481 U.S. 551 (1987)
In 1975 respondent Dorothy Finley was convicted of second-degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and sentenced to life imprisonment.1 Her appointed trial counsel appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which unanimously affirmed in 1978.2
After the direct appeal failed, Finley filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., raising the same issues previously rejected.3 The trial court denied relief, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed in 1981 and held that state law entitled her to appointed counsel for the postconviction proceedings.4
On remand the trial court appointed new counsel. That attorney reviewed the trial record, consulted with Finley, concluded there were no arguable bases for relief, and submitted a written no-merit letter to the court requesting permission to withdraw.5 The trial court conducted its own review of the record, agreed that no meritorious issues existed, and dismissed the petition.6
Finley obtained new appointed counsel and appealed the dismissal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.7 In 1984 that court, over a dissent, held that the postconviction counsel's conduct violated her rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, relying on procedures derived from Anders v. California.8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.9
Whether the procedures set forth in Anders v. California apply to state postconviction collateral proceedings in which counsel is provided under state law?10
Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.11
No. Finley received appointed counsel under Pennsylvania law for her postconviction petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act after her direct appeal had been unanimously affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.12 Her counsel reviewed the trial record, consulted with her, concluded there were no arguable bases for relief, and submitted a written no-merit letter requesting permission to withdraw.13 The trial court conducted an independent review of the record and dismissed the petition.14 Because the source of Finley's right to counsel was state law rather than the federal Constitution, and because postconviction review is civil in nature and further removed from the criminal trial than discretionary direct review, the Anders procedures were not constitutionally required.15
The Anders procedures do not apply to state postconviction collateral proceedings in which counsel is provided under state law.16
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Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that once a state affords a right to counsel in collateral proceedings, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require that the Anders procedures be followed to ensure fundamental fairness.17 He emphasized that Finley's appointed counsel failed to amend the petition, submit a brief, or provide notice as required by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's remand order under the PCHA, leaving the proceeding effectively uncounselled.18 In his view, allowing counsel to advocate against the client's claims without notice transforms the right to effective counsel into a meaningless ritual and violates equal protection by denying indigents the advocacy that retained counsel would provide.19
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court’s conclusion that the Superior Court erred in its belief that the United States Constitution required the application of the procedures mandated by Anders v. California, 386 U. S.
738 (1967), to this case.20 In his view, however, on remand the Superior Court should be able to consider whether appointed counsel’s review of respondent’s case was adequate under Pennsylvania law or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remand order.21
Whether a prisoner possesses a federal constitutional right to appointed counsel when mounting a collateral attack on a conviction?22
The right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. Prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions.23
No. Finley had already pursued and lost her direct appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, after which her conviction became final.24 Her subsequent petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act constituted a collateral attack initiated by the prisoner rather than a continuation of the criminal prosecution.25 The considerations of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause and meaningful access under the Equal Protection Clause that support counsel on first appeal do not extend to these proceedings.26 States have no obligation to provide such proceedings at all.27
A prisoner does not possess a federal constitutional right to appointed counsel when mounting a collateral attack on a conviction.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the threshold ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision rested on an independent and adequate state ground.29 He noted that the Superior Court explicitly stated it was applying Pennsylvania law concerning procedures to be followed when a court-appointed attorney sees no basis for an appeal.30 As for federal precedents, the court simply noted that state law in the area was derived from this Court's 1967 decision in Anders v. California.31
In his view, the plain statement test of Michigan v. Long was satisfied, and the decision on review rested on independent and adequate state grounds.32 He would dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction.33
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings follow the Anders procedures once a state has chosen to provide such counsel?34
When a state provides counsel in postconviction proceedings as a matter of state law rather than federal constitutional command. The Due Process Clause does not require that counsel's actions conform to the specific prophylactic procedures set forth in Anders.35
No. Pennsylvania chose to provide Finley with counsel for her first postconviction petition and the trial court found that the combination of counsel's no-merit letter and the court's independent record review satisfied the state-law right.36 Unlike the prisoner in Evitts v. Lucey who was actually deprived of a state-created right to appeal, Finley suffered no deprivation of the assistance to which she was entitled under state law.37 The Constitution therefore does not compel the additional Anders safeguards in this context.38
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings follow the Anders procedures once a state has chosen to provide such counsel.39