328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1946)
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton are brothers who lived a short distance from each other on Daniel's farm.1 They were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. The indictment contained ten substantive counts and one conspiracy count.2
The jury found Walter guilty on nine of the substantive counts and on the conspiracy count. It found Daniel guilty on six of the substantive counts and on the conspiracy count.3 Walter was fined $500 and sentenced generally on the substantive counts to imprisonment for thirty months. On the conspiracy count he was given a two year sentence to run concurrently with the other sentence. Daniel was fined $1,000 and sentenced generally on the substantive counts to imprisonment for thirty months. On the conspiracy count he was fined $500 and given a two year sentence to run concurrently with the other sentence.4
The judgments of conviction were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because one of the questions presented involved a conflict between the decision below and United States v. Sall, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.6
A single conspiracy was charged and proved. Some of the overt acts charged in the conspiracy count were the same acts charged in the substantive counts.7 Each of the substantive offenses found was committed pursuant to the conspiracy.89 There is no evidence to show that Daniel participated directly in the commission of the substantive offenses on which his conviction has been sustained.10 There was evidence to show that these substantive offenses were in fact committed by Walter in furtherance of the unlawful agreement or conspiracy existing between the brothers.11 Daniel in fact was in the penitentiary, under sentence for other crimes, when some of Walter’s crimes were done.12 The indictment was filed after a prior one for conspiracy alone had been dismissed following reversal on appeal.13
Whether the substantive offenses merged in the conspiracy count?14
The commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses. The power of Congress to separate the two and to affix to each a different penalty is well established.15 A conviction for the conspiracy may be had though the substantive offense was completed.16 The plea of double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both offenses.17 It is only an identity of offenses which is fatal.18
No. The established facts demonstrate that a single conspiracy was charged and proved.19 Some of the overt acts charged in the conspiracy count were the same acts charged in the substantive counts. Each of the substantive offenses found was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. The rule treats these as distinct because a conspiracy is a partnership in crime with ingredients as well as implications distinct from the completion of the unlawful project. The facts further establish that the brothers received separate sentences on the substantive counts and the conspiracy count with the judgments affirmed below.20 The court therefore rejects merger and permits cumulative punishment under the distinct statutory provisions.21
The facts also show that the indictment contained ten substantive counts and one conspiracy count with the jury returning guilty verdicts on multiple substantive counts against each brother in addition to the conspiracy count.22 This structure confirms that Congress exercised its authority to define and punish the offenses separately rather than treating the substantive violations as merged into the single conspiracy agreement.23
The substantive offenses did not merge in the conspiracy count and separate convictions and sentences were permissible.24
Whether participation in a conspiracy alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction for substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy?25
So long as the partnership in crime continues the partners act for each other in carrying it forward.26 An overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act.27 The governing principle is the same when the substantive offense is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful project.28 The criminal intent to do the act is established by the formation of the conspiracy.29 Each conspirator instigated the commission of the crime.30 The unlawful agreement contemplated precisely what was done.31
Yes. The established facts show there is no evidence that Daniel participated directly in the commission of the substantive offenses on which his conviction has been sustained.32 There was evidence to show that these substantive offenses were in fact committed by Walter in furtherance of the unlawful agreement or conspiracy existing between the brothers. The rule attributes responsibility because the brothers formed a continuous conspiracy with no evidence of affirmative action by Daniel to withdraw. The facts establish that the substantive offenses were committed pursuant to the conspiracy and therefore fall within the scope of the unlawful project.33
The established facts further indicate that Daniel and Walter are brothers who lived a short distance from each other on Daniel's farm.34 The jury found both guilty on the conspiracy count after evidence of their confederation over several years to commit similar crimes concerning unlawful possession, transportation, and dealing in whiskey in fraud of the federal revenues.35 Under the rule the act of one conspirator done in furtherance is attributable to the other so long as the partnership continues.36
Participation in the conspiracy alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the substantive offenses committed by the co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.37
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rutledge dissented from the holding that conspiracy participation alone supports substantive liability.38 He argued that the ruling violates both the letter and the spirit of what Congress did when it separately defined the three classes of crime.39 The established facts showed Daniel was in the penitentiary when some of Walter's crimes occurred.40 There was no evidence that Daniel participated in, aided, or even knew of the specific substantive offenses.41
Rutledge viewed the conviction as either attributing Walter's guilt to Daniel or punishing Daniel twice for the agreement itself.42 He urged adherence to United States v. Sall and warned that the decision expands vicarious criminal responsibility beyond proper bounds in the criminal field where guilt remains personal rather than vicarious.43
Whether there was sufficient evidence to implicate Daniel Pinkerton in the conspiracy?44
A conspiracy is a partnership in crime.45 Motive or intent may be proved by the acts or declarations of some of the conspirators in furtherance of the common objective.46 There is enough evidence for submission of the issue to the jury when the record shows a continuous conspiracy between the brothers.47
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Walter and Daniel Pinkerton are brothers who lived a short distance from each other on Daniel's farm.48 They were indicted together for violations of the Internal Revenue Code involving a single conspiracy that was charged and proved.49 The jury found Daniel guilty on the conspiracy count along with six substantive counts after evidence showed the brothers had confederated over several years to commit similar crimes of unlawful whiskey dealing in fraud of federal revenues.50 The facts further establish that the judgments were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and that certiorari was granted in part because of a conflict with United States v. Sall.51
The established facts also note that the indictment was filed after a prior conspiracy indictment had been dismissed following reversal on appeal.52 Yet the evidence of the ongoing agreement between the brothers supported submission to the jury on the conspiracy count.53
There was sufficient evidence to implicate Daniel Pinkerton in the conspiracy and to submit the issue to the jury.54