823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992)
In May 1987, Robert Serravo was charged in a multi-count information with attempted first degree murder after deliberation, first degree assault, and crimes of violence arising from the stabbing of his wife, Joyce Serravo.1
Serravo entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and was examined by several psychiatrists. The issue of his legal insanity was tried separately to a jury.2
On the evening of May 9, 1987, Serravo visited striking employees at a King Soopers store near his home. He returned home around 12:30 a.m. on May 10. After sitting in the kitchen and reading the Bible, he went upstairs to the bedroom where his wife was sleeping, stood over her for a few minutes, and then stabbed her in the back just below the shoulder blade.3 When his wife awoke, Serravo told her that she had been stabbed by an intruder and that she should stay in bed while he went downstairs to call for medical help.4
Police officers were later dispatched to the home. Serravo signed a consent to search his home and gave the police clothes that he was wearing at the time of his discovery of his wife's injury.5 Several weeks after the stabbing, Joyce Serravo found letters written by Serravo in which he admitted the stabbing.6
At the insanity trial, the prosecution presented testimony from Dr. Ann Seig.7 Doctor Seig diagnosed Serravo as suffering either from an organic delusional disorder or paranoid schizophrenia.8 Doctor Seig was of the view that Serravo was sane at the time of the stabbing because he was aware that the act of stabbing was contrary to law.9 Serravo presented four psychiatrists and a clinical psychologist on the issue of his legal insanity.10
The first psychiatrist, Doctor Frederick Miller, was of the opinion that on the night of the stabbing Serravo was under the psychotic delusion that it was his divine mission to kill his wife.11 Doctor Miller was of the opinion that Serravo's mental illness made it impossible for him to distinguish right from wrong even though Serravo was probably aware that such conduct was legally wrong.12 Another psychiatrist, Doctor Eric Kaplan, was of the opinion that Serravo was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing and was unable to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the stabbing.13 Two other psychiatrists, Doctor Geoffrey Heron and Doctor Seymour Sundell, offered the opinion that Serravo was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and a paranoid delusion about God which so affected his cognitive ability as to render him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong as normal people would be able to do in accordance with societal standards of morality.14
The trial court instructed the jury that a person is not accountable who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to the act.15 The court also gave Instruction No. 5 stating that the phrase includes within its meaning the case where a person appreciates that his conduct is criminal but because of a mental disease or defect believes it to be morally right.16 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes.17 The court committed Serravo to the custody of the Department of Institutions until such time as he is found to be eligible for release. The prosecution appealed the district court's ruling on the challenged jury-instruction to the court of appeals which approved the ruling.18 We thereafter granted the People's petition to consider whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the meaning of the phrase incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in the statutory definition of insanity.19
Whether the phrase incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in Colorado's statutory definition of insanity refers to an inability to distinguish legal right from legal wrong or instead to an inability to distinguish right from wrong under societal standards of morality?20
The phrase refers to a cognitive inability due to mental disease or defect to distinguish right from wrong under existing societal standards of morality rather than under a purely subjective personal standard or a formal legal standard of right and wrong.21
Yes. The court applied this rule directly to the established facts that Serravo suffered from paranoid schizophrenia or a similar psychotic disorder involving a delusion that God commanded the stabbing of his wife on May 10, 1987.22 Defense experts including Dr. Miller, Dr. Kaplan, Dr. Heron, Dr. Sundell, and Dr. Cohen testified that this delusion destroyed Serravo's capacity to distinguish right from wrong under societal moral standards even though he knew the act was illegal.23 Prosecution expert Dr. Seig reached the opposite conclusion solely because Serravo knew the stabbing violated positive law.24
The court held that the statutory test drawn from M'Naghten measures moral wrong by community standards of ethics transmitted through family, education, and religion, not by awareness of criminality alone.25
The phrase refers to societal standards of morality.26
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Justice Vollack dissented on this issue. He argued that the plain language of M'Naghten and section 16-8-101(1) requires a legal standard under which a defendant is sane if conscious that the act was contrary to the law of the land.27 He rejected the majority's reliance on Schmidt as unsupported by the M'Naghten answers because nowhere in the judges' responses does the word moral appear.28
The General Assembly's use of incapable of distinguishing signals a rigid cognitive test focused on legal prohibition rather than societal morality.29 During legislative hearings the bill sponsor emphasized that sanity remains a legal term.30 Vollack would have held that knowledge the act violated positive law defeats the insanity defense.31
Whether a jury instruction stating that the insanity standard includes the case where a person appreciates that his conduct is criminal but believes it to be morally right accurately reflects the meaning of incapable of distinguishing right from wrong?32
A jury instruction on the meaning of incapable of distinguishing right from wrong must clearly state that the standard is measured by societal standards of morality and must expressly reject a purely personal and subjective moral standard.33
No. The court applied this rule to the established facts that the trial court gave Instruction No. 5 which told the jury the phrase includes the case where a person appreciates that his conduct is criminal but because of mental disease or defect believes it to be morally right.34 The instruction was given over prosecution objection after the jury heard evidence that Serravo knew the stabbing was illegal yet believed it morally justified by divine command.35 Because the instruction was cast in general terms that permitted the jury to apply a personal moral standard it failed to convey the required societal-morality test and was therefore erroneous.36
The jury instruction does not accurately reflect the meaning of the phrase.37
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Vollack did not separately address the instruction but maintained throughout his dissent that the underlying legal standard he advocated would have rendered any moral-wrong instruction improper.38 Because he read the statute to require only consciousness that the act violated positive law, an instruction permitting jurors to acquit on the basis of a defendant's personal moral belief would have been legally incorrect under his view.39 Vollack consistently urged that the General Assembly had rejected moral or subjective formulations in favor of a strict legal test.40
He would have reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a new sanity trial under the legal-wrong standard.41
Whether a defendant who knows an act is illegal and contrary to societal standards of morality but believes due to a psychotic delusion that God has ordained the act may be found legally insane?42
A defendant may be found legally insane when a psychotic delusion that God has commanded the act destroys the defendant's cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong under societal standards of morality even if the defendant knows the act is illegal.43
Yes. The court applied this rule to the established facts that multiple defense experts testified Serravo's paranoid delusion that God ordered him to stab his wife on May 10, 1987 destroyed his capacity to appreciate the moral wrongfulness of the act under societal standards.44 Although Serravo told police an intruder had committed the crime and later admitted knowing the act was illegal the experts concluded the deific-decree delusion overbore his moral cognition.45 The court held that such a delusion is not an exception but an integral factor demonstrating incapacity under the societal-morality test.46
Such a defendant may be found legally insane.47
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Vollack dissented on this issue. He argued that incorporating a deific-decree delusion introduces a subjective religious standard into the statute contrary to the General Assembly's rejection of volitional and subjective tests in 1983 and this court's prior refusal to adopt subjective standards in Castro v. People.48 By deleting the volitional prong in 1983 the legislature eliminated any focus on an individual's subjective behavior and restricted the insanity defense only to those cases where the defendant was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.49
Vollack noted that this court had already rejected subjective emotional or integrated-personality tests in Castro.50 He would reject the deific-decree concept in any form because it allows personal religious beliefs to override the legal standard.51
Whether federal and state double jeopardy principles bar retrial of the defendant on the issue of sanity after a jury returns a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity?52
A jury verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is an adjudication on the merits that the prosecution failed to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Federal and state double jeopardy principles therefore prohibit retrial on the sanity issue even when the verdict rests on an erroneous jury instruction.54
Yes. The court applied this rule to the established facts that the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity after hearing conflicting expert testimony on Serravo's capacity and the prosecution appealed solely on the legal correctness of Instruction No. 5.55 Because the verdict constituted a determination that the prosecution had not carried its burden on the affirmative defense Burks v. United States and Colorado precedents such as People v. Paulsen and People v. Quintana bar retrial regardless of the instructional error.56 The court therefore disapproved the instruction but affirmed the judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity.57
Double jeopardy principles bar retrial on the sanity issue.58
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Vollack dissented on this issue. He argued that under the bifurcated trial system a sanity proceeding does not place the defendant in jeopardy because it does not risk a determination of guilt.59 Without a risk of conviction jeopardy never attaches and the prosecution may retry the sanity issue.60
Vollack would have overruled the court of appeals, disapproved the instruction, and remanded for a new sanity trial.61 He distinguished Burks because that case involved a non-bifurcated trial in which the jury could have returned a guilty verdict.62 Under Colorado's separate sanity phase the defendant faces no criminal punishment and therefore faces no double-jeopardy bar to retrial.63