30 Cal. 3d 290, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279 (1981)
In the late night and early morning hours of January 2 and 3, 1979, defendant Robert Watson consumed large quantities of beer in a Redding bar.1 Approximately an hour and a half after leaving the bar, Watson drove through a red light on a Redding street.2 He avoided a collision with another car only by skidding to a halt in the middle of the intersection.3
After this near collision, Watson drove away at high speed, approached another intersection and struck a Toyota sedan, ejecting three passengers.4 The driver and her six-year-old daughter were killed.5 Watson left 112 feet of skid marks prior to impact and another 180 feet of skid marks to the vehicle's point of rest.6 The speed limit at the accident scene was 35 miles per hour.7
Expert testimony based on the skid marks and other physical evidence estimated Watson's speed immediately prior to applying his brakes at 84 miles per hour and approximately 70 miles per hour at point of impact.8 Eyewitness Henke testified that Watson's car passed him real fast shortly before the collision.9 Watson swerved from the slow lane into the fast lane, suddenly braked and skidded into the intersection.10 Watson's blood alcohol content one-half hour after the collision was .23 percent.11
The complaint charged Watson with two counts each of second degree murder and vehicular manslaughter.12 At the preliminary examination the magistrate found probable cause to charge Watson with vehicular manslaughter but refused to hold him to answer the second degree murder counts.13 Despite the magistrate's ruling the People included the two counts of second degree murder in the information.14 Watson's section 995 motion to dismiss the murder counts was granted by the superior court, and the People appealed from the order of dismissal.15
Whether the vehicular manslaughter statute precludes a charge of second degree murder arising from the same vehicular homicide?16
The Williamson preemption rule applies when each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute.17 It also applies when a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.18 Murder under section 187 requires a finding of malice while section 192 defines manslaughter as a killing without malice.19 Implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does gross negligence.20
No. The murder charge requires a finding of malice.21 The manslaughter statute defines the offense as a killing without malice.22 A violation of the vehicular manslaughter statute would not necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the murder statute because of the malice requirement.23 The degrees of awareness differ with implied malice contemplating a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk.24
The vehicular manslaughter statute does not preclude a charge of second degree murder arising from the same vehicular homicide.25
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Chief Justice Bird dissents from the majority's conclusion regarding preemption and implied malice.26 She argues that the majority ignores disputed facts such as Henke's testimony.27 Henke stated that Watson had a green light and was driving at 55 or 60 miles per hour.28
In her view the evidence does not support an act likely to kill.29 She further contends that the evidence of drinking does not establish conscious disregard for life at the time of the accident.30 The majority's approach would allow second degree murder charges in every case where a person drives to a bar, drinks, and is involved in a fatal accident.31
Justice Ibanez dissents arguing that the definitional boundary line separating gross negligence and implied malice is illusory.32 He notes that both require an awareness of the risk involved but differ in degree.33 The majority's distinction is inadequate as a guideline for making critical distinctions.34
He emphasizes that the legislative history shows the Legislature did not intend tandem charges of murder and vehicular manslaughter under facts such as those presented.35 The specific statute should preempt the general one according to the Williamson rule.36
Whether the facts presented at the preliminary examination support a finding of implied malice sufficient to charge second degree murder?37
Second degree murder based on implied malice occurs when a person does an act the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.38 The act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.39 Malice may be implied when defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life.40
Yes. Watson had consumed enough alcohol to raise his blood alcohol content to .23 percent.41 He drove at highly excessive speeds through city streets.42 Watson nearly collided with a vehicle after running a red light.43 He resumed his excessive speed before colliding with the victims' car.44 These facts reasonably support a conclusion that Watson acted wantonly and with a conscious disregard for human life.45
The facts presented at the preliminary examination support a finding of implied malice sufficient to charge second degree murder.46
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Bird dissents contending that the majority improperly ignores Henke's testimony.47 She states that speeding through a green light at 55 or 60 miles per hour is not an act likely to kill.48 She further argues that the evidence of drinking earlier does not establish conscious disregard for life at the time of the accident.49
The majority's reasoning will be used to establish second degree murder in every case in which a person drives a car to a bar, drinks, and is involved in a fatal accident.50 She concludes that the elements of implied malice have not been established.51
Whether the superior court properly granted the motion to dismiss the second degree murder counts for lack of probable cause?52
The determination of no probable cause based upon undisputed facts is a legal conclusion subject to independent review on appeal.53 The function on review is to determine whether a person of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion that defendant committed the crime charged.54
No. The facts of Watson's consumption of large quantities of beer provide a rational ground for concluding that his conduct was sufficiently wanton.55 Watson drove through a red light at high speed estimated at 84 miles per hour.56 He had a blood alcohol content of .23 percent.57 The fatal collision occurred after he resumed excessive speed.58 The superior court therefore erred in granting the motion to dismiss.59
The superior court did not properly grant the motion to dismiss the second degree murder counts for lack of probable cause.60
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ibanez dissents agreeing with Chief Justice Bird.61 He adds that the evidence failed to establish reasonable or probable cause that murder was committed.62 He argues that the specific statute preempts the general statute under the Williamson rule.63
He concludes that the legislative history demonstrates the Legislature did not intend such tandem charges as have been approved by the majority.64 The definitional classification of the offenses compels the conclusion that tandem charges are not permitted.65