556 U.S. 178 (2009)
Jesse Williams, a heavy smoker of Marlboro cigarettes, died from smoking-related causes. His widow, representing his estate as respondent, brought a state-court action for negligence and deceit against Philip Morris, the manufacturer.1
The jury found that Williams's death was caused by smoking, that he smoked in significant part because Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe it was safe, and that Philip Morris was negligent and had engaged in deceit. It awarded approximately $821,000 in compensatory damages, consisting of about $21,000 economic and $800,000 noneconomic, together with $79.5 million in punitive damages.2
The trial judge found the punitive award excessive and reduced it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Philip Morris's arguments and restored the original $79.5 million jury award. After the Supreme Court remanded in light of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Oregon Court of Appeals adhered to its original views, and the Oregon Supreme Court granted review.3
In closing argument the plaintiff's attorney told the jury to consider how many other Oregon smokers Philip Morris's conduct had harmed. The argument referenced ten deaths per hundred smokers and Philip Morris's one-third market share.4 Philip Morris requested an instruction stating that the jury could consider harm to others in determining the reasonable relationship between the award and harm to Williams. The request added that the jury could not punish the defendant for the impact of its misconduct on nonparties who might bring their own lawsuits.5 The trial court rejected the proposed instruction and instead told the jury that punitive damages punish and deter misconduct and are not intended to compensate anyone.6
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected Philip Morris's claims that the Constitution prohibits punishing a defendant for harm to nonparties and that the roughly 100-to-1 ratio made the award grossly excessive.7 Philip Morris petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted limited to the questions of punishment for nonparty harm and the required relationship to the plaintiff's harm.8
Whether the Due Process Clause permits a jury to base a punitive damages award in part upon its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court?9
The Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent.10
No. The Due Process Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual with an opportunity to present every available defense.11 In the present case the jury heard closing argument directing it to consider how many other Oregon smokers Philip Morris had harmed through references to ten deaths per hundred smokers and the company's one-third market share.12 The trial court rejected the requested instruction that would have permitted consideration of harm to others only for the reasonable-relationship inquiry while barring punishment for nonparty impact.13 The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the award after concluding that the jury could consider such harm.14
This procedure created an unreasonable risk that the jury punished Philip Morris for injuries to strangers to the litigation rather than solely for the reprehensibility of its conduct toward Jesse Williams.15
The Due Process Clause does not permit a jury to base a punitive damages award in part upon its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissents because the Court's imposition of a novel limit on the State's power to impose punishment in civil litigation is unwarranted.17 He maintains that punitive damages serve as a sanction for the public harm the defendant's conduct has caused or threatened.18 He adds that harm to third parties remains a relevant factor when evaluating the reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongdoing.19
In his view the Oregon Supreme Court faithfully applied prior precedent to the egregious facts of this record.20 He would affirm the judgment.21
Justice Thomas joins Justice Ginsburg's dissent in full.22 He writes separately to reiterate his view that the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.23 He observes that it matters not that the Court styles today's holding as procedural because the procedural rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages.24
He concludes that today's opinion proves once again that this Court's punitive damages jurisprudence is insusceptible of principled application.25
Joined by Justice Scalia And Justice Thomas
Justice Ginsburg dissents on the basis that the Oregon courts followed the decisions in BMW and State Farm and did not deprive the jury of proper legal guidance.26 She notes that Philip Morris preserved no objection to the charges actually delivered, the evidence introduced, or opposing counsel's argument.27 She adds that the proposed instruction was itself confusing as to the permissible use of harm to others.28
She would affirm the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court.29