416 U.S. 363 (1974)
In May 1971, petitioner Dave Pernell entered into a lease agreement with respondent Southall Realty for the rental of a house in the District of Columbia.1 In July 1971, Southall filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia seeking to evict Pernell from the premises for alleged nonpayment of rent under D.C. Code §§ 16-1501 through 16-1505.2
In his answer, Pernell denied that rent was owing.3 He asserted that Southall maintained the premises in an unsafe, unhealthy, and unsanitary condition in violation of the housing regulations of the District of Columbia.4 Pernell alleged that Southall breached an agreement to waive several months’ rent in exchange for Pernell’s making specific improvements on the property.5 He also claimed a setoff of $389.60 for repairs made to bring the premises into partial compliance with the District’s housing regulations and a counterclaim of $75 for back rent paid.6 Pernell requested a trial by jury.7
The trial judge struck the jury demand, tried the case himself, and entered judgment for Southall.8 Pernell appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, claiming that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to trial by jury in all cases brought under § 16-1501 and, alternatively, that he was entitled to a jury trial in this case by virtue of the counterclaim and setoff specified in his answer.9
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that jury trials are not guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment in landlord-tenant cases predicated on nonpayment of rent or some other breach of the lease where the only remedy sought is repossession of the rented premises. The court also held that if Pernell wished to litigate his counterclaim for damages before a jury, he should have instituted a separate action rather than raise the counterclaim in the landlord’s action for repossession.10 Because of the novel nature of the Seventh Amendment question, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Although the statutory cause of action now codified in § 16-1501 dates back to 1864, prior to 1970 D.C. Code § 13-702 preserved the right to jury trial in all actions for the recovery of possession of real property.12 Section 13-702 was repealed by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.13 After the repeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the right to jury trial had to stand on constitutional ground if it were to stand at all.14
Whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in an action brought in the District of Columbia for the recovery of possession of real property?15
The Seventh Amendment provides that in suits at common law where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.16 This right extends to actions involving legal rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in actions at law, rather than equity or admiralty, including actions to recover possession of real property that serve the same essential function as the common-law ejectment action in which jury trial was afforded.17
Yes. In May 1971 petitioner Dave Pernell entered into a lease agreement with respondent Southall Realty for the rental of a house in the District of Columbia. In July 1971 Southall filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia seeking to evict Pernell from the premises for alleged nonpayment of rent under D.C. Code §§ 16-1501 through 16-1505. In his answer, Pernell denied that rent was owing. He asserted that Southall maintained the premises in an unsafe, unhealthy, and unsanitary condition in violation of the housing regulations of the District of Columbia. Pernell alleged that Southall breached an agreement to waive several months’ rent in exchange for Pernell’s making specific improvements on the property. He also claimed a setoff of $389.60 for repairs made to bring the premises into partial compliance with the District’s housing regulations and a counterclaim of $75 for back rent paid. Pernell requested a trial by jury.
The trial judge struck the jury demand, tried the case himself, and entered judgment for Southall. Pernell appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals claiming that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to trial by jury in all cases brought under § 16-1501.18 The Court of Appeals affirmed holding that jury trials are not guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment in landlord-tenant cases where the only remedy sought is repossession of the rented premises.19
Because of the novel nature of the Seventh Amendment question the Supreme Court granted certiorari.20 The proceeding established by § 16-1501 serves the same essential function as the common-law action of ejectment.21 Since the right to recover possession of real property governed by § 16-1501 was a right ascertained and protected by courts at common law, the Seventh Amendment preserves to either party the right to trial by jury.22
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in an action brought in the District of Columbia for the recovery of possession of real property.23