663 A.2d 912, 920 (R.I. 1995)
Scott Kodanko was waiting for a bus at about 4:30 P.M. on a Saturday, after leaving work. He was alone in a three-sided plexiglass bus shelter open to the street in downtown Milwaukee.1 Two men, Mr. Moore and the defendant, entered the bus shelter while a third man, Mr. Levy, remained outside.2
Moore and the defendant stood one to two feet from the complainant. Moore asked the complainant if he wanted to buy some cigarettes. The complainant responded that he did not. Moore then said, "Give us some change." When the complainant refused, the defendant said "Give us some change, man." The defendant repeated this demand in an increasingly loud voice three to four times. The defendant then reached into his coat with his right hand at about the waist level, whereupon Moore stated something to the effect of "put that gun away." At that point Levy, who had been waiting outside the bus shelter, entered and said to the defendant and Moore "Come on, let’s go." Levy showed the complainant some money, stating, "I don’t want your money, I got lots of money."3
The three men left the bus shelter together and entered a restaurant across the street.4 A few minutes later Moore returned and made "small talk" with the complainant. The three men were arrested a short while later. It appears from the record that the complainant did not report the incident to the police. The record does not reveal who called the police.5 The complainant testified that he felt threatened throughout the encounter, which lasted less than three minutes. None of the men ever touched him or raised a hand to him, and at no time did he attempt to leave the shelter.6
In a bench trial, the circuit judge found the defendant guilty of attempted robbery. The circuit judge at first expressed doubt that the state had proved the elements of the charge because he believed the defendant’s abandonment of the criminal enterprise negated the intent necessary for attempted robbery. After the parties submitted briefs on this issue, the circuit judge found the defendant guilty.7 The court of appeals reversed the conviction in an unpublished decision filed on March 18, 1987, reversing a judgment entered by the circuit court for Milwaukee county, John F. Foley, circuit judge.8
Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit the crime of robbery?9
Intent may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, including his words and gestures taken in the context of the circumstances.10 The acts must establish that the accused intended to commit the substantive crime and must not be so few or of such an equivocal nature as to render doubtful the existence of the requisite criminal intent.11 Desistance raises a factual question relevant to the element of intent.12
Yes. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the circuit judge as trier of fact could reasonably find that the defendant’s repeated statement, 'Give us some change,' was not merely a request but a demand backed by threat of force.13 The setting in the bus shelter where Scott Kodanko was cornered by the defendant and Moore, with the defendant reaching into his coat at waist level prompting the statement 'put that gun away,' allowed the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant intended to frighten the complainant into handing over his change.14 The trier of fact did not have to accept the inference that the defendant was merely panhandling, and the evidence satisfies the first element of attempted robbery.15
The complainant testified that he felt threatened throughout the encounter, which lasted less than three minutes, and none of the men touched him, but the demands in an increasingly loud voice three to four times support the finding of intent to commit robbery.16
The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit the crime of robbery.17
Whether the attempt statute requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the intervention of another person or an extraneous factor aborted the commission of the crime?18
The attempt statute does not require the state to prove the existence of an extraneous factor as a third element of the crime of attempt.19 The statutory language necessitates a determination whether under all the circumstances it was too late for the person to have repented and withdrawn.20 The defendant’s conduct must pass that point where most men, holding such an intention as the defendant holds, would think better of their conduct and desist.21 The purpose of the language is to denote that the actor must have gone far enough toward completion of the crime to make it improbable that he would change his mind and desist.22
No. The court of appeals misinterpreted the statute by requiring proof that Levy's entering the bus shelter or the complainant's resistance actually aborted the crime.23 Instead, the focus is on whether the accused's acts demonstrate unequivocally that he formed the intent and would commit the crime except for intervention, even if no such intervention occurs.24 In this case, the defendant's conduct of demanding change repeatedly and reaching into his coat while in close proximity to Scott Kodanko in the plexiglass bus shelter showed that he had taken sufficient steps for his conduct to constitute an attempted robbery, as only a circumstance beyond his control would prevent the crime.25
The 'stop the film' test confirms that if the film were stopped just before Levy entered, the acts of demanding money and appearing to reach for a gun were directed toward robbery, satisfying the conduct element without proof of actual interruption.26
The attempt statute does not require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the intervention of another person or an extraneous factor aborted the commission of the crime.27
Whether voluntary abandonment after sufficient acts for an attempt but before consummation of the robbery provides a defense?28
Sec. 939.32(3) does not expressly make voluntary abandonment a defense.29 If the legislature had intended voluntary abandonment to be a defense, it would have expressly said so.30 The statute punishes individuals who have exhibited a dangerous propensity toward committing a crime because these individuals are as dangerous as a person who completes the crime contemplated.31 Recognition of the defense is better addressed to the legislature.32
No. Although the three men left the bus shelter together after Levy entered and entered a restaurant across the street, with Moore later returning to make small talk, the attempt was already complete when the defendant, with intent to commit robbery, took action by demanding the money and appearing to reach for a gun.33 The voluntary abandonment after the attempt was complete but before the crime of robbery was consummated does not excuse the defendant from criminal liability.34 The circuit judge correctly found the defendant guilty after considering briefs on the issue, and the court of appeals erred in reversing on that basis.35
Voluntary abandonment after sufficient acts for an attempt but before consummation of the robbery does not provide a defense.36