Pega initiated a program dubbed "Project Crush" where it analyzed Appian's strengths and weaknesses, and determined that Pega's software had many significant advantages over Appian's. Buttressed by this knowledge, Pega created or updated marketing materials attacking Appian based on these vulnerabilities. Each of the so-called "weakness" trade secrets identified by Appian was the subject of a Pega marketing foray. Supra at 453-55, 904 S.E.2d at 257-58. Pega marketing materials addressing these weaknesses were presented to the jury as exhibits.
On this record, the trial court did not err in denying Pega's motions to strike and to set aside the verdict as a matter of law. Having rejected Pega's position that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we next turn to Pega's claims that a series of evidentiary errors and instruction missteps below necessitate a retrial. Here, we agree with Pega.
A. Standard of Review
The sole purpose of appellate review of jury instructions is "to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises." Dorman v. State Indus., Inc., 292 Va. 111, 125, 787 S.E.2d 132 (2016) (quoting Cain v. Lee, 290 Va. 129, 134, 772 S.E.2d 894 (2015)). "We review a trial court's decisions in giving and denying requested jury instructions for abuse of discretion." Conley v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 658, 675, 871 S.E.2d 640 (2022). "Whether a proffered jury instruction accurately states the law, however, is reviewed de novo." Holmes v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 34, 53, 880 S.E.2d 17 (2022). "Questions relating to burden of proof, including the standard of proof and which party bears the burden to meet it, are questions of law reviewed de novo." La Bella Dona Skin Care, Inc. v. Belle Femme Enters., LLC, 294 Va. 243, 257, 805 S.E.2d 399 (2017) (quoting Ballagh v. Fauber Enters., 290 Va. 120, 124, 773 S.E.2d 366 (2015)).
B. VUTSA and Virginia Precedent Require Plaintiffs to Prove Proximate Cause
Remedies based on unjust enrichment require a defendant to disgorge its gain resulting from a wrong. Schmidt v. Household Fin. Corp., 276 Va. 108, 116, 661 S.E.2d 834 (2008).10 The damages Appian sought against Pega were grounded in unjust enrichment. VUTSA requires the complainant to prove that "unjust enrichment" damages were "caused by misappropriation." Code § 59.1-338(A). Yet, the trial court's instructions, here, relieved Appian of its burden of proving that the alleged misappropriation caused Pega to win any sale. The trial court rejected Pega's requests for instructions requiring Appian to prove that "Pega's wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of Appian's damages." Instead, the court instructed the jury to apply a burden-shifting approach under which, upon proving a misappropriation of a trade secret, Appian's only further burden was to "establish[ ] by ... greater weight of the evidence Pegasystems' sales." (Emphasis added).
The result was a presumption that Appian's trade secrets were the but-for cause of all of Pega's sales—including product lines that did not use any information associated with Appian's claimed trade secrets. Under this hotly contested framework, once Appian proved Pega's total sales revenue (which was billions during the relevant time frame), the burden shifted to Pega to prove what portion of these sales were not attributable to the trade secrets. Pega contended that this damages rubric was impermissible on multiple levels: (1) it failed to place the burden of proving proximate cause on Appian, (2) it utilized burden shifting concepts that the Supreme Court of Virginia has rejected, and (3) even if burden shifting were appropriate in the unjust enrichment arena, the instruction utilized here, which was modeled after principles enunciated by the Restatement of Unfair Competition, improperly applied the Restatement framework. We agree with Pega on all fronts.
Appian argued to the trial court that burden shifting was appropriate under the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition in the situation where a victim of misappropriation has relied upon unjust enrichment damages under VUTSA because the wrongdoer has more knowledge of its own sales than the victim. Based on this logic, Appian championed a burden-shifting framework which placed the onus on Pega, after Appian demonstrated misappropriation, to prove all of its sales were not tainted. This instruction followed:
If you find that plaintiff Appian has proved by greater weight of the evidence its claim for misappropriation of trade secrets against defendant Pegasystems, you must find your verdict for Appian and decide the issue of damages as to Pegasystems. You may award the amount of unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation.
For unjust enrichment, Appian is entitled to recover Pegasystems' net profits. Appian has the burden of establishing by greater weight of the evidence Pegasystems' sales; Pegasystems has the burden of establishing by greater weight of the evidence any portion of the sales not attributable to the trade secret or trade secrets and any expenses to be deducted in determining net profits.
Instruction 14.
Per the instruction, the court advised the jury that Appian could prove its damages simply by establishing "Pegasystems' sales." This framework impermissibly "shifted the burden" to Pega to prove sales were not related to the wrongdoing and relieved Appian of its burden to prove proximate cause for the misappropriation. Put another way, for damages purposes, Appian only had to establish Pega's enrichment—it did not have to prove "unjust" enrichment. Moreover, by permitting Appian to use all of Pega's sales as damages, the instruction removed any causation nexus between the sales and the misappropriation.
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo, and we determine the legislative intent from the words used in the statute, applying the plain meaning of the words unless they are ambiguous or would lead to an absurd result." Wright v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 754, 759, 685 S.E.2d 655 (2009). When a statute "is plain and unambiguous, [courts] are bound by th[at] plain meaning." Jones v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 412, 415, 821 S.E.2d 540 (2018) (quoting Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 769, 652 S.E.2d 456 (2007)). A court "must presume that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words that appear in a statute, and must apply the statute in a manner faithful to that choice." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 738, 742, 793 S.E.2d 321 (2016)). "Once the legislature has acted, the role of the judiciary `is the narrow one of determining what [the legislature] meant by the words it used in the statute.'" Dionne, 240 Va. at 304, 397 S.E.2d 110 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 2212, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980)).
VUTSA's plain language places the burden of proving unjust enrichment damages caused by misappropriation on the complainant:
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. If a complainant is unable to prove a greater amount of damages by other methods of measurement, the damages caused by misappropriation can be measured exclusively by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
Code § 59.1-338(A) (emphases added). First, under the statute's plain language, only damages "caused by misappropriation" are recoverable.
Moreover, the second sentence of the provision makes clear that it is the complainant —Appian—that has the burden to "prove" unjust enrichment damages.11 It is also notable that the key statutory language "[i]f a complainant is unable to prove" is unique to VUTSA. While forty-eight other states have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the model uniform act does not speak in terms of the complainant "proving" damages.12 Virginia expressly codified this language clarifying that the burden to "prove" damages is on the complainant. Where a legislative body deviates from a model, uniform act to add language, we effectuate this "deliberate and intentional" choice. Commonwealth, Dep't of Taxation v. Champion Int'l Corp., 220 Va. 981, 992, 265 S.E.2d 720 (1980); see Cornell v. Benedict, 301 Va. 342, 350, 878 S.E.2d 191 (2022) ("Our canons of statutory construction presume that the General Assembly's decision" not to adopt some of the statute's definitions, while accepting others, "represents a conscious decision with deliberate implications."). Thus, VUTSA's express language militates against relieving Appian of its burden of proving proximate cause.
Even if VUTSA did not contain this clarifying language, Virginia law generally places the burden on plaintiffs "in any case" to "prove with reasonable certainty the amount of [their] damages and the cause from which they resulted." Hale v. Fawcett, 214 Va. 583, 585-86, 202 S.E.2d 923 (1974). Establishing proximate cause requires a plaintiff to prove that defendant's unlawful conduct produced the damages in a "natural and continuous sequence" and that it was a but-for cause "without which that event would not have occurred." Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 285 Va. 141, 150, 736 S.E.2d 724 (2013); see also Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 272 Va. 177, 189, 630 S.E.2d 304 (2006) (plaintiff bears burden of proving its damages were proximately caused by defendant's wrongful conduct). This requirement also applies in the trade secret arena.
Our Supreme Court has stated that to establish lost profits a plaintiff has "the burden of proving with reasonable certainty the amount of damages and the cause from which they resulted; speculation and conjecture cannot form the basis of the recovery." Banks v. Mario Indus., 274 Va. 438, 455, 650 S.E.2d 687 (2007) (quoting Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 188, 630 S.E.2d 304). A plaintiff must establish both a causal connection between defendant's wrongful conduct and the damages claimed—and prove the amount of damages with reasonable certainty using a proper method and factual foundation for calculating such damages. See Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 188-89, 630 S.E.2d 304. Professor Sinclair's treatise on remedies also notes that this causation requirement should be applied to trade secret claims, including claims for unjust enrichment damages. See Sinclair, 1 Virginia Remedies, supra, § 29-3[A]; see also Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 190, 630 S.E.2d 304 (Plaintiffs must "show the necessary factor of proximate causation.").
Given the plain language of the Act and the foregoing case law on causation and damages principles, Instruction 14 was erroneous in requiring Appian to prove only misappropriation plus Pega's total sales to meet its burden in proving damages. Appian should have been required to carry the burden of proving that the misappropriation caused the damages—and to prove its damages and their cause with reasonable certainty.13 Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d 687.
C. Virginia has Rejected the Burden-Shifting Framework Adopted by the Trial Court—and even if it had not, the Instruction Granted by the Trial Court Misconstrues the Restatement Approach
In addition to relieving Appian of its obligation of proving proximate cause, the trial court's Instruction 14 openly applies a burden-shifting framework. Our Supreme Court has explicitly addressed the issue of burden-shifting under VUTSA: "The plain language of the Act does not provide any burden-shifting requirement. As we observed in Dionne, `the proponent must bear the burden of proving a trade-secret claim.' This burden does not shift, even when a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case." MicroStrategy Inc., 268 Va. at 265, 601 S.E.2d 580 (quoting Dionne, 240 Va. at 303 n.2, 397 S.E.2d 110).
Appian argues that MicroStrategy is not controlling here because it was discussing burden-shifting in the context of the misappropriation element. However, the Court in MicroStrategy did not qualify or limit its finding that VUTSA does not permit any burden-shifting. While the Court made this ruling in the context of the misappropriation element, VUTSA contains no burden-shifting requirement as to damages either; indeed, as discussed above, the statutory language in Code § 59.1-338(A) places the burden of proof for damages squarely on the complainant.
Even if it were appropriate under Virginia law to employ burden-shifting and to invoke the approach adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, the instruction advanced by Appian wholly misconstrued the Restatement framework. Jurisdictions that allow burden-shifting require plaintiffs to prove more than misappropriation plus total sales. These jurisdictions still require the plaintiff to prove "whether or not the sales are attributable to the trade secret[s]" —what some commentators call "sales causation." See, e.g., ADA Motors, Inc. v. Butler, 7 Wash.App.2d 53, 432 P.3d 445, 449-51 (2018); Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. Trizetto Grp., Inc., 68 F.4th 792, 810 (2d Cir. 2023) (finding Restatement requires plaintiff to establish "defendant's profits on sales attributable to the use of the trade secret").
Under the Restatement formula, after the plaintiff has established sales causation, the burden shifts to defendants for analysis of subsequent considerations including: (1) deducting expenses from revenue to yield profits; and (2) what is often called "apportionment" which is the exercise of segregating the portion of revenue from any particular sale that is attributable to the misappropriated information from the portion that is "not attributable to the trade secret[s]."14 ADA Motors, Inc., 432 P.3d at 450-51.
These steps—apportionment and profit calculation—help isolate the defendant's unjust gains from its just ones. See William O. Kerr & Richard B. Troxel, Calculating Intellectual Property Damages § 7:4 (2018 ed.); Collelo, 283 Va. at 84, 727 S.E.2d 55 (McClanahan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (explaining that plaintiffs must "provid[e] a factual basis upon which a jury could discern between [defendants'] just and unjust enrichment"). And, again, the Restatement shifts the burden to defendant to prove these adjustments to the damage calculation—deducting expenses, apportionment, and isolating "just" profits—only after plaintiffs prove the first step: the share of sales that were caused by the misappropriation. In short, nothing in the Restatement methodology relieved Appian of its obligation to prove causation in the first instance. This approach is consistent with the Restatement comments and uniform practice of the states that have adopted the Restatement framework. See ADA Motors, Inc., 432 P.3d at 451 ("The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving sales attributable to the trade secret."); Iconics, Inc. v. Massaro, 266 F. Supp. 3d 461, 467 (D. Mass. 2017) ("[i]n order to establish defendants' unjust profits, plaintiffs must `do more initially than toss up an undifferentiated gross revenue number; the revenue stream must bear a legally significant relationship to the infringement" (citations omitted)).15 The Restatement certainly does not authorize a plaintiff to sidestep its burden of proof as to proximate cause between sales and the misappropriation.16
The trial court granted Instruction 14 based on a misreading of comment f of the Restatement of Unfair Competition § 45 and a case from Washington state that utilized the instruction at issue in another context. Ultimately, Instruction 14 was inconsistent with the very authorities Appian invoked— the Restatement and Washington law.
Comment f, set out below, actually confirms that plaintiffs bear the burden to show proximate cause (or sales causation).17 The comment first defines the outer limits of recoverable unjust enrichment damages: plaintiffs can recover a defendant's "profits on sales attributable to the use of the trade secret." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 45, cmt. f (1995) (emphasis added). The comment then uses the language Appian emphasized in Instruction 14—identifying a plaintiff's burden as "establishing the defendant's sales." Id. This mid-paragraph proposition, however, assumes what has been previously stated in the comment—that plaintiff must first identify sales attributable to the improper use of the trade secret. Thus, when this sentence speaks of identifying defendants' "sales," it takes for granted that this figure will be a subset of relevant damages— i.e., sales attributable to the use of the trade secret.18
The trial court, however, applied the term "sales" to all Pega's sales—not just sales attributable to the misappropriation of the trade secret. To support its reading of comment f, the trial court adopted a novel interpretation of the law of Washington state and purported to follow Petters, 210 P.3d at 1054. Petters involved the misappropriation of the design of an undersea drill. Notably, Petters did not absolve plaintiffs of the initial burden of proving sales causation; it addressed the defendant's apportionment burden following the Restatement's burden-shifting template. Id. Critically, several years later, in ADA Motors, the Washington Court of Appeals clarified and emphasized that Petters should not be read to relieve a plaintiff of its burden of proving proximate cause. The ADA Motors court flatly rejected an instruction nearly identical to the one issued here: "Plaintiff has the initial burden of proving defendants' sales." See 432 P.3d at 451 (emphasis omitted). The ADA Motors court held the instruction to be error—even under Petters —because it could "be read to allow the plaintiff to satisfy its burden with gross sales data, whether or not the sales are attributable to the trade secret." Id. (emphasis added). That is exactly what happened here.
The ADA Motors court explained that a proper instruction must impose on plaintiffs the burden of proving not just any sales, but sales "attributable to the trade secret."19 Id.; accord Inteum Co., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 884-85.20
Thus, Instruction 14 contravenes Virginia case law, VUTSA's express language, and the Restatement's own burden-shifting framework. We hold that the granting of Instruction 14 was reversible error. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial in which the jury is instructed that the complainant bears the burden of proving proximate cause between the misappropriation and any unjust enrichment damages. See Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 190, 630 S.E.2d 304.21
After Instruction 14 improperly shifted the burden to Pega to disprove damages, the trial court then hampered Pega from meeting that burden by precluding Pega from presenting evidence, or conducting cross-examination, to demonstrate that much of Pega's total sales revenue was attributable to products with which Appian did not compete and that had "nothing to do with" the misappropriation. This evidence, highlighted in detail earlier, supra at 462-63, 904 S.E.2d at 261-62, included testimony that "more than 50 percent of Pega's revenue is derived from customers" buying products not in competition with Appian and that Pega had many customers who "bought things that Appian didn't sell."
Pega's efforts to disprove such total sales, under the flawed instruction, were short-circuited based upon a dispute involving an interrogatory. The interrogatory sought information about Pega revenues derived from different versions of its software:
Interrogatory No. 18: Identify all revenues received by Pegasystems for each fiscal year from 2012 through 2021 relating to Pega 6.3, Pega 7.0 and any subsequent version broken out by year and version of the software; and identify the costs and expenses Pegasystems incurred in order to realize those revenues.
Answer: Pegasystems does not record or report revenue, or any associated costs and expenses incurred by Pegasystems, based on the "version" of the product sold (e.g., Pega 6.3, Pega 7.0). There is no mechanism or process by which Pegasystems is able to determine these revenue, cost and expense amounts. As a result, Pegasystems' financial results (including total revenue and all associated costs and expenses) for each applicable fiscal year as reported to the SEC in Pegasystems' annual Form 10-K filings and quarterly Form 10-Q filings are attached as Schedule 3.
R. 47525-26 (objections omitted). While Pega disclaimed revenue records for versions of its software in this answer—the trial court interpreted the response to disclaim records for all of its products or other lines of business: "[Y]ou've essentially given up by answering an interrogatory that you can't breakdown the damages, you can't breakdown your revenue based on lines of business."
The trial court's reading of the response misses the distinction between different products and different "versions" of the same product. The interrogatory asked about "versions" of a specific product: Pega's software. Reporting that Pega does not track revenue by software versions is not tantamount to asserting that Pega sells no other products or that Pega does not track revenue by product or by lines of business. This is particularly true where long before trial Pega's damages expert, Platt, submitted a report breaking out revenue attributable to various products.