475 U.S. 767 (1986)
Maurice S. Hepps served as the principal stockholder of General Programming, Inc. (GPI).1 GPI franchised a chain of Thrifty stores selling beer, soft drinks, and snacks.2 Hepps, the corporation, and several franchisees brought a defamation action in Pennsylvania state court against Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., owner of the Philadelphia Inquirer, and reporters William Ecenbarger and William Lambert.3
Between May 1975 and May 1976 the Inquirer published five articles.4 The articles stated that Hepps and the Thrifty chain maintained links to organized crime.5 They claimed those links allowed influence over a state legislator described as a convicted felon.6 The stories reported that federal investigators had uncovered connections between Thrifty and underworld figures.7 They also stated that Thrifty had obtained competitive advantages through State Liquor Control Board rulings and that a grand jury was examining whether the chain received special treatment from the Governor's administration.8
At trial Hepps testified at length that the statements were false.9 He cross-examined the articles' authors on their accuracy.10 The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity and instructed the jury accordingly.11 The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.12
The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.13 That court held that the burden of proving truth remained with the defendants and remanded the case for a new trial.14 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.15
Whether a private-figure plaintiff must prove the falsity of allegedly defamatory statements published by a media defendant concerning matters of public concern?16
The First Amendment requires a private-figure plaintiff to bear the burden of proving falsity before recovering damages for defamation from a media defendant when the speech involves matters of public concern.17
Yes. The articles addressed links between Hepps, the Thrifty chain, and organized crime, along with influence over state legislative and administrative processes.18 These topics qualify as speech of public concern.19 Hepps functioned as a private figure in his role as principal stockholder of a franchise operation.
The common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand in this configuration because the allocation of the burden of proof determines liability for speech that is unknowably true or false.20 Placing the burden on the plaintiff protects true speech from self-censorship while the requirement of fault already limits recovery.21 The trial court correctly assigned the burden to Hepps and the other plaintiffs when it instructed the jury.22 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's contrary ruling must therefore be reversed.23
A private-figure plaintiff must prove the falsity of allegedly defamatory statements published by a media defendant concerning matters of public concern.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion because where allegedly defamatory speech is of public concern the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff whether public official public figure or private individual prove the statements at issue to be false.25 He wrote separately only to note that while the Court reserves the question whether the rule it announces applies to nonmedia defendants he adheres to his view that such a distinction is irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source whether corporation association union or individual.26
Joined by Chief Justice, Justice White, And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens joined by the Chief Justice Justice White and Justice Rehnquist dissented.27 He argued that the decision undervalues the state's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.28 Stevens contended that the ruling gives publishers who act with fault an absolute license to defame when statements cannot be proven true or false.29
The antecedent fault determination already ensures that a significant portion of the affected speech lies beyond constitutional protection.30 In his view the common-law burden on the defendant should remain for private-figure plaintiffs.31 Stevens emphasized that the state interest in preventing and redressing injuries to reputation is obviously important reflecting the essential dignity and worth of every human being.32
He noted that deliberate or inadvertent libels contribute little to the marketplace of ideas and that when the publisher is at fault society's need for judicial redress is at its zenith.33 The Court's approach by attaching little weight to the strong state interest provides unwarranted protection for malicious gossip.34