242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926)
A police officer arrested the defendant on a charge that he had stolen an overcoat.1 The defendant when taken into custody was in the hall of his boarding house.2 The officer after making the arrest entered the defendant’s room and searched it. The search produced a bag, and in the bag was a blackjack.3
The defendant after trial at Special Sessions was acquitted of the larceny. In the meantime he had been indicted as a second offender for the possession of the weapon.4 He made a motion before trial to suppress the evidence obtained through search without a Warrant. The motion was denied.5
He made objection again upon the trial when the bag and the contents, i. e., the blackjack and a hat, were offered in evidence by the People. The objection was overruled.6 The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment of conviction on the weapon possession charge.7
Whether the defendant suffered a denial of his rights under the statute against unreasonable search and seizure through the admission of evidence obtained by search without a warrant?8
The statute against unreasonable search and seizure (Civil Rights Law § 8) places official and private trespasses on equal footing and does not require exclusion of evidence obtained through an unlawful search; remedies for the trespass remain civil damages, criminal prosecution of the officer, or disciplinary action.9
No. The officer arrested the defendant in the hall of his boarding house on a misdemeanor charge of stealing an overcoat valued at fifty dollars or less.10
The arrest was unlawful because the crime had not been committed or attempted in the officer's presence.11 The subsequent warrantless entry into the defendant's room and search that produced the bag containing the blackjack could not be justified as incident to a lawful arrest.12 The blackjack was contraband subject to seizure if in plain view.13
Yet the statute supplies no rule that evidence discovered by trespass must be suppressed at trial.14 The Court of Appeals had previously held in People v. Adams that documents seized without authority remained competent evidence.15 The legislature's subsequent silence confirms that the statute does not anathematize the fruits of an unlawful search.16 The balance struck in Adams between the social need to repress crime and the need to deter official insolence remains controlling until the legislature speaks with a clearer voice.17
Admitting the blackjack therefore did not deny the defendant any right conferred by the statute.18
The admission of the evidence obtained through the warrantless search did not deny the defendant his rights under the statute against unreasonable search and seizure.19
Whether the defendant suffered a denial of his rights under the provision of the State Constitution which gives immunity against compulsory self-incrimination?20
The state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects only against compelled testimonial disclosure extracted by legal process directed at a witness. It does not extend to the seizure of contraband or implements of crime whether accomplished with or without a warrant.21
No. The blackjack was an implement of crime, not an item protected against prying inquisition.22
Its production would have been equally incriminatory whether seized pursuant to a warrant or through trespass.23 The privilege applies only when incriminatory disclosure is extorted by the constraint of legal process aimed at a witness, as the Court of Appeals held in People v. Adams.24 Mere seizure of outlawed property does not constitute testimonial compulsion.25
The distinction between the Fourth and Fifth Amendment analogues remains intact under state law.26 The production of the weapon did not trench upon the privilege.27
The admission of the blackjack did not deny the defendant his rights under the state constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.28
Whether the defendant suffered a denial of his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?29
The Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the federal exclusionary rule for evidence obtained through an unreasonable search. Due process is satisfied even if the privilege against self-incrimination were abolished altogether. The same holds for the use of evidence seized without a warrant.30
No. The Supreme Court's decisions construing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not bind the states.31
The Fourteenth Amendment would not be violated even if the immunity against search and seizure without warrant were entirely eliminated with respect to the subsequent use of evidence.32 The Court of Appeals therefore follows its own established rule that the evidence remains admissible.33
The admission of the evidence did not deny the defendant his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34