72 Ill. 2d 16, 377 N.E.2d 28 (1978)
The Supreme Court of Illinois consolidated two appeals involving convictions for attempted murder.1 In the first case, William Myers Harris was charged by information with the attempted murder of Joyce Baker on November 18, 1975, in a rural area east of Champaign, as well as with aggravated kidnapping.2 Harris and Baker had been arguing throughout much of the evening about the defendant's accusations of infidelity. During the argument, Harris picked up a revolver from the floor of the car and placed it in his lap with the barrel pointed toward Baker. Baker interpreted several of his remarks as threats to kill her.3
She exited the car, ran into a barbed wire fence injuring her leg, returned to the car, attempted to seize the gun, then drove away toward a nearby farmhouse. As she drove off, she saw Harris standing behind the car holding the gun with both hands and pointing it at her. She heard something strike the rear window, which broke, and police later found a bullet fragment on the left side of the rear seat.4 Harris was convicted of attempted murder but acquitted of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to a term of not less than four years and not more than twelve years.5
The information alleged that he committed attempted murder with the intent to commit the crime of murder by shooting a gun at Baker.6 The State tendered and the court gave, over objection, instructions defining attempt and murder, including that a person commits murder who kills an individual if in performing the acts which cause the death he intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual.7 The Appellate Court for the Fourth District affirmed the conviction but remanded for resentencing, finding the minimum sentence improper.8 The State appealed the sentencing portion, and Harris challenged the instructions.9
In the second case, Johnnie E. Shields was indicted for the attempted murder of Marion Bradley and for aggravated battery arising out of the same act on New Year's Day.10 The offense followed a fight in the defendant's apartment between Shields and the victim's son Robert, who was intoxicated. After the fight, Shields appeared at the Bradley apartment armed with a shotgun, said he was going to kill them, pursued them outdoors, and after a scuffle fired the shotgun, wounding Marion Bradley who had positioned herself to shield her son.11 The jury found Shields guilty of both charges, but the trial court entered judgment only on the attempted murder count and sentenced him to imprisonment of not less than seven and not more than twenty-one years.12
The indictment charged that with the intent to commit murder he did an act constituting a substantial step by shooting Marion Bradley knowing that such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.13 The State tendered and the court gave instructions defining attempt and murder in terms of knowledge that acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.14 The Appellate Court for the Third District initially affirmed but on rehearing reversed the conviction.15 The Supreme Court of Illinois granted review in both cases and consolidated them for decision in an opinion filed on May 26, 1978.16
Whether the jury instructions in the attempted murder prosecution of William Myers Harris adequately required proof of intent to kill rather than intent to do great bodily harm?17
Attempted murder under section 8-4(a) requires a specific intent to commit the offense of murder, meaning an intent to kill.18 Instructions that define murder to include intent to do great bodily harm under section 9-1(a)(1) or knowledge creating a strong probability of death or great bodily harm under section 9-1(a)(2) are improper.19 They allow conviction without proof of the requisite intent to kill.20
No. The instruction given in Harris stated that a person commits the crime of murder who kills an individual if, in performing the acts which cause the death, he intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual.21 This permitted the jury to convict Harris of attempted murder upon a finding of intent only to cause great bodily harm rather than intent to kill.22 The evidence showed Harris pointing and firing the gun at Baker after their argument over infidelity.23
The jury instructions were inadequate and the conviction must be reversed.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Underwood And Clark, Jj.
Justice Ryan concurs in the judgment reversing Harris but provides additional analysis on the distinction between intent and knowledge.25 He notes that the instruction under section 9-1(a)(1) would permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder if his specific intent was either to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual.26 This creates a clear conflict between that instruction, the instruction defining attempt, and the issue instruction, which require the specific intent to unlawfully take the life of another.27
Unlike the knowledge-based definition in section 9-1(a)(2), this intent-based definition directly conflicts with the requirement of intent to kill for attempted murder.28 Therefore, the words "or do great bodily harm" must be excised from the definition of murder and from the instruction when framing charges under section 9-1(a)(1).29
Whether the jury instructions in the attempted murder prosecution of Johnnie E. Shields adequately required proof of intent to kill rather than knowledge that the acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm?30
Attempted murder under section 8-4(a) requires a specific intent to commit the offense of murder, meaning an intent to kill. Instructions that define murder to include intent to do great bodily harm under section 9-1(a)(1) or knowledge creating a strong probability of death or great bodily harm under section 9-1(a)(2) are improper. They allow conviction without proof of the requisite intent to kill.
No. The instruction given in Shields defined murder as occurring when a person knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual.31 This language is identical to the language disapproved in Trinkle.32 It permitted the jury to convict without finding intent to kill.33 The evidence showed Shields firing the shotgun at Bradley after threatening to kill her and her son.34
The jury instructions were inadequate and the conviction must be reversed.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Underwood And Clark, Jj.
Justice Ryan dissents from the judgment reversing Shields.35 He explains that the indictment and instructions were framed under section 9-1(a)(2), as were the charges in Muir and Trinkle.36 When read as a whole, the issue instruction required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime of murder.37
The definition of murder using knowledge language did not mislead the jury or omit the intent element because the issue instruction spelled out the specific intent requirement.38 The instructions were therefore sufficient, and he would hold that they were not erroneous, consistent with his position in Muir.39 He does not agree that the instruction in Shields is identical to the one disapproved in Trinkle, as the defect in Trinkle was the absence of the intent element in the issue instruction.40