51 Cal. 4th 989, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 252 P.3d 968 (2011)
Paul D. Anderson is a longtime methamphetamine addict.1 As of the time of the crimes at issue here, he had been out of work for a year, was separated from his wife, had neither a job nor a car, and was living on the streets or spending nights in the homes of other methamphetamine users.2
Defendant spent the morning and afternoon of November 7, 2003, at the home of Ginger Lyle, a drug dealer, where he smoked methamphetamine and socialized with Lyle and several other users.3 After leaving Lyle's home, he went to an apartment complex a few blocks away, later stating he went with the intention of finding a car to steal so he could visit his wife and children.4
On November 7, 19-year-old Pamela Thompson came home from work around 9:00 p.m. She parked her car in the apartment complex's carport and went to her apartment to change her clothing before going out, leaving her purse in the car.5 In the meantime, defendant entered the complex looking for a car he could enter with his key.6 After failing to break into several cars, defendant successfully opened the door to Pamela's car, started it, and attempted to drive out of the complex.7 After discovering the gate to the complex did not open automatically, defendant backed the car into a parking space to wait for someone else to open the gate.8
By this time, Pamela had discovered her car was gone.9 She telephoned her stepfather, Joe Deitz, asking if he had taken it.10 When he said he had not, she told him the car had been stolen.11 Pamela also called her mother, Barbara Thompson, telling her the car had been stolen and she was looking for it.12 After they spoke for a few minutes, Barbara heard Pamela say, loudly, "Oh, my God. Here comes my car real fast."13 The phone went silent.14 Joe ran to the gate where he found Pamela lying in a puddle of blood on the street.15 Pamela never regained consciousness and died a few days later.16 She had suffered multiple blunt-force traumas resulting in multiple skull and rib fractures, injuries consistent with having been crushed by a car traveling the length of her body.17 Defendant quickly abandoned the car but took from it a credit card and driver's license belonging to Pamela.18 He was arrested several days later after having used the credit card several times.19 Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance of killing during the course of a robbery, robbery, and receipt of stolen property.20 The Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that the trial court erred by failing to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident.21
Whether the intent element of robbery includes an intent to apply force against the victim or to cause the victim to feel fear?22
Robbery is defined as the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.23 The intent required for robbery is the specific intent to deprive the victim of the property permanently.24 The act of force or intimidation by which the taking is accomplished in robbery must be motivated by the intent to steal.25
No. Anderson committed a forcible act against Pamela Thompson by driving her car over her at 25 to 30 miles per hour while fleeing the apartment complex after stealing the vehicle.26 This act was motivated by his intent to steal the car and escape with it.27 Even under his version of the facts, he drove with more force than necessary to move the car to safety and his motive was to retain the property.28 The law requires only that the perpetrator exert some quantum of force in excess of that necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property, and that the forcible act be motivated by the intent to steal, not an additional intent to apply force or cause fear.29
The evidence shows that Anderson ran over Thompson, who was standing outside the gate with her hand up, after accelerating to clear the closing gate, and then fled without stopping.30 This satisfies the elements of robbery because the force was used to facilitate escape with the stolen property.31
The intent element of robbery does not include an intent to apply force against the victim or to cause the victim to feel fear.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennard agrees with the result reversing the Court of Appeal.33 She questions the majority's conclusion that robbery requires no general intent to use force.34 She views robbery as a combination of theft and assault under common law principles incorporated into the 1872 statute.35
Nevertheless, she concludes that any instructional error on general intent was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.36 Anderson's conduct of driving at high speed toward the gate without braking established the mental element for assault even under his own account of the events.37
Whether a trial court has an obligation to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident where the defendant's theory of accident is an attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime?38
A trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.39 This includes defenses the defendant is relying on if there is substantial evidence.40 However, when a defendant presents evidence to negate an element of the offense, it is not a special defense requiring sua sponte instruction.41 A pinpoint instruction is required only upon request.42
No. Anderson's theory that hitting Thompson was an accident was an attempt to negate the intent element of robbery by claiming he did not intend to apply force or cause fear.43 The trial court provided complete instructions on the elements of robbery through CALCRIM No. 1600, explaining that the defendant must have used force or fear to take the property with the intent to deprive the owner permanently, and that the intent must have been formed before or during the use of force.44 Since the accident theory was merely negating an element and not a separate defense, no sua sponte instruction was required.45 The instruction could not have caused the jury to fail to consider a potentially meritorious defense.46
The Court of Appeal erred in reversing the convictions on this ground.47
A trial court has no obligation to provide a sua sponte instruction on accident where the defendant's theory of accident is an attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime.48
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennard concurs in the majority's holding that a trial court need not instruct sua sponte on accident when the claim merely negates a mental element of the offense.49 This is provided the jury received complete and accurate instructions on the requisite mental element.50 She emphasizes that any potential error in failing to instruct on general intent to use force was not prejudicial.51
A rational jury would have found the element satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt based on Anderson's testimony that he saw Thompson and swerved without braking while driving at 25 to 30 miles per hour.52